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ABSTRACT
GETTING TO DEATH: ARE EXECUTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL?
This Article addresses the question of when a method of executing a
capital defendant amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has never reviewed
evidence concerning whether any particular execution method is
unconstitutional and has rarely even broached the issue. However, the
Court's stance is changing. In 1993, three Supreme Court Justices invited
litigation concerning the constitutionality of electrocution in light of
modern evidence of electrocution's effects on the human body. Moreover,
the Court may have the opportunity to examine the execution method
question as a result of Fierro v. Gomz the Ninth Circuit's recent and
unprecedented decision holding that execution by lethal gas amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment.
This Article contends that Fierro and other execution methods cases,
while reaching the right result, fail to provide a sufficiently comprehensive
Eighth Amendment standard for determining the constitutionality of any
execution method. The Article proposes a test that better comports with
the Court's Eighth Amendment case law and more appropriately considers
scientific determinations of excessive pain. To apply this test, the Article
studies each state's legislative changes in execution methods during the
Twentieth Century as well as accounts of "botched" executions. The Article
suggests that the two most prevalent methods of execution-lethal inject-
ion and electrocution-are unconstitutional The Article concludes that
this country's historic failure to question the constitutionality of execution
methods has often been motivated solely by legislatures' and courts' desires
to perpetuate the death penalty. This motivation distorts the "death is
different' principle as well as any rational philosophy of punishment
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has never reviewed evidence
concerning whether any method of execution violates the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.2 Indeed, the Court
has rarely even broached the issue.5 In striking contrast to its treatment of
1. Currently, there are five available methods of execution in the United States:
hanging, firing squad, electrocution, lethal gas, and lethal injection. See infra app. 1, tbl. 1.
2. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." US. Const. amend.
VilL
3. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir.) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court
has rarely... addressed whether particular methods of execution employed in this country
are unconstitutionally cruel."), cert. dni4ed 511 U.S. 1119 (1994); Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F.
Supp. 1387, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("The Supreme Court has rarely addressed the question of
whether a specific mode of execution violates the eighth amendment."), affd, 77 F.3d 301,
309 (9th Cir.) (holding that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
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executions, the Court has made more expansive use of the Clause to guard
against "cruel and unusual" prison conditions.4 This incongruity between
the Court's execution and prison conditions jurisprudence is especially
curious in light of the Eighth Amendment's original purpose-to proscribe
"torturous" and "barbarous" punishments, the penalties most commonly
associated with executions
Such disparate restraints on capital and noncapital punishments are
not specific to execution devices nor to the differing standards of review
applicable to legislatures and prison personnel under the Eighth
Amendment. More generally, the disparity reflects the Court's failure to
heed its principle that "death is different" from all other punishments and
therefore requires greater scrutiny!
The Court first enunciated the death is different principle in Furman
v. Geoiia.7  Furman emphasized that death-"an unusually severe
ment), vacated on other groun. 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light
of changed statute). In Wikeon v. Utah, 99 US. 130 (1878), the Court concluded in dicta
that shooting Is not a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment See id. at
135. However, the Court never reviewed evidence on the cruelty of shooting; nor was the issue
ever raised by the plaintiff who was protesting the application of a Utah statute authorizing
the death penalty for first degree murder. The plaintiff claimed that because the method of
execution was not specified by the statute, the trial court was not authorized to pass a
sentence of death stating that the plaintiff be publicly shot. See i&. at 131.
4. See infra Part LC (discussing the recent prison conditions cases). There is no sign that
the Court will impose substantial Eighth Amendment restrictions on prison conditions cases
In the future. In Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995), for example, a divided (5-4) Court
restricted prisoners' constitutional challenges of prison officials' actions, holding that the
"liberty" interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment exclude what the Court
considered to be "within the range of confinement to be normally expected" for the type of
sentence the prisoner was serving. Id. at 2302. Yet, the Sandin Court did not alter the Court's
approach to prisoners' complaints under the Eighth Amendment, noting that the Eighth
Amendment could be invoked "where appropriate." I& at 2302 n.11.
5. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (describing the manifestly cruel
punishments of burning at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel); Wi rson, 99
U.S. at 135 (emphasizing the particularly cruel punishments of embowelling or burning alive,
beheading, quartering, and public dissection); see also California First Amendment Coalition v.
Calderon, 956 F. Supp. 883, 886 (ND. Cal. 1997) ("Executions are fundamentally different
from the everyday workings of the prison system."); infra text accompanying notes 37-39
(listing several egregious forms of capital punishment). See generally Deborah W. Denno, Is
Eletrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineering of Death over the Centuy, 35
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 551 (1994) (providing an Eighth Amendment analysis of electrocution).
6. See generaly Hugo Adam Bedau, Death Is Different: Studies In The Morality, Law, And
Politics Of Capital Punishment (1987); The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies
(Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997); Roger Hood, The Death Penalty. A World-Wide Perspective
(1996); Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty In The Nineties: An Examination Of The Modern
System Of Capital Punishment (1991); Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital
Cases by State High Courts After Gregg- Ony "theAppearance ofJustice?'t 87J. Crim. L & Criminol-
ogy 130 (1996); Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second 77Toughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment 109 Narv. L. Rev. 355 (1995).
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Funnan established that all existing death penalty
statutes were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because they were being applied
arbitrarily and inconsistently. See ag., id. at 248-49 (Douglas, J., concurring). It is not dear if
1997]
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punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity"s-
required heightened procedural safeguards to predude its cruel and
unusual application.9 More recently, the Court has twisted the purpose of
death is different to such an extent that the doctrine now represents the
ultimate irony. Death often triggers fewer safeguards in certain
circumstances than lesser forms of punishment' °
This Artide examines the distortion of the death is different principle
in the context of one of the Eighth Amendment's original goals-
safeguarding states' selection and use of execution methods." Because
the Court has not analyzed this issue thoroughly nor established a
doctrinal framework for it,5 this Article proposes an execution methods
there is an actual holding in Furman because each Justice wrote a separate opinion. See Robert
Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305, 314-15 (1984) (arguing that "what Furman
condemned is not very clear"; it may have overruled McGautha, or it may "be merely an
exhortation to the states to solve a problem the Court could barely identiW). Five justices
filed separate supporting opinions, which posit two positions. Justices Brennan and Marshall
contended that any method of capital punishment violated the Eighth and the Fourteenth
Amendments. SeeFurman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan,J., concurring); iU! at 364-66 (MarshallJ.,
concurring). Rejecting this per se position, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White stated that
existing capital punishment statutes were deficient in their form. Id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring). They
claimed that the statutes allowed decisionmakers to have unbridled discretion that resulted in
"wanton" or "freakish" capital sentencing patterns. See id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring);
iU at 313-14 (White, J., concurring). ChiefJustice Burger, andJustices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist, filed separate dissenting opinions. See id. at 375-470.
8. Furman, 408 US. at 287-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Steikers appropriately note
that althoughJustice Brennan "singlehandedly constructed" the death is different argument in
his solo concurrence in Furman, the "now-familiar" principle was highlighted by a plurality of
the Court four years later in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality
opinion), "in language that would be repeated many times in future cases." Steiker & Steiker,
supra note 6, at 370. See, eg., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (recognizing
that the "qualitative difference of death from other punishments requires a correspondingly
greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination").
9. The death is different principle has provided the foundation for the Court's creation
of two requirements to monitor the constitutionally valid application of the death penalty.
The first requirement, presented in Furman, stated that a capital sentence must not result
from unguided discretion. SeeFurman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas,J., concurring); id. at 274-
97 (Brennan, J., concurring). The second requirement, presented after Furman, mandated a
consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence, such as the defendant's character, record, or
other circumstances of the offense, to enable individualized sentencing. Se Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion) (arguing that courts must consider mitigating
factors); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 6, at 370-71, 397-403 (reviewing the Court's
death is different case law).
10. SeeWhite, supra note 6, at 4-79; Daniel Ross Harris, Capital Sentencing AfLer Walton v.
Arizona: A Retreat From the 'Veath isDiferent'Docine, 40 Am. U. L Rev. 1389, 1389-92 (1991)
(discussing the problems associated with the death is different doctrine); see aso Deborah W.
Denno, 'Death is Different' and Other Twits of Fate, 83 J. Crim. L & Criminology 437, 437.59
(1992) (reviewing Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in The Nineties: An Examination of the
Modem System of Capital Punishment (1991)).
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Amendment's original
goal of proscribing punishments associated with executions).
12. SeeFlerro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1409 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("In none of [the
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test that comports with the broader Eighth Amendment case law and
restores the true meaning of death is different.
Recent decisions may force the Court to confront an Eighth
Amendment evaluation of different execution methods. In 1993, three
Supreme CourtJustices invited litigation concerning the constitutionality of
electrocution, concluding that century-old precedent is not dispositive in
light of modem evidence of electrocution's effects on the human body1 3
One year later, in Campbell v. Wood, 4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that execution by hanging does not violate the Eighth Amendment; 5
however, the court's 6-5 en banc opinion pertained only to the State of
Washington's particular method of hanging and the limited evidence
available on how it specifically operated.'6 Moreover, in Firrm v. Gomet, '7
the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that California's statute authorizing
execution by lethal gas is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. s Fierro
marked the first time in this country's history that a federal appeals court
has held any method of execution unconstitutional.'9 The ruling also
enables the Court to address the constitutionality of an execution method
at some future point should the Court decide to review the Ninth Circuit's
Court's execution method cases] did the Court analyze the issue at length nor set forth a
framework for making [Eighth Amendment] determinations."), affd, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th
Cir.) (holding that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punishment), vacated
on other grounds 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of changed
statute).
13. See Poyner v. Murray, 508 US. 931, 931-33 (1993) (dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Justices Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens commented on a denial of Syvasky
Poyner's petition for writ of certiorari. See id, For a discussion of the effects of electrocution
on the human body, see Denno, supra note 5, at 624-53 (evaluating the constitutionality of
electrocution in terms of the mechanics of its use, the available empirical and eyewitness
descriptions of its application, and the evidence of its infliction of pain and mutilation).
14. 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), er. dmnied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).
15. See id. at 687.
16. See id. at 683-87. The Campbel majority's decision prompted a lengthy response from
four members of the circuit court, see id. at 692 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), in addition to Justice Blackmun's heated dissent in the Court's denial of
Campbell's petition for writ of certiorari. See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Perhaps in light of these conflicts, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington determined several
months later that hanging was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual when the condemned's
excessive body weight heightened the risk of decapitation. See Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp.
1307,1314-15 (W.D. Wash. 1994), vacated on other grounds as moot, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Car. 1996)
(appeal dismissed as moot in light of changed statute).
17. 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds 117 S. Ct 285 (1996) (remanding for
reconsideration in light of changed statute).
18. Seeid at309.
19. See id, at 308 (stating that two circuit courts have found execution by lethal gas to be
constitutional). Notably, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rendered unconstitu-
tional a prosecutor's unsupported dosing argument suggesting that the defendant's death by
lethal gas would be "quick, painless, and humane." Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1361 (8th
CAr. 1995). The court emphasized that "[t]he reality, as we understand it, is or at least may be
quite different." Id.
[1997]
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decision concerning lethal gas.20
Part I of this Article discusses the major types of Eighth Amendment
claims and the early execution methods jurisprudence. This background
frames an analysis of the 1994-1997 execution methods cases and their
failure to develop a sufficiently comprehensive Eighth Amendment test.
Part I also surveys the Court's relatively more expansive approach to prison
conditions cases to show that an Eighth Amendment test of execution
methods requires examining the behavior of prison officials, as well as the
decisions of legislatures and courts.
Part II introduces a five-factor execution methods test that, unlike
prior tests, incorporates the multifaceted legal and factual issues pertinent
for assessing any execution method. Part II focuses on the most widely
used methods-electrocution and lethal injection.
Applying the first two factors of the execution methods test ("humane
baseline" and "excessiveness") to electrocution, Part II suggests that
electrocution may be unconstitutionally excessive in terms of its"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," the risk of pain, and the loss
of human dignity. Part II bases this conclusion on scientific determinations
of pain and this Article's account of a selected number of "botched" execu-
tions. To determine if electrocution and other methods comport with the
test's third factor, "standards of decency," Part II conducts an extensive
study of each state's legislative changes in execution methods during the
Twentieth Century. This study reveals a national consensus opposing the
use of electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, and the firing squad. The study
also shows that most states have switched to lethal injection. Application of
the test's fourth factor, "alternative methods of execution," demonstrates
that lethal injection is not a constitutionally feasible alternative to electro-
cution given the growing evidence of medical difficulties, botched
injections, and physicians' criticisms. Lastly, Part II examines lethal
injection, electrocution, and other methods according to the test's fifth
factor, "the penological justification for punishment." The Article contends
that states that either change or retain an execution method are often
20. The Supreme Court recently vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in light of the
California legislature's subsequent amendment of the state's death penalty statute allowing
lethal injection to be used unless the defendant specifically requested lethal gas. See Gomez v.
Fierro, 117 S. Ct. 285 (remanding for reconsideration in light of changed statute), vacating on
other groun 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996). The issue on remand will not be the merits of the
Ninth Circuit's decision regarding lethal gas, but rather whether the defendants have standing
to question the constitutionality of their executions under the changed statute. Telephone
Interviews with Michael Laurence, Partner, Sternberg, Sowards & Laurence, Attorney for De-
fendants (Oct. 21, 1996; April 24, 1997). California has also encountered challenges to its
method of administering lethal injection because prison officials have prohibited witnesses
from viewing the entire execution procedure. Recently, for example, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California held that the First Amendment requires prison
officials to allow the public and the media to witness a lethal injection from the moment
preceding a prisoner's strap down to a gurney until just after the prisoner's death. So
California First Amendment Coalition v. Calderon, 956 F. Supp. 883, 890 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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motivated solely by legislatures' and courts' desires to perpetuate the death
penalty. This motivation distorts the death is different principle as well as
any rational philosophy of punishment.
This Article concludes that the death is different principle has
ensured less, not more, scrutiny of execution methods, particularly as
compared to prison conditions. Various factors fuel this counterintuitive
result. First, this Article suggests that if the Court conducted a comprehen-
sive and balanced Eighth Amendment review of execution methods, the
Court might decide that no current method could ever be enforced
humanely and that the death penalty would once again be open to
critique. Rather than face another constitutional assault on its oversight of
this most final punishment, the Court has continued to dodge the issue.
Second, the Court lacks a coherent constitutional standard for assessing
pain. Although the gratuitous infliction of pain is definitely impermissible,
far less dear is the constitutionally allowable amount of pain that can exist
for an execution and the penological theory that might justify such pain.
For this reason, the lower courts generally avoid evaluating the wide range
of medical and scientific evidence available on execution methods. From
both a constitutional and scientific standpoint, they find such evidence
difficult to comprehend. Lastly, courts frequently deflect emotionally and
morally laden subjects such as the death penalty. With regard to the
spedfic context of implementing an execution method, courts have chosen
several paths-shunning the issue entirely, relying on ill-conceived Eighth
Amendment standards, and deferring to state legislatures that have
repeatedly failed to fulfill courts' expectations.
By introducing and applying an execution methods test, this Article
attempts to revive the Eighth Amendment's original purpose and the true
meaning of death is different. It suggests that because the most frequently
used execution methods are constitutionally suspect, legislatures should
either seek a method of execution that comports with the standards of a
comprehensive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence or eliminate the death
penalty. Justices Powell and Blackmun ultimately concluded that the death
penalty should be abolished because the punishment could never be
administered fairly or meaningfully under any set of rules.2' I agree with
21. For a discussion of Justice Powell's views, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. 451-52 (1994) (stating that "capital punishment should be abolished" because,
among other things, it "serves no useful purpose" and "brings discredit on the whole legal
system, that the sentence upheld by the Supreme Court and adopted by more than thirty
states can't be or isn't carried out"). For an overview ofJustice Blackmun's views, see Calins v.
Collins, 510 US. 1141, 1158-59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Because I no longer can
state with confidence that this Court is able to reconcile the Eighth Amendment's competing
constitutional commands..., I believe that the death penalty, as currently administered, is
unconstitutional."). See generaly David Von Drehle, Among The Lowest of the Dead. The
Culture of Death Row 412 (1995) (notingJustices Powell's and Blackmun's "conversions" in
the Supreme Coures death penalty cases); David C. Baldus et al., Refljtions on the "Inevitabiliy'
of Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Irpossibility" of its Prevention Dtection, and
Correction, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 359 (1994) (discounting claims that scrutiny of the death
[1997]
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their views. This Article suggests that evidence of the unconstitutional
application of execution methods is simply one more indication of the
legal system's ongoing incompetence in the capital punishment arena.
I. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
When the United States Constitution was being ratified, criticism of its
failure to provide protection for convicted criminals spurred the inclusion
of the Eighth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.23 "[P]recisely because the
legislature would otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe
punishments for crimes," the Framers included in the Bill of Rights a
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.2 4 Although the Framers
did not define what they considered to be "crue "r or "unusual,2 6 there
sentencing system will result in de facto abolition of the death penalty). Justices Brennan's
and Marshall's statements would favor elimination because both declared that the death
penalty, in general, and electrocution and lethal gas, in particular, were cruel and unusual
punishments. See supra note 7 and accompanying text and infta notes 108-10, 287 and accom-
panying text. See generally Alan L Bigel, Justicas Wlliamj. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall on
Capital Punishment: Its Constitutionality, Morality, Deterrent Effect, and Interretation by the Couvt 8
Notre Dame J.L Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 13 (1994) (providing a thorough account and
comparison of the Justices' views); William J. Brennan, Jr., The 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Lectu. Constitutional Adjudication and The Death Penalty: A View From the Cour, 100 Harv. L
Rev. 313 (1986) (presentingJustice Brennan's views on the Court's death penalty cases).
22. The origin of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has
been described in detail. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 973-79 (1991); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Raoul Berger, Death
Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course 29-58 (1982); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor
Cmuel and Unusual Punishments Infllcted.: The Original Meaning 57 Cal. L Rev. 839, 839-65
(1969) (examining the history of the Clause and the case law). This section concerns how the
Clause has been interpreted in Eighth Amendment cases.
23. See Ingrahamv. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977) (noting that criticism of the original
Constitution in the Massachusetts and Virginia Conventions "provided the impetus" for
including the Eighth Amendment in the Bill of Rights).
24. Furman, 408 U.S. at 263 (Brennan,J., concurring).
25. See, &g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (noting that "[t]he
provision received very little debate in Congress").
26. This Article does not focus on the issue of what constitutes an "unusual" punishment
or how that term relates to the word "crueL" In Furman Justice Brennan suggested that the
distinction was of "minor significance" because the Court did not try to interpret the meaning
of the Clause by examining each word. Furman, 408 U.S. at 276 n.20 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Anthony Granucd contends that the final phrasing of the Clause, particularly the
use of the word "unusual," was due to "chance and sloppy draftsmanship," since other terms,
such as "illegal," had been considered. See Granucd, supra note 22, at 855. Infliction of an
"illegal" punishment could be cruel because its severity would be less known and predictable,
and therefore arbitrary. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 318 (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding
that the use of the word "unusual" appears to be inadvertent). In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957 (1991), the Court considered as "unusual" that which "[does not] occu[r] in
ordinary practice." Id. at 976 (citation omitted); see also John Hart Ely, Democracy And
Distrust: A Theory Of Judicial Review 14 (1980) (referring to "unusual" as "susceptible to
sporadic imposition"). The Court appears to have relied on this interpretation in the few cases
that have discussed the concept of unusualness. Se, &g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 n.32
(1958) (noting that although it was unclear whether the word "unusual" had any different
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is no evidence to suggest the Framers intended to ban only torture or
punishments viewed as cruel and unusual at the time!,
Such vagueness may have contributed in part to the Clause's initial
dormancy.28 A similarly important factor may have been the Court's
determination in 1890 that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the
states.? Indeed, prior to its 1962 incorporation into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth AmendmentP° the Clause was discussed in only
nine Supreme Court cases."' Only in the last three decades has the Court
meaning apart from the word "cruel," if it did, "unusual" should take on its ordinary meaning,
i.e., signify something different from what is normally done); Weems, 217 U.S. at 377
(concluding that the punishment of cadena temporal - which consisted of 12-to-20 years in
prison, as well as "hard and painful" labor, the loss of various civil rights, and surveillance for
life - was both "cruel in its excess of imprisonment" and "unusual in its character" for it had
"no fellow in American legislation").
27. SeeFurman, 408 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J., concurring); Hugo A. Bedau, Thinking of The
Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 873, 892-97 (1985).
28. See Margaret J. Radin, T7e Judrepmdence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 989, 997 (1978).
29. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 445 (1890). Several years prior to Kmmler, the Court
held that two other amendments were not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment: the
Second Amendment, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), and the guarantee of a
grand jury provision of the Fifth Amendment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535
(1884). Nearly three decades later, the Court held that the Seventh Amendment was not
Incorporated. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 220 (1916). The
issue concerning the incorporation of the Third Amendment has not been litigated before
the Supreme Court. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Modem Constitutional Law- Cases and Notes 358
(4th ed. 1993).
30. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). As the following incorporation
cases indicate (in chronological order by increasing amendment number and year of case),
the Eighth Amendment was the last amendment to have any one of its provisions
Incorporated by the Court. See Rotunda, supra note 29, at 358 (reviewing the major
Incorporation cases). First Amendment Incorporation: See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)
(freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 US. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press);
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (freedom of petition); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of
religion); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (free exercise of the nonestab-
lishment of religion). FourthAmendment Inwporatio= See Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(freedom from unreasonable search and seizure); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusion from criminal trials of evidence illegally seized). Fflh Amendment Incoiporation: See
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (right tojust compensa-
don); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.. 1 (1964) (freedom from compelled self-incrimination);
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (freedom from compelled double jeopardy). Sixth
Ametdment Incorporation: See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial and notice
of charges); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in criminal cases);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to an opportunity to confront opposing
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process for the purpose of
obtaining favorable witnesses); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.. 145 (1968) (right to a trial
before ajury).
31. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion); Louisiana ex reL. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (plurality opinion); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391
(1916); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126
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established that the Clause limits state legislatures as well as Congress, even
though such limits were tacitly assumed in earlier cases.3 2
Over time, courts and commentators have proposed five interrelated
types of Eighth Amendment limitations on criminal punishments:3 (1)
means of punishment; (2) proportionality, (3) power to criminalize; (4)
prison conditions (conditions of confinement); and (5) procedural due
process.34 Types 1 and 2 include the major cruel and unusual punish-
ments cases, whereas Types 3, 4, and 5 also bear on the Due Process
Clause. 3 The following overview of these five types of limitations is
important for several reasons: the types frame this Article's analysis of the
deficiencies in current case law;, they support this Article's proposal for a
comprehensive Eighth Amendment execution methods test; and they
illustrate why a court's reliance on only one or two types can create a
truncated Eighth Amendment evaluation that twists the true meaning of
death is different.
Type 1: Means of Punishment. Type 1 cases limit the legislature's power
to authorize a particular means of punishment for any crime3 6 In dictum,
the Court has referred to constraints on the legislature's power to allow
the more obvious kinds of barbaric punishments, such as embowelling
alive, public dissection," burning at the stakes quartering, and
castration 9 As early as 1910, however, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions are not confined to those
methods considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adoptedi4 Rather, "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the
(1903); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 US. 323, 339-41 (1892) (Field, J. & Harlan & Brewer, jJ.,
dissenting); i& at 370-71 (Howard & Flemming, JI., dissenting); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
475 (1866).
32. See Francis, 329 U.S. at 463 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment would prohibit
execution by a state in a cruel manner); see also Radin, supra note 28, at 997 (suggesting that
historically, the Court saw few reasons to use the Eighth Amendment because it was unlikely
that a state legislature would authorize such punishments as the rack or the wheel, and even
less likely that it would use them in the future).
33. Radin clarified these five types in a superb article on death penalty jurisprudence. SeC
Radin, supra note 28, at 992-96. This Article modifies these five types to reflect current case
law and the topic of this Article. An excellent analysis of much of this current case law can be
found in Steiker & Steiker, supra note 6, at 357-403.
34. See Radin, supra note 28, at 992-96.
35. Seeidat996.
36. Id. at 993; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 US. 957, 976 (1991) (stating that "the
Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or 'modes' of punish-
ment-specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily
employed").
37. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 US. 130, 135 (1878).
38. In reKesmmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
39. Weems v. United States, 217 US. 349, 377 (1910).
40. See id. at 372-73 (discussing the flexibility of Eighth Amendment protections). In Trop
v. Dufes 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion), for example, the Court held that the use of
denationalization for wartime desertion was also cruel and unusual, emphasizing that Eighth
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evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 1 Although Type 1 cases are most applicable to restrictions on
the legislative power to authorize execution methods, there are few
execution methods cases. 42
Type 2: Proportionality. Type 2 cases limit two types of power: (A) the
legislature's power to allow a means or amount of punishment for a particular
crime," for example, the Court's rejection of the death penalty for rape"
and its restrictions on the death penalty for accomplice felony murder;4
and (B) the legislature's power to authorize a means or amount of
punishment for a particular category of offender,4 such as insane individuals"
or persons under age sixteen at the time of their offense.
Amendment protections were "not static." Id at 103. Although denationalization did not
Involve "physical mistreatment" or "primitive torture," the Court concluded that it was a
punishment "more primitive than torture" because it "strips the citizen of his status in the
national and international political community." Id. at 101. Moreover, denationalization could
be considered "unusual" because it was never applied by the government until 1940 and was
never before tested against the Constitution. Id at 100 n.32.
41. Trop, 356 US. at 101.
42. See infra Part IA-B of this Article (discussing the early execution methods cases and
the 1994-1997 cases).
43. Radin, supra note 28, at 993; see also NancyJ. King, Portioning Punishment. Constitutional
Limits on Suesive and Eccssive Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L Rev. 101, 151-57 (1995) (discussing
proportionality review for all penalties as well as the cumulation of penalties from different
jurisdictions).
44. Radin, supra note 28, at 993. Although Hanndin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), a
Type 2A. case, diminished the strength of the proportionality requirement for noncapital
cases, the requirement still exists. Se- id. at 957-96.
45. Se Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-600 (1977) (rejecting the imposition of the
death penalty for the rape of a woman). But see State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La.
1996) (determining to be constitutional the state's criminal statute authorizing the death
penalty for offenders who rape victims under age 12).
46. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 146-58 (1987) (holding that although defendants
neither committed the murder nor had an actual intent to kill, "major participation in the
felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy
the Enmund culpability requirement"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)
(requiring an intent to kill for the imposition of the death penalty).
47. See Radin, supra note 28, at 993. This Article modifies and redefines Radin's Type 2B
category to comport with more recent case law. Radin proposed that a Type 2B case would
take the following form: "Is it constitutional for the government to impose punishment X on
offender Nfor crime Y, committed in a particular manner and under particular circumstan-
ces?" Id. When Radin proposed this category, there was not yet a Supreme Court case using
the Type 2B rationale. See id. at 994 n.16. Because of the infrequency of cases representing
such a category, this Article shortens Radin's question for Type 2B cases so that it asks the
following- "Is it constitutional for the government to impose punishment X on offender Nfor
crime ?"
48. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-10 (1985) (concluding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of insane individuals). But see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 339-40 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of a
mentally retarded person who commits a capital crime "simply by virtue of his or her mental
retardation alone").
49. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-38 (1988) (concluding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of persons under age 16 at the time of their offense).
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Type 3: Power to Criminalize. Type 3 cases limit the legislature's power
to make particular conduct criminal. In Robinson v. California, t" for
example, the Court determined that it is unconstitutional to punish
individuals because they have the status of being a narcotics addict."
Type 4: Prison Conditions (Conditions of Confinement). Type 4 cases, which
limit the official discretion that accompanies the performance of an
acceptable punishment,5 primarily concern prison conditions and inmate
health care. They are frequently brought as section 1983 civil rights
actions.' Estelle v. Gamble55 introduced the most pervasive prison
conditions standard by forbidding prison officials' "deliberate indifference"
to prisoners' serious medical problems.56 The Court subsequently
enhanced Estelles subjective standard with an objective standard and
extended it to cases that involve prison officials' use of excessive force,6
prisoners' risk of future injury, 9 and inmate-against-inmate violence6°
But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1988) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit the execution of an individual who committed a capital offense at age 16 or
17).
50. Radin, supra note 28, at 994.
51. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
52. See i&L at 66-67. Robinson's reach is very limited. See, ag., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 667 (1977) (emphasizing that the limitations on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause put forth by Robinson and cases like it are "to be applied sparingly"); Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (plurality opinion) ("The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if
the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an
interest in preventing.").
53. SeeRadin, supra note 28, at 995.
54. See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.d 301, 305 (9th Cir.) (explaining that challenges to the
method of execution may be brought as habeas petitions or as § 1983 actions and citing cases
brought under the latter), vacated on other groun. 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for
reconsideration in light of changed statute). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
55. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
56. See i& at 104, 106; see infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (discussing recent
prison conditions cases).
57. SeeWilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (requiring that an inmate show that the
deprivation alleged was "sufficiently grave").
58. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1992) (discussing the standard
appropriate when prison officials are accused of using excessive force).
59. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-35 (1993) (discussing a prisoner's right to be
kept "reasonably safe").
60. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840-42 (1994) (discussing prison officials'
responsibilities and the standard that courts should apply for inmate-against-inmate violence).
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7 pe 5: Procedural Due Process. Type 5 cases limit the legislature's power
to authorize the procedures for imposing a particular punishment.61 In
Furman v. Georgia,62 for example, three Justices stated that the death
penalty, as administered, was cruel and unusual because it could be
arbitrarily or capriciously applied.3 The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia
emphasized the constitutionally required constraints on discretion in
implementing the death penalty.e More recent cases have held that
capital sentencing procedures must reliably distinguish between those
individuals who receive the death sentence and those who do not.66
These five types of cases are not mutually exclusive. In particular,
Type 4 (prison conditions) cases could overlap with other categories, for
example, Type 1 (means of punishment) and Type 2 (proportionality).67
At the same time, some distinction among these types of cases is generally
necessary because a court's standard of review concerning a punishment
will differ when it is reviewing a legislature's enactment, a court's decision,
or a prison official's conduct.6s "[N]o one 'test' seems to fit all types of
cases that can arise under the clause." 69
An Eighth Amendment analysis of execution methods requires a
simultaneous examination of the behaviors of all three institutional
decisionmakers-legislatures, courts, and prison officials. For example, a
61. Radin, supra note 28, at 995.
62. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
63. See id at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
310-14 (White, J., concurring).
64. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
65. See id. at 188-95 (holding that legislation authorizing the death penalty must require
that the sentencer takes into account the individual offender and the offense, as well as
aggravating and mitigating factors). The Court has refined such procedures substantially over
the past two decades. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 6, at 378-96.
66. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992) (holding that a vague aggravating
factor is improper "in deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty or who shall receive
the death penalty"). The Court has limited the kinds of distinctions that can be made. In
McCakqSf v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1986), for example, the Court held that statistical evidence
demonstrating a racial disparity in Georgia's imposition of the death sentence failed to show
that the state arbitrarily and capriciously applied its capital punishment system, that race is a
factor in any capital sentencing decisions, or that race influenced McCleskey's particular case.
See id. at 308-12.
67. See Radin, supra note 28, at 996.
68. See id. A standard of review can incorporate a number of different factors: (a) burden
of proof (including a determination of whether a question is one of law or fact); (b)
relevance and weight of the evidence; and (c) adjudicatory attitudes, which can range from
extreme judicial activism to extreme deference to a state legislature. See id. at 1001.
69. Id. at 1011. The Court has also shied from developing a single test for evaluating
forfeitures under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fies Clause. Although the Court held
In Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), that civil in rem forfeitures are subject to the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, see id, at 604, the Justices relegated to the lower
courts the creation of an excessiveness test. See id. at 622-23; see also King, supra note 43, at
158-94 (discussing how courts determine which penalties are cumulated and when these
combined penalties are in excess of Eighth Amendment limitations).
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federal appeals court's standard of review of lethal gas as a method of
execution should accommodate not only the legislature's enactment of
such a punishment, but also the trial court's decision concerning the
execution method's constitutionality. In addition, the appeals court should
evaluate prison officials' conduct in administering the method. Even
though a legislature may consider a particular method to be the most
humane under ideal circumstances, prison officials may, in practice,
continually misapply the method. If a pattern of inappropriate application
exists, the court should find that method unconstitutional, and the
legislature should abandon the method.
A. The Early Execution Methods Cases
To date, the Court has provided only scant guidance for reviewing
evidence on the constitutionality of any method of execution which,
historically, is the prototypical means of punishment issue and the raison
d'etre of the Eighth Amendment.7  Moreover, courts often dismiss
execution methods cases for various reasons-rendering execution
methods evidence to be "marginally" relevant,71 irrelevant,72 unconvinc-
ing or "frivolous," indicative only of an "accident,"74 or raised too late
in the case to justify a judicial evaluation.7
Most commonly, courts dismiss the execution issue entirely (often in
one sentence) by relying on the century-old precedent of In re Kenmler.1
70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
71. See eg., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 686 (9th Cir.) (excluding evidence of
botched hangings that were "of marginal relation" to hangings conducted under the protocol
in Washington State), cert. dened, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).
72. Se4 &g., id. at 686-87 (excluding evidence related to execution by lethal injection
because "[t]he relative merits of lethal injection are irrelevant" to determining whether
hanging is cruel and unusual punishment).
73. See id. at 686, 688; Jones v. Whitley, 938 F.2d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding
that evidence concerning Louisiana's electric chair does not demonstrate that electrocution is
inhumane); Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1155 (11th diCr. 1987) (concluding that claims
that electrocution is cruel and unusual are "frivolous').
74. See, e.g., Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (plurality
opinion) (holding that the Clause prohibits only the "infliction of unnecessary pain," not the
suffering created in an "unforeseeable accident").
75. The Robert Alton Harris case exemplifies when an execution methods issue is raised
too late in the process to warrantjudidal consideration. See Gomez v. United States, 503 U.S.
653, 654 (1992) (contending that Harris' claim that lethal gas was cruel and unusual
punishment "should have been brought a decade ago"); see also infra note 288 and
accompanying text (discussing the Courtes holdings in Gom= and Ferro, both of which dealt
with lethal gas challenges). Notably, no court has dismissed a claim under the standards
proposed by Daubeit v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Ina, 509 US. 579, 589 (1993) (adopting the
following standard from Fed. R. of Evid. 702: "'If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue' an expert 'may testify thereto'"), or by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)
(holding that new rules of constitutional criminal procedure cannot be imposed retroactively
to cases in which direct review had become final prior to the decision introducing the new
rule).
76. 136 US. 436 (1890). Keramler, in turn, relied heavily on Wikerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
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In Kemmier, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to
the states and deferred to the New York legislature's conclusion that
electrocution was not a cruel and unusual punishment under the state's
Electrical Execution Act." Although courts have relied on Kemmier
primarily to dismiss challenges to the constitutionality of electrocution,8
they have also used Kemmier to dismiss challenges to each of the other four
execution methods.79
However, Kemmiers precedential value has diminished substantially
over the last century. First, the Kemmier Court never specifically employed
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause" even though post
incorporation cases have continued to cite Kemmier as an Eighth
Amendment case.s Moreover, Kemmier was decided before anyone had
been electrocuted; therefore, the Court had limited evidence in reaching
its conclusion82 Next, the Kemmier Court adopted the burden of proof
promulgated by the New York court 5 that required the prisoner to show
135 (1878) (determining In dicta that the firing squad is not a cruel and unusual punish-
ment).
77. Kemmle, 136 US. at 443.
78. For some examples of such dismissals, see Funchess v. Wainmight, 788 F.2d 1443, 1446
(11th Cir. 1986); Sullivan v. Dugger, 721 F.2d 719, 720 (11th Cir. 1983); Spinkeuink v.
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 616 (5th Cir. 1978); Squires v. Dugger; 794 F. Supp. 1568, 1580 (M.D.
Fla. 1992); Hamren v. Dugger, 748 F. Supp. 1498, 1503 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Thomas v.Jones 742 F.
Supp. 598, 603 (S.D. Ala. 1990);Jones v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (S.D. Ala. 1984), affd,
772 F.2d 668 (l1th Cir. 1985); Songerv. Wainwright 571 F. Supp. 1384, 1406 (M.D. Fla. 1983),
aff 4 733 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1984); Mitchell v. Hope 538 F. Supp. 77, 94 (S.D. Ga. 1982);
McCorquodale v. Bawkom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 431 (N.D. Ga. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in par4
705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cr. 1983).
79. For some examples of such dismissals, see the following cases categorized by type of
execution method. Lethal gas: People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 173 (Colo. 1990); Calhoun v.
State, 468 A.2d 45, 70 (Md. 1983); State v. Kllpatrick, 439 P.2d 99, 110 (Kan. 1968);
Hernandez v. State, 32 P.2d 18, 24-25 (Ariz. 1934). Lethal injectiom People v. Stewart, 528
N.E.2d 631, 639 (Il. 1988); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
FTing squad. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 890-91 (Cal. 1972); KiPatrick 439 P.2d at 110.
Hanging. Deshields v. State, 534 A.2d 630, 640 (Del. 1987); Andeson, 493 P.2d at 890;
Kipatrick 439 P.2d at 110.
80. See Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring The Death Penalty Unconstitu-
tional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1784 n.51 (1970) (noting that Kemmler's impact as precedent is
limited because it did not "specifically apply" the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
Instead, the Court examined KemmIer's alternative claim that his execution would violate
both the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
by depriving him of life without due process of law. Kemmr, 136 U.S. at 446.
81. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (listing cases citing Kemmlerspecifically as
an Eighth Amendment case); see also Denno, supra note 5, at 616-23 (analyzing the 226 cases
that have cited Kemrnler from the time the case was decided to the present and indicating that
state and federal courts have repeatedly and incorrectly referred to Kemmier as Eighth
Amendment authority).
82. Historical accounts of Kemmier show that it was based in part on the particular
uncertainties and pressures resulting from the passage of the Electrical Execution Act, as well
as the political, financial, and scientific controversies preceding it. See Denno, sufra note 5, at
559-607.
83. According to the Court, the lower court "held that the presumption of constitutional-
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"beyond doubt" that the execution method was cruel and unusual. As far
as can be determined, this standard has not been used since Kemmier in
this context. 4 Although courts typically fail to specify any kind of burden
of proof standard when they review evidence for an Eighth Amendment
violatione (including the recent execution methods cases),86 the burden
of proof most frequently cited-preponderance of the evidence-is far less
stringent.87 Lastly, because the Court never conducted an Eighth Amend-
ment evaluation of New York's Electrical Execution Act, the Court would
be less likely to defer to the state's legislature today to the extent it did
when it decided Kemmer.s In summary, the Kemmier Court's factual
ity had not been overcome by the prisoner, because he had not 'made it appear, by proofs or
otherwise, beyond doubt, that the statute of 1888 in regard to the infliction of the death penalty
provides cruel and unusual ... punishment.'" Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
Although the NewYork court had actually applied a "beyond a reasonable doubt standard," In
re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. 145, 151-52 (Cayuga County Ct. 1889), the distinction in wording is
minor, given the unique way this standard was used. In October, 1889, the New York Supreme
Court had stayed Kemmler's execution to appoint a referee to collect testimony and evidence
on electrocution's effects for use in evidentiary hearings to be held on the issue. See id at 146.
84. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1994) (discussing the historical development
of the reasonable doubt rule, including its meaning in 1850); Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond
Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law
of Evidence 40-41 (1991) (contending that intellectual traditions, such as the English new
empiricist philosophy of the seventeenth century, helped to shape the "secular moral standard
of beyond reasonable doubt," yet failing to discuss how the standard was applied by legal
institutions and actors). See generally Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the R~asonable
Doubt Rue 75 Cal. L Rev. 1665 (1987) (discussing how courts apply the "reasonable doubt
rule" in modem case law).
85. SeeJames R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Lfe orDeath. The Sentencing Provisions
in Capital Punishment Statute,% 31 Crim. L Bull. 19, 34 (1995) (concluding from a thorough
review of the case law that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has acknowledged that depriving
an individual of life is qualitatively different from taking away liberty, it has imposed no
corresponding constitutional requirements regarding either what the state must prove or what
standard of proof is necessary to establish that death is an appropriate punishment").
86. Se e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 688 (9th Cir.) (stating only that "Campbell
faces a heavy burden in attempting to show that the existence of an option related to his
execution is cruel and unusual") (emphasis added), cet. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994); see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) ("[1]n assessing a punishment selected by a
democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its
validity.... And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the
representatives of the people.") (emphasis added).
87. Se e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649-51 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(upholding Arizona's imposition on defendants the burden of establishing, "by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the existence of mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency" in order to avoid the death penalty after the establishment of one or more
aggravating factors); Blake v. Hall, 668 F.2d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1981) (determining that plaintiffs
had failed to establish by "a fair preponderance of the evidence" that cell conditions at a
prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment); McGill v. Duckworth, 726 F. Supp. 1144,
1148-49 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (discussing the applicability of the preponderance of the evidence
standard in suits against prison officials for failing to protect a prison inmate from attack by
another inmate), affd in part and re,'d in par, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Foti,
561 F. Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Ia. 1983) (noting that plaintiffs had "failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence" that conditions were cruel and unusual).
88. According to the New York Supreme Court,
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assumptions regarding the acceptability of electrocution have no support
in light of modem evidence.s" Some of the Kemmler Court's legal
conclusions, however, remain viable: "Punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death... something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.""
Following Kemm/er, a number of electrocution executions were
grotesque failures,91 including William Kemmler's.e Regardless, the
Court relied on Kemmier in Malloy v. South Carolina9" to conclude that the
State's implementation of death through electrocution, rather than
hanging, did not increase the punishment of murder, but only changed its
mode.94 Twenty-two years later in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, "5
the issue was not whether electrocution was per se unconstitutional, but
whether the State of Louisiana could constitutionally execute the appellant
after the electric chair had malfunctioned during the first attempt.' In
there was nothing in the constitution of the government or in the nature of things
giving any color to the proposition that, upon a mere question of fact involved in
legislation, the judgment of a court is superior to that of the legislature itself, nor
was there any authority for the proposition that in respect to such questions, relating
either to the manner or the matter of legislation, the decision of the legislature
could be reviewed by the court.
Kemmier, 136 U.S. at 44243 (citation omitted).
89. See infra Part IIA of this Article (discussing the constitutionality of electrocution).
90. Kemmler, 136 U.. at 447.
91. See Denno, supra note 5, at 605-06 0.375 (discussing the circumstances of several
failed electrocution executions).
92. William Kemrler's execution was a well-publicized technical and medical bungle. See
Far Worse Than Hanging, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1890, at 1 [hereinafter Far Worse]; see also infra
note 261 (providing a detailed description of Kemmler's execution).
93. 237 U.S. 180 (1915).
94. See id. at 185. The Court considered that such a change was not unconstitutional
under the Ex Post Facto provision. See id at 184 ("I do not consider any law ex post facto,
within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the law, but only those that create, or
aggravate, the crime; or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the
purpose of conviction.") (citation omitted).
95. 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (plurality opinion).
96. See id. at 461.Justice Reed, who wrote the plurality opinion contending that a second
execution attempt would not be cruel and unusual, was joined by Chief Justice Vinson and
Justices Black and Jackson. See id. at 460. Justices Burton, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge
contended that a second attempt at execution would be cruel and unusual. See id. at 479
(Burton, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter's concurrence cast the fifth and deciding vote. See
id at 471-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The appellant, Willie Francis, a 16 year-old black,
was sentenced to be electrocuted for the murder of a popular white druggist in St.
Martinsville, Louisiana. SeeArthur S. Miller &Jeffrey H. Bowman, Death by Installments 19-24
(1988) [hereinafter Miller & Bowman, Death by Installments]; Arthur S. Miller &Jeffrey H.
Bowman, "Slow Dance on the Killing Ground"• The Wlie Francis Case Revisited 32 DePaul L. Rev.
1, 5-7 (1982) [hereinafter Miller & Bowman, WVilie Francis Revisited]. Francis' execution failed,
however, apparently because of some "mechanical difficulty," Fran4 329 U.S. at 460, with the
portable hardwood chair that the state had delivered. See Miller & Bowman, Willie Francis
RevisiteA supra, at 86. Although the executioner had flipped the switch, there was insufficient
current and, after another attempt, Francis yelled that the hood be removed so that he could
breathe. See id. at 8.
(1997]
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examining the circumstances of Francis "under the assumption, but without
so deciding" that the Eighth Amendment applied,97 a plurality of four
Justices interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as
prohibiting only the "infliction of unnecessary pain," not the suffering
created in an "unforeseeable accident."98 The Justices thus assumed that
state officials performed "their duties in a careful and humane manner."99
Justice Frankfurter explained, however, that his deciding fifth vote did "not
mean that a hypothetical situation, which assumes a series of abortive
attempts at electrocution... would not raise different questions." '
In 1962, the Court held in Robinson v. California'0 ' that the Eighth
Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'02 Both before and after Robinson, however, the
Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine emphasized an evolving standard of
cruel and unusual punishment.03  This evolution occurs because
"[t]ime... brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore,
a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth."'1 4 For these reasons, the Court has viewed
the Eighth Amendment "'in a flexible and dynamic manner,'""'
recognizing that the Clause "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
" '16
97. FRands, 329 U.S. at 462. The four plurality Justices contended that even if the Eighth
Amendment did apply to the states, a second execution attempt could be authorized. See id at
463-64. The four dissentingJustices strongly suggested otherwise. See id. at 475-81 (Burton, J.,
dissenting). OnlyJustice Frankfurter's concurrence directly stated that the Eighth Amendment
did not apply to the states. See id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 464.
99. Id at 462 ("Accidents happen for which no man is to blame."). Both the plurality and
the dissent relied on Kemmler's "torture or lingering death" standard for cruelty. See id. at 463-
64 n.4 (Reed, J., plurality) & 476 (Burton, J., dissenting) ("'Punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death... something more than the mere extinguishing of
life.'") (quoting Kemmnler, 136 U.S. at 447 (1890)). Yet, the Court did not review evidence of
any potential pain that an individual may suffer during electrocution. Even the dissent
appeared to assume that, properly applied, electrocution would be painless and instantaneous.
See id. at 474 (Burton, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It is not clear whether Justice Frankfurter was
referring to "a series of abortive attempts" in the execution of one individual, or a series over
time for a number of individuals. This Article contends that the distinction is irrelevant, since
both interpretations suggest negligence and possibly deliberate indifference on the part of the
state.
101. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
102. Se id. at 666. In Funnan v. Gwigia, 408 U.S. 239 (1971), Justice Douglas relied on
both Francis and Robinson to conclude that the Eighth Amendment's applicability to the states
is "now settled." Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring).
103. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing Type 1 (means of
punishment) cases).
104. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
105. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 171 (1976)).
106. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1985) (plurality opinion).
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Current claims of cruel and unusual punishment must therefore be
assessed "in the light of contemporary human knowledge."107
Regardless of this jurisprudence, the Court has refused to consider
the constitutionality of electrocution or the other execution methods
despite considerable evidence that the methods may be unconstitutionally
cruel. In a lengthy dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari to review a
prisoner's challenge to electrocution in Glass v. Louisiana,"s Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, denounced both the law and the
application of electrocution. 0 9  The dissent focused on Justice
Frankfurter's concern with "abortive" or "botched" executions. n °
107. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
108. 471 U.S. 1080 (1985).
109. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Flrst, the Glass dissent depicted Kemmier as"antiquated authority" given the Eighth Amendment's applicability to the states, see id. at
1083, although it retained Kemmer's "torture and lingering death" standard. &e id at 1086.
Next, the dissent suggested three "objective" criteria for determining the constitutionality of
an execution method, see id. at 1084-85, based upon the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence: (1) "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," id. at 1084 (citing Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Francis 329 U.S. at 463; In mKemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879)); (2) affronts to the "dignity of man"
(e.g., "a minimization of physical violence during execution"), i. at 1085 (citing Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)); and (3) "mutilation" and "distortion" of
the condemned person's body. Id. (citation omitted). "If a method of execution does not
satisfy these criteria-if it causes 'torture or lingering death' in a significant number of cases-
then unnecessary cruelty inheres in that method of execution and the method violates the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Id. at 1086 (quoting Kemmler, 136 U.. at 447). Even
If electrocution did not "invariably produce pain and indignities, the apparent century-long
pattern of 'abortive attempts' and lingering deaths suggests that this method of execution
carries an unconstitutionally high risk of causing such atrocities." Id. at 1093.
110. It appears that the term "botch" as it applies to executions was first used to describe
Kemmler's mishap in 1890. See Far Worse supra note 92, at 1-2. The term has been frequently
used since that time to characterize defective executions, particularly those that result in
extraordinary pain, violence, or mutilation. ,e; e.g., Elizabeth Fernandez, All Forms of Execution
Produce Horror Storie6 S.F. Examiner, Apr. 22, 1992, at A14 (listing the most recent "botched
executions"). Herb Haines contends that the term "botched execution" is too narrow because
It excludes other problematic aspects of the capital punishment process. See Herb Haines,
Rawed Executions, the Anti-Death Penalty Movement, and the Politics of Capital Punishment 39 Soc.
Probs. 125, 125 (1992). Haines prefers the broader term "flawed executions," defined as"executions in which public sensibilities are offended by a breakdown in the 'normal' routine
of convicting killers and putting them to death." Id.
According to Michael Radelet, an execution is "botched" when there are "unanticipated
problems or the duration of the execution (over thirty minutes) caused prolonged agony for
the prisoner." Affidavit of Professor Michael L. Radelet 1 3 [hereinafter Radelet Affidavit],
Exhibit of Application for Post-Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus, Fx parte Miguel A.
Richardson, No. 81-CR-1548 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Richardson
Application]. Radelet has collected reports of botched executions over the past decade. Id.
2. In light of this commentary and range of definitions, this Article considers an execution to
be "botched" when the execution has demonstrated technical, mechanical, or physical
mishaps that substantially heighten the likelihood that an inmate experienced extreme pain
and prolonged suffering. See Deborah W. Denno, ExeRution and the Forgotten Eighth Amendment,
in America's Experiment with Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Past, Present, and
Future of the Ultimate Penal Sanction (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1997).
[1997]
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In light of these early execution methods cases, the following sections
briefly examine the more recent and significant cases on execution
methods and prison conditions as a backdrop for developing this Article's
execution methods test. The sections emphasize the integration of the five
Eighth Amendment typologies discussed previously'1 as a means of
restoring the principle that death is different.
B. The 1994-1997 Execution Methods Cases
A focus on the 1994-1997 execution methods cases requires some
perspective on the number of states that allow only one method of
execution and those states that allow a choice between two different
methods of execution.1 According to Table 1 (Appendix 1), which lists
the methods of execution currently enacted in the thirty-eight death
penalty states, lethal injection is the predominant method of execution,
followed by electrocution. Hanging, the firing squad, and lethal gas are no
longer the sole method of execution in any state; however, these methods
are included as options in some states.
Recent cases may prompt the Court to conduct an Eighth
Amendment review of execution methods. In 1993, three members of the
Court indicated their interest in deciding the constitutionality of
electrocution, emphasizing that Kemmierwas not "a dispositive response to
litigation of the issue in light of modem knowledge.""' One year later,
in Campbell v. Wood, 1 4 a 6-5 en banc decision,"5 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of hanging under
Washington State's choice statute."6 The statute provided for death
"either by hanging by the neck or, at the election of the defendant, by
[lethal injection]." 7  Upon rejecting the State's contention that
Campbell's claims were not justiciable because Campbell was allowed to
select lethal injection-an execution method that would render his case
mootns-the Campbell majority concluded that execution by hanging
111. See supra notes 33-69 and accompanying text.
112. Although the federal government and the United States military also have a death
penalty, see Denno, supra note 5, at 624, this Article examines only state death penalty statutes.
113. See Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 933 (1993). Justices Souter, Blackmun, and
Stevens commented on the denial of Syvasky Poyner's petition for writ of certiorari. See id. at
932-33.
114. 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).
115. Judge Beezer, who wrote the majority opinion, wasjoined by ChiefJudge Wallace and
Judges Wiggins, Thompson, O'Scannlain, and Kleinfeld. See id at 667. Judge Reinhardt, who
wrote the minority opinion, was joined byJudges Browning, Tang, and D.W. Nelson. See id at
692 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Poole wrote the sole
dissenting opinion. See id. at 729.
116. Seeid.at680.
117. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.180(1) (1990). In 1996, Washington State changed its
execution method statute so that an inmate is now executed by lethal injection unless that
inmate elects hanging by the neck. See infra app. 3 (Washington).
118. Campbell 18 F.3d at 680. Emphasizing that the government may not "cloak
unconstitutional punishments in the mantle of 'choice,'" the court provided examples of
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under Washington State's protocol was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment."'
In general, Campbell constituted an unsophisticated and disappointing
exercise in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, perhaps because of the
unprecedented nature of the issue or because of the sharp split within the
court.12 0 A detailed critique of the Campbell majority's approach is
available in Campbels minority opinion.1 2 1 The Campbell majority's
primary flaws resulted from the majority's reliance upon a truncated
distortion of selected Type 1 (means of punishment) and Type 2
(proportionality) cases as well as the majority's nearly exclusive focus on
the Court's "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard.'2 In a
heated dissent to Campbell's denial of certiorari,12s Justice Blackmun
emphasized that even if he thought the death penalty were constitution-
al, Campbell's claim had merit. Justice Blackmun noted in particular
the Campbell majority's unprecedented doctrinal truncation!2s and the
when It had held punishments to be unconstitutional despite the availability of considerably
harsher, albeit constitutional, alternatives. Id. (citing Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312
F.2d 73, 75-76 (9th CIr. 1962) (holding that voluntary and permanent departure from the
United States as a condition of suspending a sentence was either a cruel or unusual sentence
or a denial of due process, irrespective of the defendant's opportunity to select the
constitutionally acceptable punishment of a prison term)). Because Campbell had not
exercised his power to choose, he had ensured that his death would be inflicted by hanging,
thereby constituting a real dispute between the parties. Id. at 681. The Campbell court's
holding is important given the number of states with choice statutes in which the default
method is not lethal injection. See infra app. 3 (Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, and
South Carolina (pre-enactment inmates only)).
119. Campbel4 18 F.3M at 681. Reviewing the district court's finding of no Eighth
Amendment violation as one of "mixed questions of fact and law," and also of "questions of
law," the Campbell court stated that it would set aside the district court's factual findings only if
they were "dearly erroneous." Id. The court asserted no other standard of review.
120. See, &g., Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (emphasizing that
"the foundations of Campbells analysis remain shrouded in suggestion and ambiguity"), affd,
77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for
reconsideration in light of changed statute).
121. See Campbel4 18 F.3d at 693-94 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Peter S. Adolf, Killing Me Soflty: Is the Gas Chamber, or Any Other Method of
Execution, 'Cruel and Unusual Punishment?', 22 Hastings Const. LQ. 815, 837 (1995)
(critiquing Campbell).
122. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. It is telling, for example, that Washington
State's own Department of Corrections recommended that the state legislature either replace
hanging with lethal injection or make lethal injection the default method when the
condemned refused to choose. See Marcia Chambers, No Death by Hanging, Nat'l UJ., May 16,
1994, at A19. The legislature finally comported with this recommendation. See supra note 117
and accompanying text; infra app. 3 (Washington).
123. Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
124. Id. at 1119 (citing Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari)).
125. Id. at 1121. Despite the wide range of types of Eighth Amendment cases that the
Court has proffered over the century, the Campbell majority based its entire analysis upon only
[1997]
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 340 1996-1997
ARE EXECUTIONS CONSTITUIONAL?
majority's predominant concern with pain.12
Several months following Campbel the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington held in Rupe v. Wood'2 that hanging
under Washington State's protocol generally did not violate the Eighth
Amendment;12 however, because of the unique circumstances involved,
the hanging of Mitchell Rupe would be unconstitutional.'2 There was a
"significant risk"' s that Rupe, who was obese,' would be decapitated
and the extent of this risk could not "be dismissed as a 'possible error' or
a portion of them, offering dubious arguments for why some types were not applicable to
execution methods. For example, the majority framed the bulk of its Eighth Amendment
analysis of hanging on the following single sentence incorporating a two-part test:
Recent decisions construing the Eighth Amendment focus on whether [1] the
sentence constitutes "one of 'those modes or acts of punishment that had been
considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted,'" and
on whether [2] the punishment is contrary to "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Campbel, 18 F.d at 681-82. The majority concluded that because there was no question that
"hanging was acceptable when the Bill of Rights was adopted," the court should focus on the
second part of the test-whether hanging complies with contemporary standards of decency.
Id. at 682.
Even at the star however, the majority's analysis is truncated and misleading. First, the
majority implies that this two-part test is typically followed in Eighth Amendment cases when
there is no such generic Eighth Amendment standard or Eighth Amendment case. Rather,
Eighth Amendment cases generally fall in one of the five types discussed in Part I of this
Article. See supra notes 33-69 and accompanying text. Although Type 1 (means of punish-
ment) cases should provide some guidance, they are limited in their scope and the Supreme
Court has never used them to evaluate execution methods. See supra notes 36-42 and
accompanying text. Indeed, it is odd that the majority derives its two-part test from Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), a Type 2B (proportionality) decision that concerned not the
means of punishment, but rather the constitutionality of applying the death penalty to 16 and
17 year-old offenders. See id. at 380 ("We discern neither a historical nor a modem societal
consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16
or 17 years of age."). This distinction -is important because the majority expressly rejects as
inappropriate those standards that are available in other Eighth Amendment proportionality
cases (such as legislative trends in the use of execution methods). See Campbel 18 F.3d at 682.
126. Campbell 511 U.S. at 1121-22. Justice Blackmun also highlighted other factors,
including- (1) the infrequent application of hanging, id. at 1120-21; (2) the rejection of hang-
ing by nearly all of the state legislatures and its decline in popularity over the years, id.; (3)
the substantial evidence that hanging, "a crude and imprecise practice[,] ... always includes a
risk that the inmate will slowly strangulate or asphyxiate," id. at 1122; and (4) the fact that the
number of states rejecting hanging has been far greater than the number of states rejecting
other laws or procedures that the Court previously has determined to be cruel and unusual,
id at 1120-21.
127. 863 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994), vacated on oter grounds 93 F.M 1434 (9th Cir.
1996) (appeal dismissed as moot in light of changed statute).
128. Id. at 1314 (noting that a state need not eliminate "every single possibility of error" in
its execution procedure to withstand constitutional scrutiny) (citing Campbell v. Wood, 18
F.M 662, 687 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994)).
129. Id. at 1314 n.9., 1315.
130. Id. at 1314.
131. Rupe weighed 409 '4pounds and measured 6' " in height. Id. at 1319.
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'accident."''" Despite the Rupe court's emphasis on the weight difference
between Rupe and Campbell,lss which the court said justified its
determination, the Rupe court applied a broader Eighth Amendment
analysis than the Campbell court and considered more evidence.lss
One month after Rupe, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held, in Fiem'o v. Gomelss that execution
by lethal gas violated the Eighth Amendment even though the plaintiffs,
San Quentin death row inmates, had the option of choosing lethal
injection.5 7 In reaching this determination, the Fierro district court
offered three major doctrinal expansions: (1) a more comprehensive
Eighth Amendment framework than Campbell'ss by emphasizing an
132. Rupe, 863 F. Supp. at 1314.
133. When Campbell was executed, he weighed 232 pounds, including the eight-pound
board connected to his body. Id at 1310. According to the court, "Campbell was a muscular
person who exercised frequently and his neck muscles were well developed and strong. He
was In excellent physical shape." Id.
134. The Rupe court particularly emphasized an incorporation of Type 4 (prison
conditions) issues. For example, like the CampbeU court, the Rupe court recognized that
"[t]raditional methods of execution selected by a state's legislature are presumed to be valid."
Id. at 1314 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 175 (1976)). A presumption of validity
was not warranted in this case, however, because the legislature did not choose the drop
length for a person with excessive weight and did not consider whether hanging would be
acceptable if the procedure could result in a significant risk of decapitation. Id. In contrast to
the Campbell court's exclusive focus on pain, the Rupe court emphasized instead "evolving
standards of decency," id. (quoting Cregg 428 U.S. at 173), "public attitudes toward hanging,"
i. ("Public attitudes toward hangings that might carry a slight risk of decapitation cannot be
equated with public attitudes toward hangings that carry a significant risk of decapitation."),
and most particularly, "human dignity[,J ... 'the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment,'" id at 1315 (quoting Gregg 428 US. at 173).
135. This evidence included, most particularly, reports of decapitations that had resulted
In other judicial hangings as well as graphic photos of a decapitation early in the century. Id.
(referring to the decapitation of Blackjack Ketchum in New Mexico in 1901). Without such
evidence, the court could never have made its determination that "decapitation is a recurrent
phenomenon In the history of judicial hanging." Id.
136. 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cr.), vacated on other
grounds, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of changed statute).
137. Id. at 1415. Former California Penal Code § 3604(b) (West 1992) provided that "[i]f
a person under sentence of death does not choose either lethal gas or lethal injection... the
penalty of death shall be imposed by lethal gas." See generaly David Stembach, Hanging
Pidures: Photographic Theoiy and Framing of Images of Fxecuion, 70 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1100, 1131-38
(1995) (examining the use of videotapes and photographic images of executions to
demonstrate the Inmate's pain and suffering, with specific discussions of the lower court deci-
sions preceding lerro v. Gom4; 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996)). California's amended death
penalty statute now provides that lethal injection shall be used unless the inmate requests
lethal gas. See infra app. 3 (California); note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the
change In California's death penalty statute providing that lethal injection be used unless the
defendant requests lethal gas).
138. The framework relies on cases representing each of the five Eighth Amendment types
previously discussed in this Article. Se supra notes 33-69 and accompanying text. These cases
Include the following- 7vp v. Dulles, 356 US. 86 (1958) (Type 1, means of punishment); Ford
v. Wainwrigh4 477 US. 399 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Type 2B, proportionality for a
[1997]
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 342 1996-1997
ARE EXECUTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL?
evolving standards of decency test (dependent upon legislative trends); U9
(2) a broader process for challenging an execution method by allowing an
inmate to bring a section 1983 action in lieu of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus;' 40 and (3) a more detailed measure of pain and
unconsciousness.141 In turn, the Fierro district court derived from Campbell
the following framework for evaluating the constitutionality of any
execution method: "[O]bjective evidence of pain must be the primary
consideration, and evidence of legislative trends may also be considered
where the evidence of pain is not dispositive."'4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals readily endorsed the Fierro district
court's suggested standards for determining the extent and risk of
unconstitutional pain, as well as the court's rehabilitative interpretation of
Campbells doctrinal ambiguities and defciencies145 "The district court's
findings of extreme pain, the length of time this extreme pain lasts, and
the substantial risk that inmates will suffer this extreme pain for several
minutes, require the conclusion that lethal gas is cruel and unusual."44
particular offender); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Type 3, power to
criminalize); Etele v. Gamb14e 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Type 4, prison conditions); Gregg v. Georgia
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Type 5, procedural due process).
139. SeeFero, 865 F. Supp. at 1405-08.
140. See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 305 (9th Car. 1996) (citing Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F.
Supp. 966, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1992)), vacated on otaer ground, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding
for reconsideration in light of changed statute). Inmates' challenges to the constitutionality of
prison conditions are typically brought as § 1983 actions that require an inmate to allege (1) a
violation of a right allowed by the Constitution or federal law, and (2) that someone acting
under color of state law violated that right. See 42 US.C. § 1983 (1994). In contrast, inmates'
challenges to the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence must be brought by means of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Fierro, 77 F.3d at 305. Unlike habeas petitions, § 1983
actions do not have a state exhaustion requirement. Id. Because the inmates in lierro
requested a review of the method by which death would be implemented, rather than a
review of their actual death sentences or confinements, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the FYero
district court's determination that method of execution challenges "are analogous" to prison
conditions challenges and therefore can be brought as § 1983 actions. Id.
141. See YFlv, 865 F. Supp. at 1400-1401; see also infra Part II and app. 1, tbl. 2 (detailing
the Ftero courtes measurements of pain and unconsciousness).
142. Id. at 1400. In reaching these conciusions, the F'nv district court questioned other
aspects of the Campbell majority's opinion that the Campbell minority had also found to be
troublesome, most particularly, the Campbdl majority's refusal to examine evidence on lethal
injection to assess whether hanging is "unnecessarily" cruel, id. at 1411 n.26; the majority's
failure to consider the separate issue of a method's lack of regard for human dignity, see id. at
1411 nn.28-29; and the majority's ambiguous treatment of state legislative trends, see id at
1412, which the F1erro court ultimately surmised is not "a sub silentio overruling of well-
established precedent in this area." I
Early lethal gas litigation associated with F'enro appeared to influence a 1994 determina-
tion by the United States District Court of the District of Maryland, which allowed a con-
demned Maryland inmate to videotape the lethal gas execution of another inmate. Se In re
Petition of Donald Thomas, 155 F.R.D. 124, 126-28 (D. Md. 1994). The purpose of the
videotaping was to acquire evidence on the length of consciousness and level of pain an
individual experiences when exposed to lethal gas. See id. at 126.
143. SeeY=r, 77 F.3d at 301.
144. Id. at 309. The Ninth Circuit only briefly acknowledged that its assessment of lethal
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Because the Ninth Circuit found the district court's factual findings
regarding pain "dispositive under the framework of Campbell" there was no
need to consider legislative trends as an additional gauge for determining
whether lethal gas violated the Eighth Amendment.145 The Ninth Circuit
also agreed that "[mlethod of execution challenges are analogous to chall-
enges to conditions of confinement,"' 4' which are typically brought by in-
mates as section 1983 actions. Any alternative holding would "carve out' a"separate [Eighth Amendment] jurisprudence for death penalty cases." 47
Fierro is the first federal appeals court case holding unconstitutional
any method of execution.J Consequently, Fierro enables the Supreme
Court to address the constitutionality of an execution method in the future
should the Court decide to review the Ninth Circuit's decision regarding
lethal gas.' In light of this possibility, the FRem, court deserves credit for
improving the Campbell majority's doctrine and affirming the district
court's approach to evaluating execution methods. By rejecting an artificial
distinction between challenges to execution methods and prison
conditions, the Ninth Circuit also endorsed a more integrated Eighth
Amendment execution jurisprudence. Yet, as the following sections show,
neither the Fen'o district court nor the Ninth Circuit sufficiently
encompassed the applicable Eighth Amendment case law. In the context of
recent Supreme Court prison conditions cases, this Article contends that a
more comprehensive Eighth Amendment execution methods test should
also include scrutiny of prison personnel as well as of the courts and
gas differed from that of hanging in Washington State because the evidence supporting the
unconstitutionally of lethal gas was more compelling. Id at 808.
145. Id
146. Id. at 305.
147. Id, at 304.
148. Seeam, 77 F.8d at 308 (stating that two circuit courts have not found execution by
lethal gas to be unconstitutional). In Antadne v. Delp, 54 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals rendered unconstitutional a Missouri prosecutor's unsupported
closing argument suggesting that the defendant's death by lethal gas would be "quick,
painless, and humane," emphasizing that "[t]he reality, as we understand it is or at least may
be quite different." Id. at 1361. Moreover, this year, in California FIrst Amendment Coalition v.
Calderon, 956 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Cal. 1997), the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California acknowledged the potential risks associated with lethal injection
executions. The district court held that, under the First Amendment, prison officials were
required to allow the public and the media to witness a lethal injection from the moment
preceding a prisoner's strap down to a gurney until just after the prisoner's death. Id. at 890;
so also infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (discussing Calderon); app. 3 (California)
(placing Calderon in the context of California's execution method jurisprudence).
149. The Supreme Court's recent decision to vacate tewrv did not discuss the Ninth
Circuit's determination regarding lethal gas. Rather, the decision concerned whether the def-
endants will have standing to question the constitutionality of their executions in light of the
change in the state's death penalty statute providing that lethal injection be used unless the
defendant requests lethal gas. See Gomez v. Fierro, 117 S. Ct. 285, 285-86 (remanding for re-
consideration In light of changed statute), vacating on other ground, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cr.
1996); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision
to remand F'ensr).
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legislatures. Any less inclusive doctrine would perpetuate the dilution of
the death is different principle.
C. The Recent Prison Conditions Cases
The coming of age of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence occurred in
1976 when the Court, in Estelle v. Gamb/e, 54 first applied the Eighth
Amendment to an injury that was not part of an inmate's sentence, but
that the inmate sustained while in prison. The Court held that prison
personnel's "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's serious illness or injury
constituted an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" violative of the
Eighth Amendment.' The Estele Court distinguished the inmate's claim
of officials' deliberate indifference to inadequate medical care from the
facts that were before it nearly thirty years earlier in Louisiana ex rel Francis
v. Resweber,'5 ' emphasizing that a second effort at electrocuting the
prisoner in Francis was not unconstitutional because the first attempt was
an "unforeseeable accident," not deliberate indifference"s
In 1991, the Court enhanced what it called Estdee's "subjective"
deliberate indifference component that required an inmate to show that a
prison official has a "sufficiently culpable state of mind."16 The Court
coupled this subjective component with an "objective" component that
mandated an inmate to demonstrate that the deprivation alleged was
"sufficiently serious."'55 Soon thereafter, the Court relaxed its require-
ments for the objective component in two primary ways. First, the Court
held that a prison official's malicious and sadistic use of excessive force
against an inmate constitutes cruel and unusual punishment even when the
inmate does not evidence serious injurye because excessive and sadistic
150. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
151. Id at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 158, 173 (1976)). The Court rejected
the inmate's claim that he received inadequate medical care for a back injury allegedly
suffered while conducting prison work, stating that the physician responsible for treating the
inmate's injury was not sufficiently culpable. Id. at 107.
152, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
153. Estell, 429 U.S. at 105 (quoting Frands, 329 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Declining to
explain more specifically what "deliberate indifference" meant, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 835 (1994), the Court subsequently interpreted Fstele as requiring for Eighth
Amendment liability "more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or
safety." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (characterizing the holding in Etele).
Moreover, a prison official's deliberate indifference must ultimately deny "the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 US. 337, 347 (1981) (holding
that the permanent double-celling of inmates is not cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment).
154. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
155. Id. at 298. In Wilson, the inmate claimed that the conditions of his confinement per
se violated the Eighth Amendment and that he should not have to demonstrate that officials
acted culpably. Id. at 299-302. Upon rejecting this argument, the Court held that an inmate
must satisfy both the subjective and objective components of the Eighth Amendment to
establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 298.
156. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 3 (1992). Writing for the majority, Justice
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force always violates "contemporary standards of decency."1 57 Second, the
Court held that an inmate's Eighth Amendment claim of prison officials'
deliberate indifference could apply to conditions threatening future, as
well as present, harm to health. ss
In Farmer v. Brennan, 9 a unanimous Courew more fully delineated
its views on the Eighth Amendment by explaining the meaning of
"deliberate indifference."1 6' The Court held that a prison official violates
the Eighth Amendment "for denying humane conditions of confinement
only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."16 2
At the same time, the Court established a number of loopholes for
inmates--ensuring, for example, that they could prevail without
demonstrating they had warned officials about a particular threat or that
officials believed a particular inmate was going to be harmed.les
Moreover, whether an official possessed the required knowledge of a
substantial risk was a question of fact that could be shown "in the usual
ways," such as "inference from circumstantial evidence" or the factfinder's
conclusion that "a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very
O'Connor was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices White, Kennedy, and Souter. id.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote separate opinions in which both concurred in the
judgment and Justice Stevens concurred in part. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id at 12 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 17 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
157. Id. at 9.Justice O'Connor explained that to hold otherwise would deem constitutional"any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman," which "inflict[ed] less than
some arbitrary quantity of injury." Id.
158. Helling v. McKinney, 509 US 25, 34-35 (1993) (discussing harm resulting from the
Inmate's Involuntary exposure to environmental tobacco smoke). The Hdling Court paralleled
the Hudson Court's 7-2 split. In Hdling Justice White's majority opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist andJustices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Id. at 26.
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 37 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
159. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
160. Justice Souter's opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg. Id. at 827. Justices Blackmun, id. at 851,
and Stevens, id. at 858, filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment. Id.
161. Id, at 829. Dee Farmer, a preoperative transsexual who "'projects feminine
characteristics,'" claimed that federal prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment through
their deliberate indifference to his safety by placing him in the general population of a
penitentiary after his transfer from a correctional institute. Id. Within two weeks, Farmer was
raped and beaten in his cell by another inmate. Id. at 830-31. The record showed that
although prior to his transfer Farmer had been housed in the general male prison population
In several federal facilities, more often he was housed in segregation. Id. The Court recog-
nized that "penitentiaries are typically higher security facilities that house more troublesome
prisoners than federal correctional institutes," where Farmer resided before his transfer to the
penitentiary. Id. at 830.
162. Id, at 847.
163. Id. at 842-43.
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fact that the risk was obvious." 64
Farmer and the other recent cases have clarified the Court's broad
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on prison conditions,"' although not
without critique. According to Justice Thomas, who filed heated dissents in
two cases joined by Justice Scalia, the Court has expanded the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause "beyond all bounds of history and
precedent." 6 Most particularly, Justice Thomas has questioned the
Court's post-Estlle premise that prisoners' deprivations can be punishment
under the Eighth Amendment even when those deprivations are not part
of a criminal sentence.67
It is beyond the scope of this Article to challenge Justice Thomas'
position,164 and, in light of his stance, a debate is unnecessary. This
Article focuses on the very type of punishment that Justice Thomas would
render fit for an Eighth Amendment challenge. 6 9 Given the Court's
164. Farme, 511 U.S., at 842. The Court provided an example. If evidence showed that a
substantial risk of inmate violence was
"longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in
the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had
been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus 'must have known' about
it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the
defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk."
Id. at 842-43 (quoting Brief for Respondents, at 22).
165. Although Farmer steers a more middle course relative to Hudson and Helling, Farmer
nonetheless "eased the concerns" of prisoners' advocates by establishing, along with
McMillian, the duty of prison officials to protect inmates not only from prison guards, but also
from other inmates. See Linda Greenhouse, Prison Officials Can be Found Liable for Inmate-
Against-Inmate Vwlence, Court Rules, N.Y. Thmes, June 7, 1994, at A18 (quoting Alvin J.
Greenhouse, director of the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union,
which represented Farmer). Farmer also impedes the government's efforts to have such suits
dismissed at an early stage in the process. See id.; see also Ashley Dunn, Flood of Prisoner Rights
Suits Brings Effort to Limit Filings; N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1994, at Al (describing the crushing
burden of inmates' civil suits over the last three decades).
166. Helling 509 U.S. at 38 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hudson, 503 US. at 17 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
167. Helling 509 U.S. at 88. Discussing the text and history of the Eighth Amendment,
along with pre-Esee precedent, Justice Thomas asserted in Helling that he would possibly vote
to overrule Estelle if given the opportunity because the Estelle Court's interpretation of
"punishment" does not comport with its historical meaning of being "a penalty imposed for
the commission of a crime." Id. Justice Thomas' separate concurring opinion in Farnt which
Justice Scalia did notjoin, reiterated his position that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to
prison conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 859 (stating that "judges or juries-but not jailers-
impose "punishment"'") (quoting Helling, 508 U.S. at 40). Although Justice Thomas
emphasized that he "disagreed with the constitutional predicate of the Court's analysis" in
Farer, he signed the opinion nonetheless because he shared the Court's view that Farmer's
theory of liability did not comport with Estele Id. at 860.
168. For a challenge to Justice Thomas' position, see generally Donald L Wallace, The
Eighth Amendment and Prison Depnivations: Histoical Revisions, 30 Crim. L Bull. 5 (1994).
169. Despite this Article's confidence that Justice Thomas would agree that execution
methods are appropriate subject matter for the Eighth Amendment, it is, of course, a wholly
different matter concerning whether he would agree that current methods of execution are
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relatively expansive view of the Eighth Amendment in prison conditions
cases, however, this Article considers how that perspective may be applied
in another context: prison officials' administration of an execution
method.
Generally, courts have shied from addressing whether a prison official
acted with deliberate indifference when depriving a death row inmate of a
proper execution, despite evidence that the execution method, as applied,
included a substantial risk of failure. Although the Estelle Court noted that
the "unforeseeable accident" in Francis was not deliberate indifference,1 0
the Court did not project a threshold point of when such failed attempts
would be considered unconstitutional. In turn, neither the Fe district
court nor the Ninth Circuit discussed the potential Eighth Amendment
ramifications of viewing analogously challenges to execution methods and
prison conditions. On the other hand, the Farmer Court does provide some
guidance through its standard for determining whether a prison official
possessed "actual knowledge" of a substantial risk of harm, that is, the risk
was "'longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted'" by
past prison personnel, and that the sued official "'must have known' about
i'.' Part II's discussion of this Article's execution methods test focuses
on these issues to provide a more comprehensive approach to assessing the
constitutionality of executions.
II. TESTING THE CONSTITUTIONALI[Y OF EXECUTION METHODS
The proposed five-factor test for evaluating execution methods in
Table 2 (Appendix 1) relies predominantly on three sources: the Eighth
Amendment typologies detailed in Part I of this Article, the Ninth Circuit's
more specific standards introduced in Campbell and Fierro, as well as related
evidence pertaining to electrocution, lethal injection, and the penological
justification of punishment that this Article discusses later. The test uses, as
a starting point, several Supreme Court standards that constitute the test's
first factor, a "humane baseline" (B), against which the test's remaining
four factors are compared. Under these humane baseline standards,
punishments are cruel when: (1) they involve "something more than the
cruel and unusual.
170. See supra notes 152-53.
171. Famer, 511 U.S. at 842; see supra note 164 and accompanying text. One can make the
argument that an execution device, such as an electric chair, is not a prison condition per se;
rather, the application of the chair is simply one facet of the court's or the jury's decision to
Impose the death sentence and of the legislature's decision to select electrocution as the
means by which death will be accomplished. Examining electrocution at these levels comports
with Justice Thomas' view of "traditional Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence, which focuses on
penalties meted out by statutes or sentencing judges." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 21 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). Yet, such distinctions become artificial when determining the constitutionality of
execution methods that should involve all three levels-the legislatures, the courts, and prison
officials. This Article contends that a comprehensive Eighth Amendment analysis cannot
exclude scrutiny of any level.
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mere extinguishment of human life"; ' 72 (2) they "constitute 'one of
"those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted"'"; 75 and (3) they are
contrary to "evolving standards of decency." 74
According to Table 2's execution methods test, any punishment that
exceeds these humane baseline standards may be excessive (E) and
therefore, possibly cruel and unusual (C). Theoretically, an excessive
punishment may not be per se cruel and unusual because there may be no
alternative (A) punishment that we yet know of that can meet the humane
baseline standards. In addition, there are varying degrees and types of
excessiveness. However, a punishment that is excessive in light of presently
used or available alternatives and that has no acceptable penological
justification (P) can be considered cruel and unusual and therefore
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. In turn, "standards of
decency" (D) pervade every facet of an assessment of the constitutionality
of an execution method. In sum, under Table 2's test, an execution
method is cruel and unusual (C) if it is excessive (E) and therefore greater
than the humane baseline (B), accounting for presently used or available
alternatives (A) and any legitimate penological justification (P) that
method may serve. As mentioned earlier, standards of decency (D) influ-
ence each of these factors.'"
As Table 2 shows, E D, A., and P comprise subfactors derived from
early and recent cases. With respect to the excessiveness (E) factor, for
example, this Article agrees with the Ninth Circuit's determination in
Campbell178 and Fierro" that objective evidence of pain is the primary
concern in scrutinizing the constitutionality of an execution method. This
approach is followed, if necessary, by an analysis of states' legislative trends
in applying that method. 8
Although the Supreme Court set forth general principles gauging
what can be considered excessive, the Campbell and Fierro courts provided
172. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death .... It implies that there is something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of human life.").
173. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (quoting Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 US. 361, 368 (1989) (quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1985)),
cert denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).
174. See id. at 682 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 US. 86, 101 (1958)).
175. The "symbolic" formula, C, = (E, > H) - (AD PD), expresses these interrelationships.
This formula is symbolic because it is not to be taken literally, i.e., it does not presume that A
and P, for example, have additive properties, or that they can be compared along a common
metric. Rather, the formula is a way of organizing descriptive factors so that they can be
balanced and evaluated.
176. 18 F.3d at 682-83.
177. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 308 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds; 117 S. Ct. 285
(1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of changed statute).
178. See Flerro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of
changed statute).
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substantially more detail in their actual evaluations. In an effort to
determine if an inmate experienced "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" while conscious, the Ninth Circuit supported the Rem district court's
consideration of a wide range of evidence, including scientific research
and eyewitness accounts of actual executions.!7 This year, in California
First Amendment Coalition v. Caldemn, * the United States District Court of
the Northern District of California once again emphasized the importance
of eyewitness accounts of actual executions, this time in the context of
lethal injection executions. 8' The court addressed in particular media
witnesses," who "almost invariably now serve as the public's surrogate" to
ensure that "no untoward conduct has occurred."'
In Fierro, the Ninth Circuit also endorsed the district court's threshold
"at which the time to unconsciousness and the corresponding pain would
violate the Constitution."'" Although death "where unconsciousness is
likely to be immediate or within a matter of seconds is apparently within
constitutional limits.... the persistence of consciousness for over a minute
or for between a minute and a minute-and-a-half, but no longer than two
minutes might be outside constitutional boundaries.""s Because Campbell
"also made dear that the method of execution must be considered in
terms of the risk of pain,"" 8 the Ninth Circuit held that a method may
be unconstitutional if an inmate faces a "substantial risk" of suffering"extreme pain for several minutes."" 7 According to the Fierro district
court, this risk was heightened if the execution protocol was created in an"unscientific, slapdash manner."""
For its standards of decency (D) factor, this Article considers critical
an analysis of "objective factors to the maximum extent possible" when
179. Sm Ywm', 77 F.3d at 308. In light of the scientific uncertainty concerning measure-
ments of pain and unconsciousness, the lRerro district court found to be probative, "in varying
degrees," all the evidence of eyewitness observations of gas chamber executions. Rmtero, 865 F.
Supp. at 1400. The court particularly considered as "objective" and "reliable sources of clinical
Information," the San Quentin execution records produced contemporaneously with the
actual executions by trained medical personnel observing inmates closely before them. Id. at
1400.01. The execution records of two recently executed inmates were deemed "the most
probative evidence of pain and consciousness" because the men were executed under the
protocol being challenged. Id. at 1401.
180. 956 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
181. Id. at 890 (noting that the First Amendment protects public access to executions).
182. Id. at 889 ('Even though the historical basis for the media's witnessing of executions
Is somewhat less clear than that of the public generally, it is no stretch to suggest that the
public's right of access includes a right of media access.").
183. Id. The court emphasized that public access to executions was needed to "inform the
community when justice is not even-handed and reform measures are therefore necessary." Id.
at 888.
184. Terfo, 77 F.3d at 307.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 308.
188. FRero, 865 F. Supp. at 1418.
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assessing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual in light of the Court's
requirementlsa Objective factors include legislation passed by elected
representatives,"'0 as well as public attitudes and opinion polls."'
Although the Ninth Circuit declared unnecessary an examination of legis-
lative trends in Fierro because the evidence of pain was so substantial, the
Fierm district court conducted an extensive standards of decency analysis of
states' past and current uses of lethal gas.'9 Because other courts may
not agree with the Ninth Circuit's assessment of lethal gas, or because
courts may find other execution methods less obviously cruel, Table 2's
standards of decency factor provides guidance on how such legislative
trends may be used.
Table 2's execution methods test also includes a factor allowing a
court to evaluate alternative execution methods (A) to determine if the
tested method at issue is unnecessary. Most likely, that alternative method
will be lethal injection,9 3 which provides the focus of this Article's later
alternative method analysis.'9 Similarly, the last factor of the execution
methods test evaluates the possible penological justification (1) for
inhumane execution methods. This Article concludes that legislatures,
courts, and prison personnel have continued to apply particular execution
methods despite substantial evidence suggesting the methods are cruel and
unusual. The penological justification factor surveys the various
philosophies of punishment, the current choice. execution methods
statutes, as well as the retroactive and nonretroactive uses of new execution
methods.
The following sections of this Article apply the execution methods test
to electrocution and lethal injection, currently the two most widely used
execution methods, 9 * as an initial approach to assessing whether these
189. Id. at 1410 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 869 (1989)).
190. Id.
191. IR at 1400-01.
192. &e id. at 1404-08.
193. Although the Ninth Circuit in Fwmr never assessed whether lethal injection was a
viable alternative for executions, the Campbell majority refused to review evidence regarding
lethal injection in order to determine if the risk of pain resulting from hanging was "unneces-
sary." Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 686-87, 716 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (concluding that in
assessing whether a method of punishment is unnecessarily cruel, "[t]he relative merits of
lethal injection are irrelevant"), ceit denie4 511 U.S. 1119 (1994). Yet, the Campbell minority
and the lerro district court seriously questioned this aspect of Campbel, contending that by
definition, "unnecessary" is a comparative standard. If one can show that another method of
execution is not as painful, or that it reduces the risk of inflicting pain, then one can con-
clude that the pain, or risk of pain, associated with the execution method at issue is unneces-
sary. See Campbel4 18 F.3d at 710; FRem,, 865 F. Supp. at 1411 n.26.
194. See infra Part ILC (discussing alternative execution methods).
195. See infra app. 1, thL 1. This Article does not evaluate thoroughly the firing squad
because that method is used infrequently and, apart from historical accounts of the obvious
intentional infliction of pain, it does not evidence the same degree of botching. See gencraly L
Kay Gillespie, The Unforgiven: Utah's Executed Men (1991) (describing the history and
current application of the firing squad in Utah); Denno, supra note 5, at 687-89 (discussing
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methods violate the Eighth Amendment Because few sources exist to
counter claims that these methods constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, the execution methods test relies on the information that is
available. Therefore, this Article offers no pretense that the analysis is




The first question a court should ask is whether electrocution satisfies
the three humane baseline (RI) standards that courts have applied
previously. The first humane baseline (HI) standard considers whether an
execution method was unacceptable when the Bill of Rights was adopted.
If a court's answer to this question is in the affirmative, no additional
examination is necessary because the execution method would be rendered
per se unconstitutional. However, because electrocution did not exist when
the Bill of Rights was adopted, this standard has limited applicability in this
context apart from one key consideration-electrocution was created to
displace hanging, a means of execution that was acceptable when the Bill
of Rights was adopted, but which the New York legislature had declared
"barbarous." ' For this reason, a court may recognize that at least at the
time electrocution was introduced, the New York legislature determined it
was the relatively more humane method and therefore per se acceptable.
In In re Kemmler,Iw the Court implicitly evaluated electrocution
according to the second humane baseline standard (M), "more than the
mere extinguishment of human life."'99 The recent conclusion by three
Justices that Kemmier is not dispositive suggests that electrocution
should be evaluated according to the second as well as the third humane
baseline standard (W), evolving standards of decency.
Some courts have also considered whether a particular state's
execution methods statute is unconstitutionally vague. This approach
recognizes that all three levels of decision makers (legislatures, courts, and
firing squad botches). Regardless, this Article examines briefly past and present penological
justifications for the firing squad in light of Utah's recent firing squad execution and its
resulting controversy. &, infra notes 459-63 and accompanying text.
196. Additional information can easily be incorporated into the execution methods test if
and when it is ever available. A number of informative analyses of execution methods have
been conducted. See generaly Jonathan S. Abernethy, The Methodology of Death. Re~examining the
Detarence Rationa*e 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L Rev. 379 (1996); Adolph, supra note 121; Kristina
E. Beard, Comment, FEve Under the Eighth" Methodology Review and the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, 51 Miami L Rev. 445 (1997); Roberta M Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney:
Analyzing the (Un)constitutionality of the Methods ofFxeution, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. LJ. 153 (1996).
197. InreKemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 447.
200. Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 933 (1993).
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prison personnel) are simultaneously involved in execution procedures,
but that legislatures could play a greater role in curtailing prison
personnel's discretion in implementing executions.2 "
Currently, nine states can still use electrocution. Six states use
electrocution as their sole method of execution,02 and three states allow
the condemned a choice between electrocution and lethal injection. 2-
Three of the nine states that allow electrocution are included in the top
five death penalty states that account for three-fourths of all execu-
tions. Yet, not one of these nine states provides information on the
voltage or amperage of the electrical current that should be applied, or the
way that current should be administered. Four of the nine states specify
201. &e infra notes 280, 286, 326-29 and accompanying text; see also Reno v. Koray, 115 S.
Ct. 2021, 2022 (1995) (holding that "[a] statute is not ambiguous... merely because there is
a division of judicial authority over its proper construction"); compare Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 652-56 (1990) (holding that Arizona's sentencing scheme for evaluating aggravating
and mitigating circumstances for death sentences was not unconstitutionally vague under the
Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments because the decision was made by ajudge and not a
jury) with Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 430-33 (1980) (holding that Georgia's death
penalty statute violated the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments because it was too broad
and invited "arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence").
202. The six states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Tennessee. Se
Ala. Code § 15-18-82(a) (1975) (current 1996) ("[T]he sentence shall be executed... by
causing to pass through the body of the convict a current of electricity of sufficient intensity
to cause death and the application and continuance of such current through the body of such
convict shall continue until such convict is dead."); Fla. Stat. ch. 922.10 (1992) (amended
1994) (current 1996) ("A death sentence shall be executed by electrocution."); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-10-38(a) (1985) (current 1997) ("[The convict] shall suffer such punishment by
electrocution."); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.220 (Banks-Baldwin 1992) (current 1996) ("Every
death sentence shall be executed by causing to pass through the body... a current of
electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death as quickly as possible."); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
2532 (1943) (current 1996) ("[Death] shall be by causing to pass through the body.., a
current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death."); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114
(1932) (current 1996) ("[The convict shall] be put to death by electrocution, and [his] body
be subjected to shock by a sufficient current of electricity until he is dead.").
203. Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia allow a choice between electrocution and lethal
injection; only the electrocution provisions in their respective statutes are cited here. Se Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2949.22(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1993) (amended 1994) (current 1997) ("[The]
death sentence shall be executed by causing a current of electricity, of sufficient intensity to
cause death, to pass through the body of the person upon whom the sentence was imposed.");
S.C. Code Ann § 24-3-530 (A) (Law Co-op. 1976) (amended 1995) (current 1996) ("[The con-
dened] shall suffer the [death] penalty by electrocution."); Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-233
(Michie 1994) (current 1997) ("The death chamber shall have all the necessary appliances for
the proper execution of prisoners by electrocution."). Arkansas allows pre-enactment
prisoners a choice between electrocution and lethal injection. See infa app. 1, tbl. 8, n.494;
app. 3 (Arkansas). However, only two inmates remain who can make that choice. Telephone
Interview with Dina Tyler, Spokesperson, Arkansas Dept. of Corrections (June 14, 1997).
Because of the limited potential for the use of electrocution in Arkansas, this Article does not
consider Arkansas a choice state.
204. Since 1977, Texas, Florida, Virginia, Louisiana, and Georgia have constituted the top
five death penalty states. Until 1995, Virginia was an electrocution-only state. See infta app. 3
(Virginia); Bureau ofJustice Statistics Bulletin, Capital Punishment 1994, 10 (1996).
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nothing more than "death or punishment by electrocution."206 Overall,
the electrocution statutes alone provide insufficient information to assess
whether electrocution meets Table 2's humane baseline standard. For this
reason, electrocution must be evaluated under the remaining four factors
of the execution methods test. The examination continues by inquiring
whether electrocution is excessive.
2. Excessiveness
Determining whether electrocution is excessive (E) depends upon
three standards assessing the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
(El), "the dignity" of the individual (E2), and the risk of "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" (3). If evidence of excessive pain is not
dispositive, this evaluation will consider evidence of legislative trends in
light of current standards of decency (D).20
a. "Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain"
Until 1990, Fred A. Leuchter Associates, Inc., of Boston dominated
the modem design and creation of the electric chair, serving as this
country's only commercial supplier of execution equipment and sole
organizer of a training program for execution technicians.o Fred
Leuchter, the president of the company, created, repaired, and installed all
types of execution equipment, including electrocution systems and chairs,
lethal injection machines, gas chambers, and gallows2os Revelations that
Leuchter had no formal academic credentials in engineering and was not
205. See supra notes 202-03 (The four states are Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and
Virginia.).
206. Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affld 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other ground; 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for consideration in light of
changed statute).
207. See Susan Lehman, A Matter of Engineering: Capital Punishment As A Technical Problem,
Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1990, at 26. Jay Wiechert, head of Wiechert Manufacturing in Fort
Smith, Arkansas, has designed "[slome of the most popular versions of the electric chair
available today," although he characterizes his electrocution business as "just a little sideline"
to his construction of automated manufacturing equipment. Carl Swanson, The Executioners
Songbook, Observatory, Jan. 23, 1995, at 13. Upon this author's request, Wiechert declined to
describe his electric chair or send any materials about its construction. Telephone Interview
with Jay Wiechert, head of Wiechert Manufacturing (Aug. 8, 1995). For a description of the
mechanics of electrocution, see Denno, supra note 5, at 626-33.
208. See Stephen Trombley, The Execution Protocol: Inside America's Capital Punishment
Industry 3-94 (1992) (discussing Leuchter's work on execution equipment); James Bandler,
1Red Leuchter: Killing 7Time with Death's Efficiency Exper, In These Times, June 2O-july 3, 1990, at
22 (describing Leuchter's construction of and attitudes toward execution devices).
[19971
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qualified to call himself an engineer' ruined his execution business."'°
Regardless, Leuchter's depictions of electrocution devices are important
because he has had more experience with the development and applica-
tion of execution equipment than anyone else in this country,2 1 his ideas
and execution equipment continue to dominate the prison industry.1 2
A typical Leuchter electric chair applies 2640 volts and five amperes
of electrical current in two separate one-minute jolts" A current
exceeding six amps can cause excessive burning of the flesh.14 According
to Leuchter, electrocution can be more humane than other methods of
execution because it operates more quickly than a subject's conscious
nervous system can record pain. Yet, because most of the execution
equipment is nearly a century old, the electric chair probably creates
pamn 6 because it is either in "questionable condition" or "downright
defective."2 7 In sum, Leuchter believes an inmate becomes unconscious
immediately and feels no pain if electrocution is applied under ideal
conditions. If electrocution is applied improperly or the equipment is
faulty, an inmate becomes unconscious relatively slowly and can feel greatpain.218
Other research on the effects of electrocution has accumulated over
209. Se Denno, supra note 5, at 654-60 (noting that Leuchter's qualifications were
investigated when he gained national attention through his published articles and expert
testimony proposing that the number of deaths in the Holocaust had been exaggerated and
that the Nazis could not have used gas chambers to kill six million Jewish people).
210. See ia at 659-60.
211. From 1979 to 1990, Leuchter consulted with or provided execution equipment for at
least 27 states. Id. at 627. This number may be an underestimate. In a personal interview with
this author, Leuchter stated that he has at one time or another consulted with an official in
every state that has the death penalty. Telephone Interview with Fred A. Leuchter, former
president, Fred A. Leuchter Associates, Inc. (July 17, 1992). Leuchter's testimony and
affidavits have also been used in a number of cases to determine whether design defects or
disrepair of electric chairs have resulted in pain and suffering. See Squires v. Dugger, 794 F.
Supp. 1568, 1579-80 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Kirkpatrick v. Whitley, No. 91-0502, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7387, at *49 (E.D. La. 1991); Buenoano v. Dugger, No. 90-475-C1V-ORL-19, 1990 WL
119637, at *32 (M.D. Fla. 1990), vacated sub m. Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433 (11th
Cir. 1992).
212. See Trombley, supra note 208, at 3-94 (discussing how Leuchter's work on execution
equipment began and continues to dominate executions in the prison industry).
213. Lehman, supra note 207, at 27. According to Leuchter, a "good" electrocution system
uses three electrodes. Id. at 26. An electrode on the inmate's head first introduces electricity
to the body and the current then travels through the body toward two electrodes secured to
the ankles. Id.
214. Id. at 27.
215. Under ideal circumstances, an inmate should lose consciousness in 4.16 milliseconds
(1/240 of a second), 24 times faster than the subject's conscious nervous system can record
pain. Id at 28. See Fred A. Leuchter Assocs., Inc., Modular Electrocutions System Manual 1
(Nov. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Electrocution Manual].
216. Lehman, supra note 207, at 28. According to Leuchter, however, "fewer people are
tortured" because of his efforts. Id.
217. Id
218. Id.
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the century. 1 The most recent research and eyewitness observations
suggest that a wide range of factors associated with an electrocution, such
as severe burning, boiling body fluids, asphyxiation, and cardiac arrest, can
cause extreme pain when unconsciousness is not instantaneous.' -
219. Experiments on animals near the turn of the century considerably swayed the Kemmier
trial courts because the experiments suggested that death by electrocution was instantaneous.
See, ag., George E. Fell, Te Influene of ETecticit on Protoplas, with Some Remarks on the
Kemmler xesution, 12 Physician & Surgeon 433, 440 (1890) (describing the research on
animals that lead to the development of the electric chair). Yet, other research indicated that
electrocution causes "pain too great to imagine." See Negley K. Teeters &Jack H1 Hedblom,
Hang By The Neck 447 (1967) (discussing Nicola Tesla, an expert on electricity who worked
at times with Thomas Edison, and who stated that during electrocution, "the vital organs may
be preserved; and pain, too great for us to imagine7, is induced"). No one systematically
examined the issue again until five decades later in a report by Great Britain's influential
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment ("Royal Commission"). See Royal Commission On
Capital Punishment, 1949-53 Report 251 (1953) [hereinafter Royal Comm'n Rep.]. The Royal
Commission agreed with the Kemmer trial courts' conclusions that during electrocution,"unconsciousness is apparently instantaneous." IM Yet, the Royal Commission's Report was
based upon a limited overview of electrocution in the United States, and it had no solid
scientific support. See Denno, supra note 5, at 636-37.
220. See infra app. 2A (Electrocution); Declaration of Theodore Bernstein, Ph.D. if 7-9
[hereinafter Bernstein-Jones Complaint Declaration], Exhibit 3 of App. to Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jones v. McAndrew, No.
497CV103 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 1997) [hereinafterJones Complaint]; Affidavit of Orrin Devinsky,
M.D. 11 9-10 [hereinafter Devinsky-Jones Complaint Affidavit], Exhibit 2 ofJones Complaint,
supra; Affidavit of Orrin Devinsky, M.D. 118-21 [hereinafter Devinsky-Bassette Memorandum
Affidavit], Exhibit I of Memorandum in Support of Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Relief,
and Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, Bassette v. Virginia, No. 5:92CVIl (ElD. Va.
Jan. 23, 1992) [hereinafter Bassette Memorandum]; Affidavit of Harold Hillman, M.D., Ph.D.
1 19 [hereinafter Hillman-Bassette Memordidum Affidavit], Exhibit Z of Bassette
Memorandum, supra; Affidavit of Harold Hillman, MD., Ph.D. 118-15 [hereinafter Hilman-
Poyner Stay Affidavit], Exhibit 10 of Application for Stay of Execution, Poyner v. Murray, 508
U.S. 931 (1993) (No. 92-7944) [hereinafter Poyner Stay]; Affidavit of E.B. Ilgren, MD. 11 8-
15 [hereinafter Ilgren-Jones Complaint Affidavit], Exhibit 5 of Jones Complaint, supra;
Affidavit of E.B. Ilgren, MD. 11 8-14 [hereinafter Ilgren-Poyner Reprieve Affidavit], Exhibit 5
of Syrasky L. Poyner, Petition for Temporary Reprieve 7, Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931
(1993) (No. 92-7944) [hereinafter Poyner Reprieve] (reviewing autopsy reports for 14 men
electrocuted in Vrginia's electric chair); Affidavit of F.B. Ilgren, M.D. 15 [hereinafter
ligren-Poyner Stay Affidavit], Exhibit 12 of Poyner Stay, supr; Declaration of Robert H.
Kirschner, M.D. 1 8-9 [hereinafter Kirschner-Jones Complaint Declaration], Exhibit 1 of
Jones Complaint, supra; Affidavit of Donald D. Price, Ph.D. 1 15-30 [hereinafter Price-Jones
Complaint Affidavit], Exhibit 4 ofJones Complaint, supra; Affidavit of Donald D. Price, Ph.D.
11 4-12 [hereinafter Price-Poyner Reprieve Affidavit], Exhibit 8 of Poyner Reprieve, supra;
Affidavit of Donald D. Price, Ph.D. 1 4-10 [hereinafter Price-Poyner Stay Affidavit], Exhibit
13 of Poyner Stay, supra; see also Harold Hillman, An Unnatural Way to Die, New Scientist, Oct.
27, 1983, at 276, 278 ("In fact, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the condemned
person does not suffer severe and prolonged pain."); Harold Hillman, 77te Possible Pain
Eperienced During Execution by Different Methods, 22 Perception 745, 749 (1993) [hereinafter
Hillman, Possible Pain] (noting the high intensity of the pain of electrocution compared to
other execution methods). Necropsy reports indicate that the electric chair generally causes
death by massive electrical damage to the nervous system. See Hillman, Possible Pain, supra, at
747; Dr. James Le Fanu, Health Second Opinion: A Shocking Way to Be Kill, Independent, Aug.
12, 1990, at 51.
[1997]
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Leuchter notes in his Modular Electrocution System Manua2' a nineteen-
page instruction manual for operating his electric chairs, that an improper
adherence to the Manual requirements "could result in pain to the subject
and failure to achieve heart death, leaving a brain dead subject in the
chair."2 Furthermore, voltages of less than 2000 volts, at saturation,
cannot ensure heart death and are therefore inadequate because "they may
cause unnecessary trauma to the subject prior to death."22 Leuchter's
account supports arguments that even a routine electrocution can cause
torture and a lingering death because of human error, a lack of
experience and knowledge, or machine malfunction. 4 Scant and
unscientific protocols exacerbate these problems.2
Other experts also emphasize that the human skull can insulate the
brain from an electric current,226 thereby preventing the current from
penetrating the brain to cause unconsciousness or to destroy nerve
activity.2 Because the electric current stimulates each muscle to full
contraction, a prisoner cannot move even when the current is momentarily
turned off, "a physiological effect that, in itself, is enormously painful
and further prevents the prisoner from crying out or providing other
outward signs of other massively painful effects of electrocution such as
third degree bums and an enormous heating up of bodily fluids
throughout the body."22 8
In some states, the more recent practice of administering a series of
two or more electric jolts, then waiting to examine the prisoner's pulse,
heightens the likelihood that death will have occurred by the time a
physician checks for the heartbeat m Even under these circumstances,
however, witnesses of botched executions have reported a substantial
number of outward signs of life, such as gasps for breath, moans, and
twitches of the hands. 2- Moreover, research on the effects of electricity
on the brain resulting from all kinds of causes-for example, lightning,
electroconvulsive therapy, accidental electrocutions, and intentional
electrocutions-indicates that during an intentional electrocution, an
individual is very likely to: (1) experience intense pain, (2) die slowly,
(3) evidence serious emotional trauma, and (4) remain conscious.23
221. See Electrocution Manual, supra note 215.
222. Id at 1.
223. Id.
224. See Bassette Memorandum, supra note 220, at 2.
225. See id. at 34 (describing the brevity of training materials).
226. See i& at 12.
227. See Hillman-Bassette Memorandum Affidavit, supra note 220, 1 9; Ilgren-Poyner
Reprieve Affidavit, supra note 220, 15; Jones Complaint, supra note 220, 1 7.
228. Hillman-Bassette Memorandum Affidavit, supra note 220, 1 12-13.
229. See id. 1 13.
230. &e id.; infra app. 2A (Electrocution) (listing botched electrocutions).
231. See Devinsky-jones Complaint Affidavit, supra note 220, 11 9-15; Hillman-Bassette
Memorandum Affidavit, supra note 220, [ 13-22; Ilgren-Jones Complaint Affidavit, supra note
220, 11 8-15; Price-Jones Complaint Affidavit, supra note 220, 11 15-30. For medical research
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According to Orrin Devinsky, M.D., Professor of Neurology at the New
York University Medical Center and Chief of Neurology at the Hospital for
Joint Diseases,2ss substantial evidence indicates that the effects of
electrical current differ among individuals due to a range of factors:
(1) skin resistance, (2) skull thickness and resistance, (3) the type of
electrode used for stimulation, and (4) the type and amount of conductive
solution applied.2 4 No study has definitively determined whether
electrocution causes immediate brain death or pain.!
In light of courts' emphasis on the probative value of eyewitness
accounts of actual executions for establishing pain, Appendix 2A of
this Article details eighteen botched electrocutions following Gregg v.
Georg42,7 when the Supreme Court ended its moratorium on the death
penalty.' The number of post-Gregg botched electrocutions is likely to be
a gross underestimate of the botches that have actually occurred because of
the dearth of media witnesses.2" Nonetheless, these accounts provide
considerable evidence of extensive pain and suffering experienced by
electrocuted prisoners.24
on the physical effects of accidental and therapeutic electrocution, see Max Fink, M.D.,
Convulsive Therapy: Theory and Practice 51-57 (1979) (balancing the physiological risks of
electroconvulsive therapy with the benefits); MacDonald Critcbley, M.D., Electdical Injuyies 229
Lancet 1002 (1935) (report of a lecture by MacDonald Critchley before the Medical Society of
London); MacDonald Critchley, M.D., Neurological Effects of Lightning and ElkectidVy, 226 Lancet
68 (1934); Leston A. Havens, M.D., A Comparative Study of Modiftied and Unmodified Electric S7wck
Treatmen, 19 Diseases Nervous Sys. 29, 32-34 (1959); C.W. Hume, Electric Shock and Sujeciwve
Sensation, 229 Lancet 1021 (1935); Fredrich Panse, Elctrical Trauma, in 23 Handbook of
Clinical Neurology: Injuries of the Brain and Skull, Part 1 683 (P.J. Viken & G.W. Bruyn eds.,
1975); A.H.D. Richmond, A Fatal Case of Elctocution, 228 Lancet 16 (1935).
232. Devinsky-Bassette Memorandum Affidavit, supra note 220, 1[ 3-4; Devinsky-Jones
Complaint Affidavit, supra note 220, [[ 3-4.
233. Devinsky-Bassette Memorandum Affidavit, supra note 220, 21.
234. Id.
235. Id. 18; see also Price-Jones Complaint Affidavit, supra note 220, 30 (emphasizing
"the absence of any objective, scientific evidence for immediate loss of consciousness").
236. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
237. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
238. See id. at 168-207.
239. See infra notes 266, 318 and accompanying text (citing instances where media
witnesses were barred or discouraged from witnessing executions).
240. Notably, eyewitness accounts of pain are generally determined by a wide range of
sources, including attorneys, reporters, prison personnel, politicians, family, friends, spiritual
advisors and, when available, doctors conducting an autopsy. Unlike some of the evidence
cited in FIleo v. Gomn 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1400-02 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of
changed statute), there are no records available that provide contemporaneous accounts of
electrocutions systematically acquired by medical personnel, the data the Herro district court
considered most probative. Id. At the same time, however, extensive autopsy data collected
from electrocuted Inmates provide information that was not reported for the lethal gas execu-
tions analyzed In Fenv. Altogether, then, a substantial amount of evidence suggests that
electrocutions can inflict pain, particularly when the electrocutions are botched.
[1997]
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 358 1996-1997
ARE EXECUTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL?
b. "Nothing Less than" Human Dignity
Evidence of mutilation resulting from electrocution is derived from
three sources: post-execution autopsies, which are required in some states;
observations provided by experts; and witnesses' descriptions of executions,
some of which are detailed in Appendix 2-A of this Article. According to
autopsy records and pictures, the mutilation results from excessive burning
of the skin that removes chunks of flesh from the prisoner's face and body
and reveals leg and skull bone wherever an electrode was touching.241
Theodore Bernstein, a nationally known electrical engineer,242 contends
that faulty electrode designs can create "excessive, completely unnecessary
burning of the person being executed."243
Even if electrocution were instantaneous, it could still be considered
unconstitutional given its effects on the human body, including: charring.
of the skin and severe external burning, such as the possible burning away
of the ear, exploding of the penis; defecation and micturition, which ne-
cessitate that the condemned person wear a diaper, drooling and vomiting;
blood flowing from facial orifices; intense muscle spasms and contractions;
odors resulting from the burning of the skin and the body;, and ex- tensive
sweating and swelling of skin tissue. 2" Moreover, condemned individuals
feel considerable anxiety and fear while they are on death row, emotions
that become more intense as the prospect of an execution nears.2
241. Some of the most extensive pictorial and autopsy evidence of burns and mutilation is
provided in the briefs for Anthony Bertolotti. See App. to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
by Person in State Custody, Bertolotti v. Dugger, No. 90-559-C1V-ORL-18 (M.D. Fla., July 23,
1990) [hereinafter Bertolotti Petition] (providing post-mortem pictures of numerous death
row inmates who have been executed); see also Ron Wikberg, Death Watch: The Horror Show,
Angolite, Sept-Oct. 1990, at 25, 33-37 (describing, among other things, the mutilated bodies
of Robert Wayne Williams and Wayne Robert Felde, who died in Louisiana's electric chair in
1983 and 1988, respectively).
242. Wikberg, supra note 241, at 40-41. Bernstein holds B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in
electrical engineering from the University of Wisconsin. His interest in the history of electro-
cution began with his studies on the effects of electricity and lightning on humans. He also
worked with Boeing in Seattle, with the AC Electronics Division of General Motors
Corporation in Milwaukee, and with TRV Systems in Redondo Beach, California. He recently
retired from the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, where his major interests were in
electrical and lightning safety. He has been qualified as an expert in electrical engineering
and lightning in over 15 state and federal courts. Id. Currently, Bernstein is a consulting
electrical engineer. See Bernstein-Jones Complaint Declaration, supra note 220, 111 -3.
243. Wikberg, supra note 220, at 40; see also Bernstein-Jones Complaint Declaration, supra
note 220, 1 7-9; Affidavit of Theodore Bernstein, Ph.D., Exhibit of Kirkpatrick v. Whitley,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7387 (E.D. La. May 29, 1991) (No. 91-0502), vacated and remande4 992
F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1993).
244. Affidavit of Harold Hillman, M.D., Ph.D. 11 13, 19 [hereinafter Hillman-Rondon
Memorandum Affidavit], Exhibit B of Petitioner's Objection to Summary Disposition and
Memorandum of Law in Support and In Opposition to Summary Disposition of Challenge to
Electric Chair, Rondon v. State, No. 2CR-186-1084-760 (Sup. Ct. Ind. Nov. 11, 1994)
[hereinafter Rondon Memorandum]; Affidavit of E.B. Ilgren, M.D. 1 8-12 [hereinafter
Ilgren-Rondon Memorandum Affidavit], Exhibit A of Rondon Memorandum, supra.
245. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22 (1995) (discussing the horrible feelings
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The 1990 execution of Wilbert Lee Evans in Virginia was particularly
offensive because of the physical violence that electrocution inflicted on his
body. According to accounts by witnesses and reporters, blood poured
from Evans' eyes and nose, drenching his shirt.! The flames witnessed
during the 1990 execution of Jesse Joseph Tafero and the 1997 execution
of Pedro Medina made the public explicitly aware of how a human body
could be burned and distorted during an electrocution.2 47 The body of
Wayne Robert Felde, who died in Louisiana's electric chair in 1988,
showed such severe third and fourth degree bums that "chunks" of his
skin had been burned off the left side of his head, revealing his skull
bone.248
c. The Risk of "Unnecessary and Wanton" Pain
When legislatures or courts validate the use of electrocution, they
presume that prison officials will carry out executions properly and that
equipment will not malfunction. An assessment of the risk of unnecessary
and wanton pain, however, comports with the Fierro district court's focus
on the execution "procedure as a whole and over time."2  It therefore
recognizes the potential for prison personnels' contributions to a risk,
either in terms of their administration of an execution, the quality of their
protocols, or their deliberate indifference to a risk.
In 1990, for example, the botched electrocution of Jesse Joseph
Tafero in Florida ° suggested there was a substantial likelihood the
state's execution procedure could result in severe pain and prolonged
agony.2' Yet, the District Court of the Middle District of Florida held in
Hamblen v. Dugger 22 that James William Hamblen would not be entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on such a claim.26 The court based its decision
on the factual findings of a prior evidentiary hearing and determined
of uncertainty that can arise during the time of incarceration preceding an execution); Robert
Johnson, Death Work: A Study of the Modem Execution Process 83-109 (1990) (describing
reports of fear and anxiety by those on death row).
246. See infra app. 2.A (Electrocution: Wilbert Lee Evans).
247. See id. (Electrocution: Jesse Joseph Tafero, Pedro Medina).
248. See id (Electrocution: Wayne Robert Felde).
249. Ferro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1411 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Louisiana ev
rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947)), affd4 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), vacated on
other ground, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of changed
statute).
250. See infra app. 2.A (Electrocution: JesseJoseph Tafero) (describing in detail the results
of the botched Tafero execution).
251. See Hamblen v. Dugger, 748 F. Supp. 1498, 1501-04 (M.D. Fla. 1990). After Tafero's
execution, facts emerged that cast great doubt on whether Tafero was guilty of the crime for
which he was executed. See RonaldJ. Tabak, Book Review, 12 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 243,
273-74 (1994) (discussing beliefs of Tafero's innocence).
252. 748 F. Supp. 1498 (MD. Fla. 1990).
253. Id. at 1501-04.
254. Id. at 1501 (citing Buenoano v. Dugger, No. 90-463-CW-ORL-19, at 70-82 (M.D. Fla.,
[1997]
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the Director of Corrections' repairs to the electric chair precluded the
likelihood of future problems.23 Moreover, Florida's record of executions
put Tafero's botch "in the category of a single, unforeseeable acci-
dent." 2 Using Alabama's experiences as an example, the Hamblea court
determined that "[ilf a pattern of mafunctions develops, perhaps even as few as
two consecutive or nearly consecutive executions, then it may become
appropriate to consider whether the application of electrocution in Florida
is infected with 'an element of cruelty. ' "27
Unfortunately, a pattern of consecutive malfunctions was established
this year when Pedro Medina's Florida electrocution was botched. As the
following accounts indicate, Tafero's and Medina's executions shared
similar problems.
Jesse Joseph Tafero, May 4, 1990 (RThida). For four minutes, the hooded
executioner applied three 2000-volt jolts of electricity to Tafero's body.
Until the last jolt Tafero "continued to clench his fists, nod, convdlse and
appear to breathe deeply.., as if he were alive." The jolts then sparked a
fire on Tafero's head with six-to twelve-inch flames that filled the execution
chamber with smoke. The fire also caused ashes, "flames and smoke clouds
to fly from [Tafero's bobbing] head during each of the three surges" while
"his throat produced gurgling sounds." Witnesses and reporters were
shocked by the incident, which created statewide newspaper headlines the
next day.!
Pedro Medina, March 25, 1997 (lrida). "Immediately" after the
executioner applied the electricity, Medina "lurched backward into the
chair and balled his hands into fists" while his mask "burst into flames."
According to witnesses, "[b]lue and orange flames up to a foot long shot
from the right side of Mr. Medina's head and flickered for 6 to 10 seconds,
filling the execution chamber with smoke." The "smell of burnt flesh filled
the witness room." Four minutes later, Medina was pronounced dead.
Corrections Department spokesperson Kerry Flack explained that "a
maintenance supervisor wearing electrical gloves patted out the flames
while another official opened a window to disperse the smoke." Witnesses
described the scene as "ghastly." Others claimed they were "nauseated by
the sight and the smell." "It was horrible. A solid flame covered his whole
head from one side to the other. I had the impression of somebody being
burned alive," stated one witness.25
June 22, 1990)).
255. Id at 1503.
256. Id. at 1504.
257. Hamblen, 748 F. Supp. at 1504 (emphasis added); se also Squires v. Dugger, 794 F.
Supp. 1568, 1580 (M.D. Fla. 1992) ("[Ain occasional malfunction that may produce added
anguish does not establish that a method of execution is unconstitutional. Absent a showing
establishing a pattern of malfunctions ... the Court cannot conclude that unnecessary pain is
being inflicted during executions in the Florida electric chair." (citation omitted)).
258. See infta app. 2A (Electrocution: Jesse Joseph Tafero).
259. See id. (Electrocution: Pedro Medina).
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The range and variety of official explanations for Tafero's and
Medina's electrocutions were also similar. Officials pointed to difficulties
with insufficient electrical current and voltage; problems with the sponge
in the headset; defects with the electrodes and overall mechanical failure;
as well as evidence that both men failed to die instantly or painlessly as
prison doctors contended. ° Ironically, Tafero's and Medina's executions
resembled William Kemmler's, which took place over a century ago.!61
A pattern of consecutive botching also occurred in Virginia even after
the state rewired the electric chair due to prior botching. Nonetheless,
Virginia still retains electrocution as a choice method.8 2
In general, the Hamblen court failed to recognize the Fierro district
court's reasoning that an execution method should be evaluated "as a
whole and over time," 2's rather than as a discrete execution event specific
to a particular time and state. Not only do most states (such as Florida and
Virginia) possess the same kinds of execution equipment, but prison
officials are aware of the problems occurring elsewhere.!
260. See id. (Electrocution:JesseJoseph Tafero, Pedro Medina).
261. According to a New York Times reporter's account of Kemmler's August 6, 1890,
execution in NewYork,
After the first convulsion there was not the slightest movement of Kemmler's
body.... Then the eyes that had been momentarily turned from Kemmler's body
returned to it and gazed with horror on what they saw. The men rose from their
chairs impulsively and groaned at the agony they felt "Great Godl he is alive?" some
one said; "Turn on the current," said another ....
Again came that click as before, and again the body of the unconscious wretch
in the chair became as rigid as one of bronze. It was awful, and the witnesses were so
horrified by the ghastly sight that they could not take their eyes off it The dynamo
did not seem to run smoothly. The current could be heard sharply snapping. Blood
began to appear on the face of the wretch in the chair. It stood on the face like
sweat ...
An awful odor began to permeate the death chamber, and then, as though to
cap the climax of this fearful sight, it was seen that the hair under and around the
electrode on the head and the flesh under and around the electrode at the base of
the spine was singeing. The stench was unbearable.
SeeFar Worse, supra note 92, at 1. Officials' explanations for Kemmler's botched execution also
resembled the explanations provided for the Tafero and Medina botches. See Denno, supra
note 5, at 601-02.
262. In Bassette v. Commonwealth, No. 3:92CVII (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 1992), Herbert P.
Bassette, who was eventually removed from death row, see Arthur Hodges, Bassette Escapes His
Date with Death, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 24, 1992, at Al, challenged the constitutional-
ity of Virginia's use of the electric chair. See Bassette Memorandum, supra note 220, at 2.
Among other things, Bassette contended that a botched electrocution was highly foreseeable
because 2 out of the last 3 electrocutions in Virginia had been bungled. Id. at 2 n.1.
Moreover, before Virginia rewired its electric chair in 1990 due to complaints that the chair
was antiquated, the state experienced 2 botched electrocutions out of 11, or 18%; yet after
the chair's rewiring, Virginia experienced an even higher botch ratio-i botched electrocu-
tion out of 2, or 50%. See id. at 40-41.
263. Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1411 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affc, 77 F.3d 301
(9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in
light of changed statute).
264. See infra app. 2.A (Electrocution) (demonstrating that many officials admit to making
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According to Michael Radelet, Professor of Sociology at the University
of Florida, nearly nine percent of all media-reported executions (for all
execution methods) since Gregg have been botched. Detailed accounts
of these and other botches are provided in Appendix 2A-C of this Article.
Radelet's and this Article's calculations of botches are limited, however,
because not all executions are media-witnessed or reported systematic-
ally.25 Regardless, these estimates highlight the need to assess botches in
the aggregate. Furthermore, the evidence on botched executions suggests
that the risk of a botch within some states approaches the Farmer Court's
standard of deliberate indifference-the risk is "longstanding, pervasive,
well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and
that the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official... had been
exposed to information concerning the risk and thus 'must have known
about it.' "27
3. "Standards of Decenc" and Legislative Trends
According to the Fierro district court's interpretation of Campbel, a
state should examine legislative trends if evidence of pain inflicted by an
execution method is "not dispositive."' This Article's assessment of
errors and that the officials are aware of them occurring in other states). For example, Florida
corrections officials were aware of the problems with electrocution from accounts of
Alabama's botched execution of Horace F. Dunkins. See Sean Loughlin, Mis-aiing Requires
Second Elekrocufion, Gainesville Sun (Fla.), July 15, 1989, at 1A. Yet, officials said such a
malfunction at Florida State Prison would be unlikely to occur because they would "'do every-
thing possible to make sure it does not.'" Id. at SA (quoting the assistant superintendent for
operations at Florida State Prison).
265. SeFernandez, supra note 110, at A14. Radelet's estimate was based on his scrutiny of
the 168 media-witnessed executions that occurred prior to the April 1992 execution of Robert
Alton Harris. Of those 168 executions, 15, or 8.9%, were botched. Id. Of the 15 executions
that were botched, 7 were by electrocution, 7 by lethal injection, and I by lethal gas. Id. For a
depiction of Radeet's active involvement in death penalty cases, see Von Drehle, supra note
21, at 280-82, 320, 356, 378, 383, 388-90; see also Affidavit of Michael L Radelet [hereinafter
Radelet-Jones Complaint Affidavit], Exhibit 6 ofJones Complaint, supra note 220 (describing
botched electrocution executions).
266. For example, until 1988, the Commonwealth of Virginia barred the media from
witnessing executions. Bassette Memorandum, supra note 220, at 3. This year, the Northern
District of California held that prison officials' exclusion of the public's and media's witnesses
from critical phases of the lethal injection process violated the First Amendment in light of
officials' curtailment of witnesses' abilities to view the 1996 execution of William Bonin. See
California First Amendment Coalition v. Calderon, 956 F. Supp. 883, 883-890 (N.D. Cal.
1997). Recently, some major news organizations in Texas have stopped sending reporters to
cover executions simply because executions have become too frequent. See Sam Howe
Verhovek, As Teas Executions Mount, TIa Grow Routine, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1997, at 1, 22.
267. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). Even though the Farmer Court's
standard pertains to the risk of inmate attacks, the Court did not suggest that it should be
limited only to this circumstance. Furthermore, the likelihood of a botched execution can be
estimated far more accurately than the likelihood of an inmate attack, given that the former is
based on more readily identifiable and objective criteria.
268. Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1412.
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electrocution suggests that evidence of pain, the risk of pain, and the loss
of human dignity are dispositive. Nonetheless, this section evaluates
standards of decency (D) as the third factor in Table 2's execution
methods test in light of possible challenges to this interpretation.
A thorough assessment should consider legislative changes in
execution methods over the course of the Twentieth Century, starting after
the Kemmier Court's decline to review the constitutionality of the New York
legislature's selection of electrocution. Tables 3-7 (Appendix 1), and their
supporting materials (Appendix 3), provide unprecedented documentation
of century-long legislative changes for each state for all five methods of
execution.269 Tables 3 and 4 show changes in every execution method for
each state; Tables 5-7 illustrate states' changes in execution methods as a
whole, starting with an overview of the century-long pattern in Table 5, and
particular states' changes in Tables 6 and 7. 7
Three themes emerge from an overview of legislative trends. First,
most state legislatures purport to change from one method of execution to
another, or to a choice between a state's old method and lethal injection,
for humanitarian reasons. However, other factors (for example, cost) can
also influence the legislature's decision. Second, legislatures evidence a
fairly consistent pattern of movement from one method to another,
suggesting states take notice of the methods used and the difficulties
encountered by other states. Third, since 1977 when lethal injection was
first introduced, no state has changed to, or included as a choice, any
other method of execution. This Article will discuss whether such
adherence to lethal injection is warranted.
a. From Hanging to Electrocution and Lethal Gas
In 1853, hanging-the "nearly universal form of execution"-was used
in forty-eight "states."21 Nearly four decades later, however, states began
269. See In re Kernmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890).
270. All materials focus on when legislatures enacted changes in a method of execution,
not on the effective dates of those changes nor on the state-wide effects of Supreme Court
decisions, such as Funman and Gregg. For example, Appendix 1, Tables 3 and 4, infra, which
document legislative changes only, do not reflect the fact that the Massachusetts judiciary has
abolished the death penalty or that, until 1995, New York's governor had always vetoed the
death penalty. However, Appendix 3, infta, does document state courts' limits or bans on
death penalty statutes or execution methods. Appendix 3 also details the reasons for legisla-
tive changes, using materials recommended by the Ferro district court-statutes, legislative
histories, cases, and newspaper articles. SeemFerro, 865 F. Supp. at 1407.
271. Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (quoting State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922, 934 (Wash. 1981)); see also infra app. 3
(detailing when each state enacted a hanging statute). Of course, in 1853, a number of
"states" were still territories. See The World Almanac and Book of Facts 542 (Robert
Famighetti ed., 1997) [hereinafter The World Almanac] (listing when states entered the
Union and showing that, in 1853, 19 states were still territories). Justice Blackmun is referring
to the current designation of these territories as states.
[19971
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to switch to electrocution following Kemm/erY2 By 1913, the year
preceding the outbreak of World War I,27 a total of fifteen states had
changed to electrocution2 4 as a result of "a well-grounded belief that
electrocution is less painful and more humane than hanging."25 By 1949,
twenty-six states had changed to electrocution, although no state thereafter
selected electrocution as its method of executionY5 Those states
authorizing exceptions to this hanging-to-electrocution pattern solely for
the crime of rape 7 may well have been racially motivated. 5
272. See infra app. 1, this. &7; app. 3 (discussing changes in execution methods).
273. General Richard Thournin, The Fgrst World War 13 (1963).
274. Se infra app. 1, this. 3-7; app. 3 (outlining the various states' execution methods).
Between the turn of the century and the time when America was entrenched in World War I
in 1917, see Thounin, supra note 273, at 347, came an era of increasing support for feminism,
prohibition, prison reform, and abolition of the death penalty. See William J. Bowers, Legal
Homicide: Death as Punishment in America, 1864-1982, 10 (1984). As Appendix 1, Table 3,
infra, shows, nine states abolished the death penalty during the years between 1910 and 1917.
Yet, most of these periods of abolition were short-lived for several reasons: (1) the changing
mood that accompanied American involvement in World War I, see Bowers, supra, at 10; (2)
the unprecedented "crime wave" during the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression, see
The Death Penalty in America 22 (Hugo Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982); and (3) the fear of
vigilantism, see infra app. 3 (e.g., Arizona's death penalty was reinstated in a landslide referen-
dum after the lynching of a murderer/rapist was blamed on the governor and his followers
during the abolition movement.). As Appendix 1, Tables 3 and 4, infra, and Appendix 3, infia,
indicate, there was no abolition of the death penalty after 1916 until Delaware's abolition in
1958. (Hawaii and Alaska abolished the death penalty in 1956 and 1957, respectively, but
neither gained statehood until 1959. Thus neither was ever a death penalty state.).
275. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 US. 180, 185 (1914).
276. See infra app. 1, this. 3-7; app. 3.
277. For example, both Kentucky and Arkansas, which changed from hanging to
electrocution in 1910 and 1913, respectively, retained public hangings for persons convicted
of rape. See infra app. 3. Kentucky returned to public hanging for rapists between 1920 and
1938, "presumably as a less humane method of execution," in response to a heinous child
rape. Bowers, supra note 274, at 12, 13 n.c. In 1915, Tennessee abolished the death penalty
for murder, but not for rape. In 1918, Virginia provided that when the death sentence had
been imposed for rape (or attempted rape), the body was not to be delivered to the
condemned's relatives. See infra app. 3.
278. On the surface, these policies appear to reflect the public perception that rape was a
more serious crime than murder and therefore warranted a "symbolically disproportionate"
penalty. Yet, before the Supreme Court held that the death penalty for rape was unconstitu-
tional in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), a grossly disproportionate number of
blacks were executed for rape relative to whites. This disproportionality has been particularly
evident for the alleged rapes of white women by black men. Se Susan Brownniller, Against
Our Wilh Men, Women and Rape 230-38 (1975) (analyzing the historical relationship between
race and rape); Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Ony As An Enenyr/. The
Legitimization of Racial Powerlessne Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia,
70 N.C. L. Rev. 969, 1057-60 (1992) (discussing the implicit and explicit bias against black
men who raped or were accused of raping a white woman in Virginia and throughout the
past); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racrn, and the Law, 6 Harv. Women's LJ. 103, 104-17 (1983)
(examining "the historical legacy of the racist social meaning of rape and its consequences").
In one extensive study of 3000 rape convictions in 11 southern states between 1945 and 1965,
researchers found that blacks were seven times more likely to receive the death penalty than
whites. Se Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and The Death Penalty,
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The gradual cessation of states' adoption of electrocution appears to
be attributable to Nevada's switch in 1921 from hanging and shooting to
lethal gas in accordance with the state's new Humane Death BillY9 Two
years later, the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected a claim that the state's
lethal gas statute inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.280 Following
Nevada's lead, both Arizona and Colorado switched from hanging to lethal
gas in 1933.81
Of all the years during the century, however, 1935 appears most intri-
guing in terms of states' uses of execution methods; perhaps the effects of
the Great Depression led to a record high that year of 199 executions.2
Whereas three states changed their methods of execution, their patterns
varied, illustrating what was, at that time, no dear method of choice.m
407 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Scl. 119, 129-30 (1973). A black who was convicted of rap-
ing a white woman, however, was 18 times more likely to be executed compared to a black
convicted of raping a black, a white convicted of raping a white, or a white convicted of
raping a black woman. Id. Altogether, 405 of the 455 men who were executed for rape in this
country were black. Higginbotham &Jacobs, supra, at 1060. Indeed, nine men, eight of them
black, were publicly hanged for rape during Kentucky's 18 year regression from electrocution
to public hanging only for the crime of rape. Bowers, supra note 274, at 442, 445. Thus, what
appears on the surface to be symbolic disproportionality for the crime of rape, may actually
be reflecting the use of execution methods for the purpose of institutionalizing racial
prejudice, a subject that is discussed further in this Article. See infra notes 470-77 and
accompanying text.
279. See infra app. 1, tbls. 37; app. 3.
280. See State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1923). The court emphasized two points:
(1) the legislature "sought to provide a method of inflicting the death penalty in the most
humane manner known to modern science," id.; see also Robert A. Maurer, Death by Lethal Gas
9 Geo. LJ. 50, 51 (1921) (noting that "it would appear that the Nevada statute would be
upheld as another attempt by a legislature to find a still more humane method of execution
than by electrocution and the other methods now in use."); and (2) prison officials admin-
istering the gas would also "carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment" when selecting the
type of gas to use, since it was unspecified in the statute. See GeeJon, 211 P. at 682; see also
Raymond Hartmann, 7he Use of Lethal Gas in Nevada Executions, 8 St. Louis U. UJ. 167, 168
(1923) (expressing support for the Nevada statute despite concerns that the lack of
specification for the type of gas might introduce error on the part of prison officials, who may
inadvertently select a type of gas that would inflict pain and suffering).
281. See infra app. 1, thUs. 3-7; app. 3.
282. Bowers, supra note 274, at 15, 22; The Death Penalty in America, supra note 274, at
25; see alsoJohn F. Galliher et al., Ciminolog: Abolition and Reinstatement of Capital Punishment
During the Progressive Era and the Early 20th Century, 83 J. Crim. L & Criminology 538, 571
n.240 (1992) (noting that in 1935, the state representative of Kansas who proposed the death
penalty bill cited "the loss of lives in the state in the wave of crime" as the reason for
reinstating the death penalty). This high number of executions declined after 1935. Notably,
there were fewer prisoners sentenced to death in the 1960s than there were executions in the
1930s, despite similar numbers of homicides during these two time periods. Bowers, supra
note 274, at 15 (explaining that there was an average of 106 admissions to death row per year
from 1961-70, and an average of 167 executions per year during the 1930s).
283. Connecticut changed from hanging to electrocution. Wyoming changed from
hanging to lethal gas. North Carolina changed from electrocution to lethal gas, the only state
to make that change while electrocution was still being selected by other states. See infra app. 3
(summarizing the states' legislative changes in execution methods and their statutory
[1997]
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Thereafter, lethal gas surpassed electrocution as the preferred new method
even though electrocution was, and still is, used by more states. By 1955,
eleven states were using lethal gas and twenty-two states were using
electrocution.2 Since 1973, however, no state has selected lethal gas.2! 5
With each new lethal gas statute came controversy and constitutional
challenges, both before2s" and after the Furman Court's moratorium
on capital punishment, as well as directly prior to Fierro in the context of
the controversial case of Robert Alton Harris.ss Indeed, Jesse Bishop, the
documentations).
284. See infra app. 1, this. 3-7; app. 3 (summarizing the states' legislative changes in
execution methods and their statutory documentations). Oregon, which had switched to
lethal gas, had abolished its death penalty. In addition, four electrocution states switched to
lethal gas between 1935 and 1955. See id. By the middle of the 1960s, the country had almost
totally abandoned the use of the death penalty. Bowers, supra note 274, at 10; se also
Raymond Paternoster, Capital Punishment in America 18 (1991) (noting that there were only
10 executions between 1965 and 1969). Beginning in 1964, eight states statutorily abolished
the death penalty. Additionally, five states had their death penalties judicially abolished by
their own state courts. These states were California (1972), Massachusetts (1975, 1984), New
York, (1977, 1984), Oregon (1981), and Rhode Island (1979). See infra app. 3. While only a
handful of states had no death penalty statute on the books, the states that had such statutes
were simply not engaged in their enforcement. In 1967, Louis Jose Monge was hanged in
Colorado, the last execution for almost ten years. Paternoster, supra, at 18. Yet, even though
by the middle of the 1960s the country had almost totally abandoned the use of the death
penalty, Rhode Island changed from hanging to lethal gas, the only state to change itsmethod of execution during that span of 22 years (1955-77). See infra app. 3.
285. See infra app. 3 (summarizing the states' legislative changes in execution methods and
their statutory documentations).
286. Se, ag., Hernandez v. State, 32 P.2d 18, 25 (Ariz. 1934) ("The fact that [lethal gas] is
less painful and more humane than hanging is all that is required to refute completely the
charge that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."); People v. Daugherty, 256 P.2d
911, 922 (Cal. 1953) (refuting defendant's contention that lethal gas is cruel and unusual
because executioners "could use a lethal gas which would cause long and cruel suffering.").
287. See Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that death by
cyanide gas is not so different in degree or nature from that resulting from other traditional
modes of execution as to implicate the Eighth Amendment right); Calhoun v. State, 486 A.2d
45, 68-70 (Md. 1983) (rejecting Calhoun's contention that death by lethal gas is "cruel and
inhuman punishment as defined by the Federal Constitution"). In their dissent to the Court's
denial of Jimmy Lee Gray's petition for writ of certiorari and stay of execution, Justices
Brennan and Marshall supported Gray's contention that Mississippi's use of lethal gas was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, emphasizing that Gray submitted "numerous affidavits
that described in graphic and horrifying detail the manner in which death is induced through
this procedure." Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1240-44 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Gray's execution was horribly botched. Se infra app. 2.B (Lethal Gas:
Jimmy Lee Gray).
288. In Goa= v. Caljfomia, 503 U.S. 653 (1992), the Supreme Court barred judges of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from entering any more stays of execution for Robert Alton
Harris. I&. at 654. Justice Stevens' dissent, which Justice Blackmun joined, contended that
Harris' claim had merit given the information available about the "extreme and unnecessary
pain inflicted by execution by cyanide gas, as well as the availability of more humane and less
violent methods of execution." I& (Stevens, J., dissenting). Harris' death appeared to involve
great suffering. See infra app. 2.B (Lethal Gas: Robert Alton Harris). For thorough and
enlightening discussions of the Harris case and the legal events preceding it, see generally
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first person to die from lethal gas following Gregg in 1979, appeared to
experience such pain and agony that Nevada abolished lethal gas and
changed to lethal injection.2s As the FienD district court noted, by 1994
there was a national consensus concluding that lethal gas was not an
acceptable execution method.2 Yet, some of the Frro court's rationales
for why states have abandoned lethal gas more frequently than electro-
cution failed to consider other factors that may contribute to this
discrepancy291 As the next section discusses, there is also a particularly
striking national consensus rejecting electrocution that has solidified in
recent years.
b. Comparing Electrocution to Lethal Gas
The Fierro district court's comparison of legislative trends between
1970 and 1992 emphasized that in 1992, Maryland was the sole lethal gas-
only state whereas there were ten lethal gas-only states in 1970." This
Wendy Lesser, Pictures at an Execution 24-187 (1993); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson,
Equily and Hirarchy: Rejletions on the Harris Execution, 102 Yale I.J. 255 (1992); Evan Caminker
& Erwin Chemerinsky, 7he Lawlas Execution of Robert Alton Harri; 102 Yale L.J. 225 (1992);
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, 7he Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and the Harris Cas 102 Yale
L.J. 205 (1992).
289. See infra app. 2.B (Lethal Gas) and app. 3 (noting post-Gregg botched executions by
lethal gas and statutory documentation of legislative changes in execution methods).
290. Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds; 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of
changed statute).
291. See infra note 298 and accompanying text (stating that electrocution is quickly
approaching the level of repugnancy established by lethal gas).
292. 1Rem,, 865 F. Supp. at 1405. In 1970, these 10 states were Arizona, California,
Colorado, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and
Wyoming. Id. The Flerro court excluded Oklahoma from its list of 1970 lethal gas-only states,
even though Oklahoma did enact a lethal gas statute in 1951. Most likely, the court
considered Oklahoma to be an electrocution-only state in 1970 because Oklahoma never
actually constructed a lethal gas chamber, whereas it actually did apply electrocution. Also,
because the Ywno court focused on states' uses of execution methods in 1970 as compared to
1992, it did not mention that Rhode Island became the last lethal gas-only state in 1973.
Rhode Island eventually abolished the death penalty in 1984. See infra app. 1, this. 3-7; app. 3
(Rhode Island). The fact that both Oklahoma and Rhode Island changed their lethal gas-only
statutes, however, provides further support for the Flerr court's conclusion that there is a
national consensus rejecting lethal gas as a viable method of execution.
The FLen court asserted that states' rejection of lethal gas as an execution method from
1970 to 1992 was "dramatically higher" than their rejection of other methods of execution.
Ficrro, 865 F. Supp. at 1406. For example, of the 25 states in 1970 (other than California) that
had a method of execution other than lethal gas, 14 (56%) switched to lethal injection-only
or some choice between their older method and lethal injection by 1992. Id. These 14 states
were Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington. The 11 states that
retained their old method of execution as their sole means of execution were Alabama,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia. See Franklin Zimring, Table 1: Current Method of Execution by Pre-Furman
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Article's 1997 update of the Fienr district court's analysis shows that
currently no lethal gas-only states exist. Thus, Maryland's recent
change renders incontrovertible the Frm court's contention that a
national consensus rejects lethal gas.
The update also shows that during the three year period since the
Fierm district court's analysis, states have made substantial changes with
regard to their rejection of electrocution. Five electrocution-only states
have changed either to lethal injection-only or to a choice between
electrocution and lethal injection.2 Therefore, of the twenty-five states in
1970 (other than California) that had a method of execution other than
lethal gas, a total of nineteen (76%) switched their method to lethal
injection or some choice between their method and lethal injection by
1997 .ss This switch represents a 20% increase over the 56% figure cited
by the Fierm court. Additional comparisons counter the Fierro court's claim
that states' rejection of lethal gas is also "more pronounced" than their
rejection of electrocution! or that "[t]he experience of a gas execution
Method in Current Death Penalty States (California Excluded) (used to aid Zinuing's expert
testimony in Flerro) (on file with the author). In comparison, 8 (89% percent) of the 9 states
(other than California) that had lethal gas as a method of execution in 1970 had changed
their method of execution by 1992. Ferro, 865 F. Supp. at 1406. All states (100%) had
changed by 1994. California was excluded from the legislative trend analyses presented in
Ferro because California's application of execution methods was the subject of the litigation.
See Transcript of Proceedings 3-151, Flerro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (No.
C-92-1482) (testimony of Professor Franklin E. Zimring concerning why California was
excluded from analysis), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds 117 S. Ct. 285
(1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of changed statute).
293. Maryland changed to lethal injection soon after the Ferro trial. The Fleo district
court took judicial notice of Maryland's change. Rtemvo, 865 F. Supp. at 1406. With one
exception, this Article's 1997 update reflects states' uses of and changes in execution methods
up to August 1, 1997, shortly before this Article went to press. The one exception concerns
this Article's decision to exclude Kentucky's electrocution of Harold McQueen on July 1,
1997. See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the U.S. Since 1976, 8 (June 25,
1997). This decision was based on a number of considerations: (1) McQueen's electrocution
was Kentucky's first execution since 1962; and (2) "more than likely," Kentucky will switch to
lethal injection either this fall (if a special legislative session is held) or in January, 1998. See
Telephone Interview with Norman W. Lawson, Jr., Staff Administrator for the Judiciary
Committee of the Legislative Research Commission, Lexington, Kentucky (July 28, 1997).
Given the prospect of Kentucky's change to lethal injection, including it as an "active"
electrocution state would inappropriately exaggerate states' uses of electrocution. As it stands,
Kentucky's switch will further support this Article's contention that a national consensus
rejects electrocution.
294. These states are, in order of date of change, Ohio, Virginia, Connecticut, Indiana,
and South Carolina. See infra app. 1, this. 37; app. 3 (summarizing legislative changes in
execution methods).
295. See supra note 292 for a list of these 25 states. New York changed from electrocution
to lethal injection in 1995. However, the Felrro court did not include New York among the 25
states in 1970 that had a method of execution. Until 1995, the death penalty in NewYork had
long periods ofjudcial abolition. See infra app. 3 (NewYork) (summarizing documentation of
legislative changes in execution methods).
296. Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1406. Altogether, 11 (58%) of the 19 states that used
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appears to have a very different effect on legislative behavior than the
experience of an execution by electrocution."7 Although there is more
state-wide repugnance to lethal gas, states are also rapidly abandoning
electrocution.
electrocution as the sole means of execution in 1970 also retained electrocution as the sole
means of execution in 1992. These 11 states are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Sew Franklin
ZMrning, Table 2: Adoption of Lethal Injection as Choice or Sole Means of Execution, by
Prior Method of Execution (California Excluded) (used to aid Zimring's expert testimony in
Fllei) (on file with the author). Yet, as already stated, only I (11%) of the 9 states other than
California that retained lethal gas as the sole method of execution in 1970 also retained lethal
gas during 1992. FYenv, 865 F. Supp. at 1406. By 1994, no state had retained lethal gas. Once
again, however, this situation has changed quite dramatically for electrocution. Only 6 (32%)
of the 19 states that used electrocution as the sole means of execution in 1970 have retained
electrocution as the sole means in 1995. These six states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Nebraska, and Tennessee. This change represents a 26% reduction in the figure
provided in F1mem,.
297. Pienu, 865 F. Supp. at 1406. Of the nine lethal gas-only states in 1970 other than
California, three had actually executed an inmate by 1992; however, none of those three states
retained lethal gas after these executions. I&. These three states were Arizona, Mississippi, and
Nevada. See Franklin Zimring, Table 3: Impact of Post-Gregg Execution Experience on
Retention of Means of Execution, by Method of Execution (California Excluded) (used to aid
Zimring's expert testimony in Rem) (on file with the author). An update of the .Raem, district
court's analysis provides additional support for the court's conclusions concerning lethal gas.
Since 1992, Maryland, one of the nine lethal gas-only states in 1970, executed an inmate.
After the execution, Maryland decided not to retain lethal gas. Maryland's decision raises
from three states to four the number of states abandoning lethal gas following a lethal gas
execution. These four states are Arizona, Maryland, Mississippi, and Nevada. SeeDeath Penalty
Information Center, supranote 293; NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death
Row, U.S.A. (July 31, 1996). The Plerro district court noted other evidence supporting a"national consensus against lethal gas executions," including legislative histories, newspaper
reports of legislative decisions, and public opinion polls. 1ienp, 865 F. Supp. at 1407. In addi-
tion, the court discounted other factors possibly explaining states' primary motivations for
rejecting lethal gas, such as the appeal of lethal injection as an alternative or injection's
potentially lower cost, because electrocution-only states had not made comparably rapid
switches to injection and had not conducted a cost analysis of injection. Id
Of the 19 electrocution-only states existing in 1970, 7 (37%) had executed an inmate by
1992; yet, 6 of those 7 (86%) states retained electrocution as their sole method of execution
after these executions. Id. at 1406. An update of the Ferro court's analysis indicates that
electrocution-only states are beginning to exhibit a pattern comparable to lethal gas-only
states. Although no additional electrocution-only states have executed an inmate other than
the 7 already mentioned, only 3 of those 7 (43%) have retained electrocution as their sole
method of execution, more than a 40% reduction in the figure provided by the Fwrro court.
These three states are Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. See Death Penalty Information Center,
supra note 293. Arkansas now requires lethal injection, and Virginia and South Carolina allow
a choice between lethal injection and electrocution. See infra app. 1, tbis. 3-7; app. 3 (sum-
marizing legislative changes in execution methods).
298. Although this Article supports the Fterro district court's contention that lethal gas is
more repugnant than electrocution, it also claims there is a national consensus rejecting
electrocution and that states' reluctance to abandon electrocution may be due to various
factors. First, over the course of the century, states have incorrectly relied on Kemmier to
support the retention of electrocution whereas no Supreme Court case has even addressed
the constitutionality of lethal gas. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); supra notes 76-90
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c. Establishing a "National Consensus"
The results of this Article's 1997 update suggest that state legislatures
may have reached a sufficient degree of national consensusP to find
both lethal gas and electrocution unconstitutional. Although the Supreme
Court has never specified how much of a consensus is considered "suffi-
dent,"s it has rendered unconstitutional punishments with far less
consensus than that shown for lethal gas or electrocution. In Enmund v.
MFida,-" for example, the Court held the death penalty unconstitutional
for some kinds of felony murder, explaining that of the thirty-six death
penalty jurisdictions, "only" eight, "a small minority," allowed capital
punishment for such an offense." 2 Furthermore, even if the Court
considered along with these eight an additional nine jurisdictions that
allowed the death penalty for an unintended felony murder if aggravating
circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances, the Court emphasized
that still "only about a third of American jurisdictions" would allow a
defendant to be sentenced to death for such offenses. 33 The Court noted
that even though this trend was "neither wholly unanimous among state
legislatures," nor as striking as the trends presented in Coker v. Georgia
"it nevertheless weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the
crime at issue."0 In those cases where the Court has rejected Eighth
Amendment challenges to a particular punishment, there has been far less
disparity between the number of states retaining or rejecting that punish-
ment.0 In sum, then, electrocution appears to be not simply cruel, but
and accompanying text (detailing courts' inappropriate and antiquated reliance on Kemmkn).
Next, electrocution was introduced three decades earlier than lethal gas during a time when
science was substantially less advanced, therefore, lethal gas, which was also considerably more
visible than electrocution, had the advantage of greater immediate scrutiny. Nonetheless,
electrocution and lethal gas have similar "legislative lifelines" (61 and 52 years respectively)
between the point at which they were introduced and the point at which they were no longer
used. Electrocution was first introduced in 1888 and last adopted in 1949; lethal gas was first
introduced in 1921 and last adopted in 1973. These comparable time spans suggest compara-
ble periods of intolerance. Finally, lethal gas is more expensive than electrocution, a factor
that states have acknowledged when they have changed execution methods. See infra app. 3
(summarizing documentation of legislative changes in execution methods).
299. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370"1 (1989).
300. There have been interesting empirical attempts to test societal consensus and
proportionality. Se4 eg., Catherine A. Crosby et al., 7he Juvenile Death Penalty and the Eighth
Amendment, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 245 (1995) (empirically examining societal consensus and
proportionality ofjuvenile death penalties).
301. 458 U.S. 782 (1981).
302. Id. at 792.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. 435 US. 584, 595-96 (1977) (invalidating the death penalty for the rape of an adult
woman, emphasizing that Georgia was the sole jurisdiction that had such a punishment, and
that only two other jurisdictions authorized such a punishment when the victim was a child).
305. Enmuna, 458 U.S. at 793.
306. Se4 eg., Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989) (rejecting a challenge to the
constitutionality of the death penalty for mentally retarded persons, emphasizing that only two
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also unusual.
One last issue bears on the standards of decency factor. Both
electrocutiono and lethal gas"8 are considered unacceptable methods
of euthanasia for animals. This fact highlights the irony that death row
inmates can be executed by a method prohibited for use on stray, unwant-
ed, or ill animals to ensure that such animals do not suffer needlessly.
The next section of this Article analyzes the fourth factor in Table 2's
execution methods test-whether there are alternative execution methods
(A) that would render unnecessary the pain involved in electrocution. The
section focuses on lethal injection, currently the most widely-used execu-
tion method, as well as the method the public most favors in opinion polls.m
states had prohibited it); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-72 (1989) (rejecting a
challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty for 16 year-olds, noting that 22 of the
37 death penalty jurisdictions allowed capital punishment for such youths); Tson v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty
for a major participant in a felony evidencing reckless indifference to human life, stating that
only 11 jurisdictions had invalidated the death penalty in such circumstances).
307. See Humane Soc'y of the U.S., General Statement Regarding Euthanasia Method for Dogs
and Cats 17 Shelter Sense, Sept. 1994, at 11-12 (classifying electrocution as an inhumane form
of euthanasia for animals); American Veterinarian Med. Ass'n., 202 JAVMA. 230, 230-49 (1993)
(classifying electrocution as an unacceptable method unless it is preceded by an injury
Inducing immediate unconsciousness, such as a blow to the head, because electrocution alone
will not lead to unconsciousness for 10-to-30 seconds or longer).
308. See Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1242 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). According to Richard Traystman, M.D., Vice Chair of the Department of Anes-
thesiology and Critical Care Medicine and Director of Research at Johns Hopkins Medical
School, "'[w]e would not use asphyxiation, by cyanide gas or by any other substance, in our
laboratory to kill animals that have been used in experiments-nor would most medical
research laboratories in this country use it.'" Id. (quoting Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1060
(5th Cir. 1983)).
309. According to one source, lethal injection was favored by the great majority (84%) of
voters. See Carla McClain, Arizona Gas Chamber Stajs, Gannet News Serv., Apr. 7, 1992. This
percentage was 21 points lower, however, in a Los Angeles Times poll taken April 23-26, 1992,
which surveyed a sample of 1,395 Californians who responded to the question, "What is the








See George Skelton, Death Penalty Still Strong in State, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1992, at Al, AIS.
The sample consisted of registered voters statewide; the margin of error was plus-or-minus 3%.
Id. On July 30, 1997, a Foida Voter poll indicated that most Florida voters desired a switch
from electrocution to lethal injection. See Florida Voter Poll. Voters Want to Retire 'Old Spar,"
Florida Voter, July 30, 1997, at I (on file with the author); Sydney P. Freedberg, Roridiam
Ready to Retire Chair, The Herald (Miami), July 30, 1997, at 5B. The poll surveyed by telephone
600 Florida registered voters who responded to the following question: "Currently, the state of
Florida uses the electric chair to execute criminals sentenced to death. Do you think the state
should keep the electric chair or switch to lethal injection instead?" Voters' responses were as
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B. Lethal Injection
In 1888, lethal injection was considered along with other execution
methods when New York's governor-appointed Commission was seeking
the most humane means of implementing the death penalty.3 0 Lethal
injection failed to become a serious rival for either hanging or
electrocution, however, because the medical profession strongly opposed
the use of the hypodermic needle for executions, fearing that the public
would associate the practice of medicine with death!" In 1953, the
British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment reported that its expert
witnesses questioned both the humaneness and, most particularly, the
practicality of lethal injection 12 for four major reasons that still remain
viable.3 '3 Twenty-five years later, the United States was the first country to
re-examine the issue.1
A rising interest in lethal injection developed after Gregg in 1976 when
the United States once again confronted the dilemma of sentencing people
follows:
Keep electric chair 34%
Lethal Injection 44%
Other method (volunteered) 7%
Against death penalty (volunteered) 8%
Don't know 7%
Florida Voter, supra, at 1. At a 95% confidence level, the margin of error for the entire
sample was plus-or-minus 4%. Id.; see also supra note 921 and accompanying text (noting a
Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research poll conducted in January 1992 which reported that
49% of Virginians favored switching from electrocution to lethal injection; 21% opposed the
switch, and the remainder stated they did not know).
310. Denno, supra note 5, at 571-72.
311. Id.; Patrick Malone, Death Ro and the MedicalMod, 9 Hastings Center Rep. No. 5,
Oct 1979, at 5. See also James W. Garner, InJlidion of the Death Penalty by Eecticity, 1 J. Crim. L
& Criminology 626, 626 (1910) (According to one Philadelphia physician, utilizing "the
practice of medicine.., for the purpose of putting criminals to death would arouse the
unanimous protest of the medical profession.").
312. Royal Comm'n Rep., supra note 219, at 258-61 (stating that "the practical difficulties
encountered in many cases when injection into a vein is attempted are such as to render the
method quite unsuitable for the purpose of execution").
313. The Royal Commission concluded that: (1) lethal injection could not be admin-
istered to individuals with certain "physical abnormalities" that make veins impossible to
locate, and that even "normal" veins can be flattened by cold or nervousness, conditions
frequently characteristic of an execution setting; (2) lethal injection is difficult unless the
subject fully cooperates and remains "absolutely still"; (3) lethal injection requires medical
skill although the medical profession was opposed to participating in the process; and (4) be-
cause of such problems, it was likely that executioners would have to implement intramuscular
(rather than intravenous) injection even though the intramuscular method would be slower
and more painful Id. at 258-59; see also infra notes 360-400 and accompanying text (discussing
the excessiveness of lethal injections).
314. In 1965, executions were abandoned entirely in Great Britain; consequently, there
was no reason for the British to re-evaluate whether lethal injection would be preferable to
other methods of execution. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Capital Punishment
and the American Agenda 109-10 (1986).
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to death.s3 1  Some scholars claim legislatures had no preference for a
particular execution method.1 s However, others contend that legislatures
preferred lethal injection because it made the death penalty appear more
humane and palatable1 " in light of an increasing public interest in the
possibility of televised executions, s as well as prior concerns over
botched electrocutions and gassings."1 9 Economics also constituted a
major impetus behind the initial adoption of lethal injectionw because
injection was far cheaper than electrocution or lethal gas.321
315. Id. at 110. According to some commentators, lethal injection became popular along
with the conservative shift in the nation's politics. See Ward Casscells, M.D. & William J.
Curran, M.D., Doctors The Death Penalty, and Lethal Injection, 307 New Eng. J. Med. 1532, 1532-
33 (1982). In 1973, for example, then-Govemor Ronald Reagan of California recommended
the Idea of lethal injection when he compared it to animal euthanasia.
Being a former farmer and horse raiser, I know what it's like to try to
eliminate an Injured horse by shooting him. Now you call the veterinarian and the
vet gives It a shot and the horse goes to sleep-that's it. I myself have wondered if
maybe this isn't part of our problem [with capital punishment], if maybe we should
review and see if there aren't even more humane methods now - the simple shot or
tranquilizer.
Henry Schwarzchild, Homicide by Injection, NY Tnes, Dec. 23, 1982, at A15; see also Scott
Christianson, Corrmetions Law Develoments: Execution by Lethal Injection, 15 Crim. L Bull. 69, '70
(1979). Zimring and Hawkins claim, however, that the subsequent lure of lethal injection
cannot be traced to any charismatic figure or special constituency. See Zimring & Hawkins,
supra note 314, at 110.
316. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 314, at 111.
317. SeeDaniel C. Hoover, InjectionDeath Bill Endorsed by House, News & Observer, June 29,
1983, at 1A.
318. Ses eg., Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468, 470-71 (N.D. Tex.) (discussing an at-
tempt by a Public Broadcasting Service television station to enjoin the Texas Department of
Corrections from banning the broadcast of the first execution in Texas since 1964), rev'd, 556
F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977); Lesser, supra note 288, at 24-92 (analyzing the effects of televised
executions on the public); James W. Marquart et al., The Rope, the Chair, and the Needle:
Capital Punishment In Texas, 1923 - 1990, 132 (1994) (noting that at the time lethal injection
was passed by the Texas legislature, a reporter had filed a suit seeking permission to film
executions and that it was believed that injection would appear to be less cruel); John W.
Murphy, Technology, Humanism, and Death by Injection, 11 Phil. & Soc. Action 55, 55 (1985)
(emphasizing how modem engineering has made it possible to refine the act of execution by
making the process increasingly technological, and therefore more acceptable);Jef L Richards
& R. Bruce Easter, Televising Executions: The High-Tech Altrnative to Public Hangings, 40 UCLA
L Rev. 381, 386-89 (1992) (discussing Garrett and related cases). For a fascinating historical
account of the press' attempts to cover executions in NewYork, see Michael Madow, Foddden
Spectace: Executions, the Public and the Press in Nineteenth Centuiy New York, 43 Buff. L Rev. 461
(1995).
319. See Susan Headden, Unlly Coalition Gives Death Sentence to Lethal Injection,
Indianapolis Star, Feb. 5, 1983, at 9.
320. See Christianson, supra note 315, at 72 (contending that Oklahoma passed the lethal
injection statute in part because of its economical benefits). Advocates of lethal injection
present four major arguments on its behalf (1) economy; (2) humaneness; (3) political
feasibility; and (4) constitutional soundness. See Herb Haines, Primum Non Noce. Chemical
Execution and the Limits ofMedical Social Control 36 Soc. Problems 442, 445-46 (1989).
321. In 1977, the now-deceased Senator Bill Dawson of Oklahoma asked Dr. Stanley
Deutsch, then Head of Oklahoma Medical School's Anesthesiology Department, to
374 1997]
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For both economical and supposed humanitarian reasons, Oklahoma
adopted lethal injection as its execution method on May 11, 1977; Texas
followed the next day and Idaho and New Mexico soon after22 Although
by 1981, five states had adopted lethal injection,' 2 the method was not
actually used in an execution until 1982, when Texas executed Charles
Brooks, Jr. in a botched procedure.324 Currently, twenty-one states have
adopted lethal injection as their sole method of execution and eleven
states provide a choice between lethal injection and another execution
methods 2s
The following sections apply Table 2's execution methods test to
lethal injection. Although the sections offer only initial results, they prompt
dear concerns with the constitutionality of this newest method.
1. Humane Baseline
a. Judicial Determinations
Like electrocution, lethal injection did not exist when the Bill of
Rights was adopted (H1). Similarly, courts have used Kemmier (H2) and the
evolving standards of decency (H3) principle to reject challenges to lethal
injection and the vagueness of the lethal injection statutes. In Ex parte
Granvielun for example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected
the first Eighth Amendment challenge to lethal injection by emphasizing
that courts, such as Kemmie, had upheld the constitutionality of other
execution methodss2 and that injection complied with evolving standards
of decency. 2
recommend a method for executing prisoners through the administration of drugs
intravenously. See Letter from Dr. Stanley Deutsch to the Honorable State Senator Bill Dawson
(Feb. 28, 1977) [hereinafter Deutsch Letter] (on file with the author); Telephone Interview
with Dr. Stanley Deutsch, Professor of Anesthesiology, George Washington Medical School
(July 25, 1995); Jeff Stryker, 7te Ro/e of Professions in the Exution Proems Recorder, Apr. 23,
1992, at 6 (noting that Senator Dawson was concerned that it would cost the state $62,000 to
fix its electric chair and $300,000 to build a gas chamber). Currently, the cost of lethal
injection drugs averages approximately $70 per use. Affidavit of Michael P. Bowen 1 3
[hereinafter Bowen Affidavit], Exhibit 4 of Petition for Post Conviction Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Ex Parte Sam Felder Jr., No. 227815-B (Tex. Crim. App. May 12, 1994) [hereinafter
Fe&der I Petition] (petition denied). The state adopted lethal injection based in part on Dr.
Deutsch's recommendation that the intiavenous method would be a rapid and painless way to
produce unconsciousness and ensuing death. &eDeutsch Letter, supra (providing specifics on
how lethal injection could be carried out); Stryker, supra, at 6 (same).
322. See infra app. 1, this. 3-7; app. 3.
323. See id.
324. See infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection: Charles Brooks, Jr.).
325. See infra app. 1, this. 1, 3-7; app. 3.
326. 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex Crim. App. 1978).
327. See id. at 509.
328. See id. The court also countered a wide range of the appellant's additional claims,
concluding that: (1) any possible pain associated with injection-related complications "could
be characterized as a possible discomfort or suffering necessary to a method of extinguishing
life humanely," id. at 510; (2) the Texas statute's failure to specify the substances to be used
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Following two other unsuccessful challenges, Heckler v. Chany-"
constituted the next major attack on lethal injection. In Heckler, inmates
sentenced to death in Oklahoma and Texas claimed the drugs used for
lethal injection had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) only for the medical purposes stated on their labels s--for
example, animal euthanasia"t-and not for the executions of hu-
mans."' Given thi circumstance and the likelihood that the drugs would
be applied by unknowledgeable prison personnel, "it was also likely that
the drugs would not induce the quick and painless death intended."'"
According to the inmates, such practices constituted the "unapproved use
of an approved drug" and therefore a violation of the prohibition against
"misbranding" under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act3
However, the Supreme Court steadfastly held that the FDA's discretionary
authority in refusing to initiate proceedings according to the inmates'
demands was not subject to judicial review.' One year later, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Hecker in Woolls v. McCotterss7 to deny
Randy Woolls' claim that Congress failed to provide for judicial review of
the FDA's refusal to evaluate the use of sodium thiopental as a lethal drug,
emphasizing that the use of such a drug did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.s Six days after his challenge, Woolls' execution
in the Injection was no less dear than those statutes pertaining to other execution methods,
such as electrocution, which no court had declared unconstitutionally vague, id. at 511-13; and
(3) the fact that the Director of the Department of Corrections determined the lethal
substance and procedure to be used does not constitute an improper delegation of the state's
legislative power, id. at 514 (noting that a legislative body "may delegate to the administrative
tribunal or officer power to prescribe details"). See generally John I-L Gordon, Jr., Note,
Criminal Procedure--Capital Punishment-Texas Statut Amended to Provid for Execution by
Intravenous Injection of a Lethal Substance, 9 St. Mary's LJ. 359 (1977) (providing arguments for
why the Texas lethal injection statute is constitutional).
329. See Earvin v. State, 582 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (rejecting
a lethal injection challenge in one sentence by citing to Granviel); Felder v. State, 564 S.W.2d
776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (same).
330. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
331. Id. at 823.
332. ,e Chaneyv. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1177 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 US. 821
(1985).
333. Healer, 470 U.S. at 823.
334. Id; see also Michele Stolls, Heckler v. Chaney Judicial and Administrative Regulation of
Capital Punishment by Lethal Injection, 11 An. J.L & Med. 251, 251-71 (1985) (discussing the
Hedder Court's decision to decline to review the FDA's nonenforcement decision and its
Impact on thejudidal regulation of death penalty cases.).
335. Hedder, 470 U.S. at 823-24.
336. Id. at 837-38.
337. 798 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1986).
338. Id. at 697-98. In support of his daim, Wools provided testimony from several
physicians contending that: (1) "the injection of sodium thiopental may cause physical and
mental pain due to possible technical difficulties in administering the drug"; (2) "even if
administered by a professional... the individual would be aware of the onset of loss of
consciousness and the paralytic drug would produce a sense of shortness of breath and
suffocation over a two to three minute period"; and (3) "the individual may also experience a
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was botched.-"'
After Woolls, courts rejected additional challenges to lethal
injection,m including one class action by Illinois death row inmates. The
inmates contended, among other things, that the State's use of Leuchter's
lethal injection machine was unconstitutional because of Leuchter's lack of
qualifications and because prison officials administered the wrong
drugs. 4' Recently, thirty-six Missouri death row inmates filed suit
claiming that lethal injection is unconstitutional because of the nature and
length of Emmitt Foster's 1995 execution.4 Although a judge granted
an order halting all executions in Missouri, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned it.5  Other challenges, however, are ongoing!"
sensation of multiple electric shocks over the entire body with erratic muscle twitching
followed by acute paralysis and suffocation." Id.
339. See infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection: Randy L Woolls).
340. See, eg., Hill v. Lockhart, 791 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (rejecting a claim
that lethal injection is unconstitutional because it is not performed by medical doctors and
therefore results in difficulties, such as an inability to locate a vein); People v. Stewart, 520
NXE.2d 348, 358 (Ill. 1988) (rejecting a claim that lethal injection constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment because "defendant has submitted no evidence which indicates that
execution by lethal injection results in protracted death or unnecessary pain").
341. In 1990, Charles Silagy and Walter Stewart brought a class action for injunctive relief
against the State of Illinois and the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) contending
that the lethal injection procedure used by the DOC violated the Illinois death penalty statute.
Plaintiffs' Complaint at 1-2, Silagy v. Thompson, No. 90-C-05028 (N.D. IMI. Feb. 7, 1991).
Plaintiffs emphasized that they were not challenging the constitutionality of lethal injection
per se, but rather the particular procedure the defendants intended to use to implement it.
Id. at 2-3. Although the Illinois statute authorized the injection of only two chemicals (a
barbiturate and a paralytic agent), the defendants authorized the injection of three chemi-
cals-sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. See id. at 1-2.
According to the plaintiffs, "defendants' procedures create the substantial risk that plaintiffs
will strangle or suffer excruciating pain during the three-chemical injection, but will be
prevented by the paralytic agent from communicating their distress." Id. at 2. In addition, the
DOC planned to use a lethal injection machine manufactured by Leuchter despite the fact
that the DOC had fired Leuchter because of his questionable qualifications. See id. at 6.
Subsequently, Leuchter announced that his machine in Illinois was faulty and likely to fail. See
id. at 6-7. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ultimately dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Silagy v. Thompson, No. 90-C.
5028 (N.D. I. Feb. 7, 1991). Similar arguments condemning lethal injection were raised and
dismissed prior to the execution of John W. Gacy. SeVerified Complaint in Chancery, Gacy v.
Peters, No. 94 CH (ill. Apr. 1994) [hereinafter Gacy Complaint]. Yet, Gacy's execution was
botched. See infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection: John Wayne Gacy).
342. See Tom Jackman, Death Penalty Resumer, Missouri Injection Case is With Supreme Court
After Appellate Rulln, Kan. City Star, June 21, 1995, at Cl; infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection:
Emmitt Foster).
343. SeeJackman, supra note 342, at Cl.
344. See, ag., Richardson Application, supra note 110 (concerning the first evidentiary
hearing on the constitutionality of lethal injection held on April 28-30, 1997); Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Felder v. Scott, No. H-95-5756 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1995) [hereinafter
Feder H Petition] (petition pending), preceded by Feder IPetition; see also State v. Webb, 680
A.2d 147, 198 (Conn. 1996) (allowing the defendant's action to be remanded to the trial
court so that the defendant could challenge the constitutionality of the state's administration
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b. Legislative Determinations
There are six general and overlapping tes of lethal injection
statutes, as Table 8 (Appendix 1) documents. These types illustrate
both the complexity and peculiarity of the manner in which states have
introduced lethal injection as a new method of execution, particularly
within the choice states. Most notable are the distinctions between states
that authorize either retroactive or nonretroactive applications of a new
method of execution, depending on whether the amending statute was
enacted after the prisoners were sentenced or convicted ("pre-enactment
prisoners") or before they were sentenced or convicted ("postenactment
prisoners").'
Table 8 shows that twenty-one states provide no alternative method of
execution for prisoners sentenced or convicted after the date the lethal
injection statute was enacted or became effective (Type 1).M" Eight states
allow prisoners to choose between lethal injection and another execution
method (Type 2),3 and four states restrict such a choice to those
prisoners sentenced or convicted prior to the statute's enactment (Type
3) 49
The single Type 4 state (Mississippi) is perhaps most odd because it
mandates that a pre-enactment prisoner use the method of execution that
existed when the prisoner was sentenced to death, although post-
enactment prisoners receive lethal injection.- In Mal/y v. South&
Carolina,31 the Court held that it was not a violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause when a new, purportedly more humane, method of execution was
retroactivess 2 Only recently have prisoners challenged a statute where the
of lethal Injection).
345. Additional types can be delineated; these six provide the most workable introduction
to lethal injection statutes.
346. For an enlightening discussion of the issue of retroactivity in the context of
constitutional analyses of economic rights, see James L Kainen, The Histoical Frammew for
Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Right, 79 Cornell L Rev. 87 (1993).
347. These 21 states are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, NewJersey, New Mexico, NewYork,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
348. These eight states are California, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina,
Utah, Virginia, and Washington.
349. These four states are Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, and South Carolina. Because of
the restrictive nature of this choice, three Type 3 states are also encompassed under Type 1.
The exception is South Carolina, a Type 2 choice state, because it allows a choice for
postenactment prisoners.
350. Mississippi's prior provisions introducing changes in execution methods have not
been so restrictive. See infra app. 3 (Mississippi).
351. 237 U.S. 180 (1915).
352. See id. at 182-84 (holding that a retroactive method of execution is not violative of
Art. L, § 10 of the Constitution barring ex post facto laws); see also supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text (discussing Malloy v. South Carolina, 287 U.S. 180 (1915)).
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new, purportedly more humane, method is not retroactive. In Booker v.
Murphy, s5 three death row inmates, the only remaining prisoners in this
country who are required to be executed by lethal gas, challenged
Mississippi's use of lethal gas, claiming that it inflicted cruel and
unnecessary pain.& Initially a stay had been entered pending the state's
promise to encourage the Mississippi legislature to eliminate the state's use
of lethal gas entirely.3 However, the United State's District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi subsequently lifted the stay, holding that:
(1) there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
execution by lethal gas was constitutional; and (2) inmates' section 1983
action was an acceptable means of challenging lethal gas.en Litigation on
these issues is ongoing.
The last two types of Table 8's lethal injection statutes are also
peculiar. Ten states now have a lethal injection-only statute but provide a"constitutional substitute" in case lethal injection is held to be unconstitu-
tional or invalid (Type 5). v As this Article later discusses,- this
constitutional substitute is typically considered more inhumane or
problematic than lethal injection. States appear to have such a replacement
to avoid any possible hiatus that may arise in applying the death penalty
should lethal injection prove to be constitutionally troublesome. In turn,
three other states allow someone other than the prisoner (such as the
commissioner of corrections) to choose the method of execution (Type
6 )."'9 Type 6 provisions appear to be partly a function of practicality in
case one method is difficult or unavailable.
2. Excessiveness
As with electrocution, an evaluation of both the presence and risk of
an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" (El, E3) requires some
background on how a lethal injection is performed. In general,
executioners strap the inmate to a gurney in the execution chamber, insert
a catheter into a vein, and inject a nonlethal solution. After the reading of
a death warrant, a lethal mixture is injected by one or more executioners
or, depending upon the state, by a machine.6
The typical lethal injection consists of three chemicals."s The first
353. 953 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
354. Id. at 761-62.
355. See Consent Agreement, Booker v. Murphy, No. 3:95CV49BN (Apr. 19, 1995)
(agreement entering stay).
356. Booker, 953 F. Supp. at 761-62.
357. These 10 states are Arkansas, California, Delaware, Illinois, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wyoming.
358. See infra note 430 and accompanying text.
359. These three states are Idaho, Missouri, and New Hampshire.
360. Trombley, supra note 208, at 105-16.
361. See Malone, supra note 311, at 6 (describing the execution procedure in Oklahoma
and Texas). For an overview of the controversy concerning these chemicals, see Haines, s ra
note 320, at 445 (discussing whether lethal injection is a humane method of execution);
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chemical is a nonlethal dose of sodium thiopental, more commonly known
as sodium pentothal, a frequently used anesthetic for surgery. Lethal
injection statutes refer to sodium pentothal as an "ultrashort-acting
barbiturate" or an "utrafast-acting barbiturate."- 2 Sodium pentothal is
supposed to induce a deep sleep and the loss of consciousness, usually in
twenty seconds.m The second chemical is pancuronium bromide, a total
muscle relaxant. The third and last chemical is potassium chloride, which
physidans most frequently use during heart bypass surgery. Potassium
chloride is supposed to induce cardiac arrest and stop the inmate's
heartbeat permanently!"
a. "Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain"
According to Edward A. Brunner, M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Anesthesia
at Northwestern University Medical School, and Lawrence Deems Egbert,
M.D., former Professor of Anesthesiology at the University of Texas
Southwestern Medical School, substantial pain and suffering can occur
when the inmate receives an inadequate dosage of sodium pentothal and
therefore retains consciousness and sensation during the injection of the
second and third chemicals. Brunner noted that the procedure applied
in Illinois initially required an amount of pentothal that would be insuffi-
dent to produce unconsciousness in approximately twenty percent of the
population.' Similar problems arise when the three chemicals are
administered out of sequence, thereby creating a high risk that the
Harold L Hlrsh, Physicians as Eecutioners, Legal Aspects of Med. Prac., Mar. 1984, at 1, 1-2
(describing the circumstances surrounding Chaney v. Hek); Don Colburn, Lethal Injetion:
WhMy Doctors are Uneasy About the Newest Method of Capital Punishment, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1990,
at Z12 (debating the role of physicians in execution by lethal injection); Death Dealing Syringes,
Time, Dec. 20, 1982, at 29 (reporting the execution of Charles Brooks by lethal injection); Ian
Fisher, Merits of Lethal Injection Are Questioned by Its Foes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1995, at B5
(analyzing the controversy surrounding lethal injection as a humane method to induce
death); Jacob Weisberg, This is Your Deatk Capital Punishment- What Really Happens; New
Republic, July 1, 1991, at 23 (explaining the debate over televised executions).
362. Malone, supra note 311, at6; see also infra app. 1, tbl. 8.
363. Malone, supra note 311, at 6. Because prisoners differ in their physiological constitu-
tion as well as their drug tolerance and drug use histories, some prisoners may need a far
higher dosage of sodium pentathol than others "before losing consciousness and sensation."
SeeAffidavit of Edward A. Brunner, M.D., Ph.D. I 8G [hereinafter Brunner Affidavit], Exhibit
B of Gacy Complaint, supra note 341 (Illinois Department of Correction's procedures typically
recommend that 40cc of sodium pentothal be injected.).
364. See The American College of Physicians et aL, Breach of Trust: Physician Participation
In Executions in the United States 20 (1994) [hereinafter American College of Physicians].
365. Brunner Affidavit, supra note 363, 1 8G-H; Affidavit of Lawrence Deems Egbert, M.D.
1 13 [hereinafter Egbert Affidavit], Exhibit 3 of Felder I Petition, supra note 321. See also
Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Even a slight error in dosage or
administration can leave a prisoner conscious but paralyzed while dying, a sentient witness of
his or her own slow, lingering asphyxiation."), rev'd 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
366. Brunner Affidavit, supra note 363, 18G; see also supra note 363 and accompanying text
(explaining why some dosages may be insufficient).
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prisoner will suffer extreme physical pain during a lethal injection even
without the outward appearance of pain.s 7
Other factors can also lead to possible pain and suffering. First, the
discretion allowed those administering each procedurem fails to take
into account each prisoner's physical characteristics. However, "[a]ge, sex,
and body weight all contribute to the individual's response to the drug," in
addition to the condition of an individual's veins!" For example,
physicians have difficulty finding a suitable vein for diabetics, those with
heavily pigmented skin, the obese or extremely muscular, the very nervous,
and drug users!"0 Indeed, nearly one-quarter of the prison population's
veins may be inaccessible because they are too deep, flat, below layers of
fat, or inoperative from drug use. 7'
Although finding a vein can be difficult for medically trained people,
the procedure becomes even more problematic for the untrained
executioner!sn In some cases, executioners must insert a catheter into a
367. See id. I 8H. As Brunner explains:
Under such circumstances, the prisoner will suffer an extremely painful
sensation of crushing and suffocation, as the pancuronium bromide takes effect and
stops his ability to breathe. The pancuroniurn bromide will paralyze the prisoner,
rendering him unable to move or communicate in any way, while he is experiencing
excruciating pain. As the third chemical, potassium chloride is administered, the
prisoner will experience an excruciating burning sensation in his vein. This burning
sensation-equivalent to the sensation of a hot poker being inserted into the
arm-will then travel with the chemical up the prisoner's arm and spread across his
chest until it reaches his heart, where it will cause the heart to stop.
Id
368. Id. 17 (noting that under the Illinois procedure, "unlimited discretion to determine
the dosages-and even to 'alter' the chemicals themselves-is given to unspecified 'qualified
health care personnel'"); Egbert Affidavit, supra note 365, 1 7 (emphasizing the discretion
under the Texas death penalty statute); Appellants' Brief at 22, Stewart v. Thompson, No. 91-
1470 (7th Cir. Apr. 15, 1991) (stating that the Illinois statute gives the department broad
discretion in determining dosages by using the term "lethal dosage" instead of the necessary
amount).
369. Thomas 0. Finks, Lethal Injection. An Uneasy Alliance of Law and Medicine, 4 J. Legal
Med. 383, 397 (1983); Hirsh, supra note 361, at 1.
370. See Finks, supra note 369, at 397 (explaining that "[l] ethal injections may not work
effectively on diabetics, drug users, and people with heavily pigmented skins"); Hish, supra
note 361, at 1 (noting that "if a person is nervous or fearful, his veins become constricted");
On Lethal Injections and theDeth Penall, 12 Hastings Center Rep. 2, 2 (Oct. 1982) [hereinafter
On Lethal Injections] (explaining that lethal injections are particularly difficult to administer "to
people with heavily pigmented skins.., and to diabetics and drug users"); Weisberg, supra
note 361, at 23 (describing the 45 minutes required for technicians to find a serviceable vein
in a former heroin addict); Another U.. Execution Amid Criticism Abroad, N.Y. Times Apr. 24,
1992, at B7 [hereinafter Another U.S. Execution] (reporting that the difficulty in executing Billy
Wayne White was due to his history as a heroin user).
371. SeeFimks, supra note 369, at 397 (explaining that "[ais many as one in four prisoners
may have veins that are hard to get at because they are deep, flat, covered by fat or damaged
by drug use").
372. See Egbert Affidavit, supra note 365, 11 ("Unskilled personnel may be unable to
insert successfully the IV catheter in the prisoner. This may be because the prisoner was once
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relatively accessible, yet sensitive, part of the body, such as the hand75 or
groin.34 In other cases, executioners are forced to perform a "cutdown,"
a surgical procedure that exposes the vein.Y5 Other problems include:
(1) inserting the catheter in the wrong direction, causing the chemicals to
flow away from the inmate's heart, thereby hindering their absorption;s
(2) inserting the catheter directly into an artery instead of a vein;" and
(3) inserting the catheter intramuscularly instead of intravenously! s
Moreover, the injection of sodium pentothal may cause choking or gagging
if the prisoner eats or drinks six to eight hours before the chemical is
administered: 79
Lethal injection is considered the most humane method for the
euthanasia of animals!"' Yet, in contrast to the way the procedures are
handled for death row inmates, the Humane Society firmly states that the
chemicals must be injected by "well trained and caring personnel. " 'ss
b. The High Risk of Botching in Texas
According to Radelet, "[1]ethal injections are far more likely to be
botched than any other modem method of execution."' Although lethal
injection botches have occurred in a number of death penalty states, the
incidence of botching is particularly high in Texas.n Leuchter contends
an addict and used the veins carelessly so the veins dotted or because the prisoner is anxious
and this causes the veins to constrict.").
373. See infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection: Rickey Ray Rector).
374. See id. (Lethal Injection: George 'Tiny" Mercer); Capital Punishwent. Cruel and
Unusual Economist, Jan. 23, 1993, at 86 (reviewing Stephen Trombley, The Execution
Protocol: Inside America's Capital Punishment Industry (1992), and quoting a death row
Inmate, "[t] hey put a catheter in your penis").
375. Trombley, supra note 208, at 261; Finks, supra note 369, at 397; Haines, supra note
320, at 448. Cutdowns are typically unnecessary if a technician is experienced and uses
modem equipment. Interview with Edward A. Brunner, MD., Ph.D., Professor of Anesthesia,
Northwestern University Medical School, San Antonio, Texas (Apr. 29, 1997).
376. &eAffidavit of Stephen M. Trombley 20 [hereinafter Trombley Affidavit], ExhibitA
of Gacy Complaint, supra note 341.
377. On Lethal Injections, supra note 370, at 2.
378. See Brunner Affidavit, supra note 363, 1 5; Egbert Affidavit, supra note 365, 1 9. If the
catheter is Improperly administered into the muscle, the prisoner will experience a severe
burning sensation, and the drugs will take longer to absorb than if they had been directly
inserted Into the bloodstream. See Brunner Affidavit, supra note 363, 8E; Egbert Affidavit,
supra note 365, 9.
379. Brunner Affidavit, supra note 363, 1 8E (noting that the risk of strangulation could be
prevented by denying the prisoner food six to eight hours before execution, but that this
precaution is not mentioned in the manuals produced by the Illinois Department of
Corrections).
380. See Humane Soc'y of the U.S., supra note 307, at 11.
381. Id. at 11-12.
382. Radelet Affidavit, supra note 110, 1 4 (listing Radelet's account of 11 botched lethal
Injection executions since 1985).
383. Nee infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection) (describing the lethal injection botches of 11
Texas Inmates: Charles Brooks, Jr., James D. Autry, Thomas Andy Barefoot, Stephen Peter
[1997]
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that "about eighty percent of the lethal injections in Texas "have had one
problem or another," although he does not document this estimate.
According to the botched execution information provided in
Appendix 2.0 of this Article, eleven-or nine percent-of the 121 lethal
injection executions conducted in Texas from December, 1982 (when
lethal injection was first used) to May, 1997, have been botched.*5 The
high percentage of botches in Texas may be partly attributable to the
dearth of written procedures provided to the executioners concerning how
to perform an execution. These "procedures" list little more than the
chemicals to be used (in incorrect order of application) and a vague
account of the content of the syringes. Moreover, there is no information
specifying the nature and extent of the qualifications that executioners
should have in order to perform an execution.ss
The results of this lack of guidance and training can be devastating, as
Raymond Landry's 1988 Texas execution demonstrated. Newspapers
reported the following-
While Landry was strapped to a gamey, executioners "repeatedly
probed" his veins with syringes for forty minutes, attempting to
inject potassium chloride. Then, two minutes after the execution
began, the syringe came out of Landry's vein, "spewing deadly
chemicals toward startled witnesses." What officials termed a
"blowout" resulted in the squirting of lethal injection liquid about
two feet across the room. A plastic curtain was pulled so that
witnesses could not see the execution-team reinsert the catheter
into Landrys vein. "After 14 minutes, and after witnesses heard
the sound of doors opening and dosing, murmurs and at least
one groan, the curtain was opened and Landry appeared motion-
less and unconscious." Landry was pronounced dead 24 minutes
after the drugs were initially injected.3
According to state officials, Landry's execution was delayed because of
a "mechanical problem caused by Landry's muscular arms and previous
drug use."ms A spokesperson for the Texas Attorney General conceded
that Landry's execution "was a mechanical and physical problem ....
Morin, Randy L Woolls, Elliot Rod Johnson, Raymond Landry, Stephen McCoy, Billy Wayne
White, Justin Lee May, and Ronald Alridge).
384. Trombley, supra note 208, at 73 (noting that, "[in the final analysis, it looks
disgusting'" because the inmates "routinely choke, cough, spasm, and writhe as they die").
385. See supra note 383 and accompanying text; see also Verhovek, supra note 266, at 1
(noting that there have been 121 lethal injection executions in Texas since the time of the
first lethal injection execution in December, 1982 until May, 1997).
386. Segenera / Richardson Application, supra note 110 (including extensive Appendixes
criticizing the lack of written guidelines for Texas lethal injection executions). The risk of
botching also creates psychological suffering, particularly if the procedure is delayed. See
Malone, supra note 311, at 6; see also Weisberg, supra note 361, at 23 ("Being strapped to a
table for a lengthy period while waiting to die [is] a form of psychological torture arguably
worse than most physical kinds.").
387. See infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection: Raymond Landry).
388. Id.
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Landry was very muscular and had 'Popeye-type' arms. When the stuff was
flowing, it wouldn't go into the veins and there was more pressure in the
hose than his veins could absorb." " A spokesperson for the Texas
Department of Corrections stated that this was the first time such a
problem had occurred in Texas. Yet, others noted the difficulties
authorities encountered in 1985 when technicians experienced setbacks
locating a vein in another Texas inmate, Stephen Morin. Morin also had
been a heavy drug user."O
Indeed, executioners required more than forty minutes to insert
Morin's lethal injection needle because his long-term drug use hindered
technicians' abilities to locate a blood vessel that had no scars or other
damage. Two minutes after entering Morin's death chamber, technicians
attempted the first injection carrying a saline solution."'1 "At least five
more attempts were made to locate appropriate veins in [Morin's] arms
and even legs before the technicians came from the department to review
its procedures for administering the drugs when the condemned man has
a history of drug abuse."" Morin's death required eleven minutes after
technicians finally found a suitable vein.9s A prison spokesperson stated
that the difficulty caused from inserting the needles "would probably
prompt the Texas Department of Corrections to review its procedures for
administering the drugs when the condemned person has a history of drug
abuse."59
Notably, the Texas Department of Corrections has never changed its
procedures to accommodate the special injection problems associated with
damaged veins. s Indeed, a botched execution attributable to an
inmate's unsuitable veins occurred each year following Morin's execution
until Landry's botched execution.3 6 Such drug user botches continue to
take place in Texas3e and other states.""
Not all errors can be linked to ill-trained prison personnel and
executioners. The lethal injection machinery can also malfunction in those
states that use them. As of 1990, four states had purchased Leuchter-
created lethal injection machines,"" although Leuchter had no technical
or medical expertise for devising the different mixtures of chemicals he
389. Id.
390. Id.




395. Segenera/!j Richardson Application, supra note 110.
396. &e infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection: Randy Woolls (1986) and Elliot Rod Johnson
(1987) In Texas).
397. See infra app. 2.C (Lethal Injection). The Texas executions of Billy Wayne White in
1992 and Ronald Allridge in 1995 were also botched because technicians experienced
difficulties locating suitable veins. Id.
398. Se id.
399. Denno, supra note 5, at 627-28 (listing Illinois, Delaware, Missouri, and NewJersey).
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recommended.o
Lastly, lethal injection does not entail mutilation in quite the same
way as electrocution. Yet, lethal injection does offend an inmate's dignity
(E3) in light of the accounts of botched lethal injections listed in
Appendix 2.C and those discussed in this section.
3. "Standards of Decency" and Legislative Trends
Although legislative trends are moving exclusively in the direction of
lethal injection, there are significant issues concerning lethal injection that
bear on the standards of decency factor. Most predominant is the ongoing
stance by the American Medical Association's (AMA's) Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, which prohibits physicians' participation in execu-
tions.' Although the Council's position pertains to all methods of
execution, it is particularly applicable to lethal injection because of that
method's perceived affiliation with the medical profession.42
The question of what does and should constitute physician
involvement in executions is controversial. 4°a The AMA and state medical
associations have publicly condemned physician participation in lethal
injection executions, stating that a physician's role should be limited to the
pronouncement of death.0 Some states have attempted to solve this
400. For example, when one of the first states that switched to lethal injection contacted
Leuchter for advice on that method, he began to study pharmacology and chemistry. Based
upon the results of studies conducted on pigs and rabbits, Leuchter calculated the dosages of
sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride required for the lethal
injection of human beings. Thereafter, he created a computer-controlled machine for inject-
ing prisoners without, as he explained, rupturing their veins or inducing "undue discomfort."
Dr. Death and His Wonderful Machin, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, atA24.
401. Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Council Repor.
PhysicanParticipation in CapitalPunishment 270JAMAL 65,365 (1993) [hereinafter Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs] ("A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to pre-
serving life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized
execution.") (quoting Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
Code of Medical Ethics, Current Opinions, Opinion 2.D6 (1994)); American College of
Physicians, supra note 364, at xi (same).
402. See generally David J. Rothman, Physicians and The Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & Pol'y 151
(1995) (discussing the historical role of physicians in executions).
403. See, e.g., Ronald Bayer, Lethal Injections and Capital Punishment: Medidne in the S&roce of
the State, 4 J. Prison & Jail Health 7, 7-14 (1984) (discussing the controversy surrounding
physician participation in lethal injections); Casscells & Curran, supra note 315, at 227 (same).
404. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 401, at 366-67. 'The AMA
guidelines... specify that selecting injection sites, starting intravenous lines, prescribing,
preparing or administering injection drugs, and consulting with lethal injection personnel
constitute physician participation in executions and are unethical." American College of
Physicians, supra note 364, at 20. The presence of a physician at a lethal injection execution
was required by some state statutes such as Oklahoma's. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1014 (1996).
However, this arrangement has changed for two reasons: (1) the AMA's pronouncement and
physicians' complaints that states were turning executions into medical procedures, seeJerome
D. Gorman, M.D. et al., The Case Against Lethal Injection, Va. Med., Dec. 1988, at 576; and (2)
claims that physicians were blurring the line between their role as a healer and as a killer, see
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dilemma by employing Leuchter's lethal injection machines in which
syringes are activated by a mechanical plunger.4 In turn, a number of
state statutes are simply extremely vague on the subject of the procedure to
be used and the involvement of medical personnel.*
Finally, there is the issue of organ donation by inmates.4 According
to some commentators, lethal injection is a preferred method of execution
because it does not mutilate the body and therefore enables death row
inmates to donate some of their organs,40 or all organs if the injection
contains noncontaminating chemicals.4 Although it is beyond the scope
of this Article to debate whether inmate organ donation constitutes an
evolving 410 or "devolving" 41 standard of decency, this issue will become
Fisher, supra note 361, at B5 (reporting that, in several states, doctors are present at execu-
tions, but do not administer the injections). As a result, states with lethal injection no longer
require the services of a physician, except to pronounce death. See generalj American College
of Physicians, supra note 364. The executioners in Texas, for example, are volunteers who are
not properly trained to insert the intravenous tubing before the execution. Se Felder I
Petition, supra note 321, at 66 138 (arguing that procedures in Texas do not require execu-
tioners to be trained, increasing the risk that inmates will suffer).
405. See supra note 399 and accompanying text (discussing those states that apply
Leuchter's machines).
406. &e generallj American College of Physicians, stpra note 364, at 18-20; FelderlPetition,
supra note 321, at 63 1131.
407. In the context of organ donation, this Article illustrates the evolving standards of
decency factor by considering the transformation in states' execution method provisions
relating to the disposition of prisoners' corpses. Historically, most states had provided for the
dissection of the corpse without regard for the burying of the body by the prisoner's relatives.
SesMadow, supra note 318, at 540.41. This dissection requirement was slowly removed from all
state statutes. In contrast the modem Kansas statute allows for the condemned to make an
"anatomical gift" and provides that "a person making such gift shall be executed in such a
manner that such gift can be carried out." An Act concerning crimes and punishments and
procedures relating thereto; creating the crime of capital murder and providing for a
sentence of death therefor under certain circumstances; providing for mandatory terms of
imprisonment for certain crimes. 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 252 § 14. The modem Mississippi
statute is similar in that It allows for the condemned's "unclaimed" body to be donated to
science. 1994 Miss. Law 479 § 99-19-55(4).
408. SeeJack Kevorklan, Prescription: Medicine, the Goodness of Planned Death 17-99
(1991) (emphasizing that the great majority of death row inmates want to donate their organs
In order to "repay a social debt" despite anti-donation arguments by the medical profession);
Rorie Sherman, 'Dr. Death' Visits the Condemne& Officials Question a Search for Organ Donor,
Nat'l LJ., Nov. 8, 1993, at 11 (noting Kevorkian's contention that "wholesale transplantation
of the death row inmates' organs should be permitted, because theoretically 'a single healthy
condemned Inmate could be the salvation of at least six doomed adults'").
409. To save key organs such as the heart and liver, prison officials would have to use a
chemical other than sodium thlopental because it contaminates the organs. See Condemned
Man is Hoping to Save Lives of Others; He Seks to Donate His Organs for Transplant After Executio,
Dallas Morning News, Oct. 21, 1993, at 25A [hereinafter Condemned Man].
410. See supra notes 407-09; Michael A. DeVita et al., Procuring Organs from a Non-Heart
Beating Cadaver A Case Port, 3 Kennedy Inst. EthicsJ. 371, 383 (1993) (discussing the ethical
and social Issues concerning organ transplants); Richard A. Epstein, Organ Transplants 4Am.
Enterprise 50, 52 (1993) (arguing that we should "shed our ethical scruples and embrace a
market system" of organ donation); Jack Kevorkian, Opinions on Capital Punishment, Executions
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 386 1996-1997
ARE EXECUTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL?
more significant with time Y2
C. Alternative Execution Methods
No state has introduced a new method of execution, despite the
repeated complications associated with lethal injections. At the same time,
courts are expected to oversee the method of execution chosen by a
particular state.413 Such Eighth Amendment review should be conducted
"in the light of contemporary human knowledge" 414 and "presently
available alternatives." 45 It is outside the bounds of this Article to discuss
presently available alternatives other than lethal injection. Yet, recent
research and literature on the subject of suicide and assisted suicide
suggest there is a range of alternatives designed to result in the most
humane death possible, particularly for the frail and terminally illr It is
and Medical Sience 4 Med. & L 515, 515-33 (1985) (contending that lethal injection is the
preferred execution method and that inmates should be allowed to donate their organs);
CharisseJones, Sharing Mmorie of Organ Donations Who Shared, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1993, atB3
(reporting that 34,000 people nationwide are awaiting transplants and that "tens of thousands
more" may need them).
411. See, ag., J.H. Meredith, Organ Procurement From the Executed, 18 Transplantation
Proceedings 406, 406-07 (1986) (detailing the legal, ethical, medical, logistic, and media-
related problems concerning organ procurement from the executed); Jones, supra note 410,
at B3 (discussing religious and personal arguments against donation); Catherine S. Manegold,
Senate Told of China Covicts Shot for Organs, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1995, atA10 (reporting that
Chinese refugees had testified in Senate hearings concerning the Chinese government's
practices of removing organs from executed prisoners and selling them to be used as medical
transplants in state-owned hospitals); Sherman, supra note 408, at 11 (noting lethal ethicists'
objections to inmates' organ donations to non-relatives "because they believe that it is
impossible to obtain voluntary consent in a prison setting--especially among death row
prisoners who hope their benevolence might win them pardon"); Cina Accused of Taking
Oigansfivra Prisoners, Herald Statesman, Aug. 30, 1994, atA2 (reporting allegations by the Hu-
man Rights Watch/Asia, that China's judiciary system intentionally botches some inmates'
executions so that surgeons can remove for transplants the shot inmates' organs while they
are still alive); Condemned Man, supra note 409, at 25A (describing problems faced by an
inmate in his attempt to donate his organs).
412. SeeLloyd R. Cohen, Organ Transplant Market Would Save Live- Nat'l LJ., Jan. 29, 1996,
at A19 (arguing that the law should allow people to sell their organs to help alleviate the
shortage of organs for transplants); Mike Smith, Does Lethal Injection Bar Organ Donation?
Legislative Panel to Study the lssuq Courier J. (Louisville), July 22, 1995, at 5A (discussing a
legislative committee that will investigate execution methods enabling an inmate to donate
organs).
413. See Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of
changed statute).
414. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
415. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
that "no court would approve any method of implementation of the death sentence found to
involve unnecessary cruelty in light of presently available alternatives").
416. For a discussion of the range of alternative execution methods, see generally Derek
Humphry, Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying
(1991); Kevorkian, supra note 408, at 185-244, 373; New Group Offers to HeY5 the ill Commit
Suicide, N.Y. Tunes, June 13, 1993, at A32; Elisabeth Rosenthal, Methods Used in Suicids Follow
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unknown whether these alternatives would appear more humane than our
current methods when examined under Table 2's execution methods test.
However, there is sufficient evidence available to warrant an Eighth
Amendment evaluation of these alternatives, thereby potentially rendering
our current methods unnecessary.
D. The Penological Justification for Inhumane Execution Methods
Why have legislatures, courts, and prison personnel perpetuated, over
the course of the century, particular execution methods when substantial
evidence suggests they constitute cruel and unusual punishment' Why, for
example, have post-Kemmler legislatures refused to initiate a scientific and
legal inquiry into which methods inflict unnecessary pain, and which
methods constitute the least inhumane alternative? Why has the Supreme
Court continued to avoid an Eighth Amendment evaluation of these
methods when the Court reviews a wide range of other claims of possible.
cruel and unusual prison conditions? Why do some state statutes incor-
porate provisions that have no apparent penological justification, such as
the nonretroactivity of a new, purportedly more humane, execution
method?
There are no dear answers to these questions.47 This section
attempts to explore some possible explanations, however, by focusing on
the reasons states provide for their decisions to either change or retain an
execution method in the context of Table 2's execution methods test. As
this section concludes, regardless of the reasons states give, each
explanation rests on a distortion of the death is different principle in ways
the Supreme Court did not intend.
1. Why States Change An Execution Method
Legislatures and courts have consistently insisted that the primary
reason states change from one execution method to the next is to ensure
greater humaneness and standards of decency for those awaiting
execution. 418 This stance comports with the view that even a condemned
person has "basic human rights."4 9 The punishment should be the loss
of life itself, not excessive deprivation or pain prior to or during the
Boo7, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,1993, atA25.
417. It is beyond the scope of this Article to conduct a fundamental rights analysis
concerning the compelling state interest in retaining inhumane execution methods, although
this Is a viable topic of inquiry. As Justice Marshall has stated with respect to such an analysis
of the death penalty itself, "the substantive due process argument reiterates what is essentially
the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment-4e, punishment may not be more severe than is necessary to serve the legitimate
Interests of the State." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
418. See infra app. 3.
419. Lloyd L. Wenreb, Oedipus at Fenway Park What Rights Are and Why There Are Any
135 (1994).
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execution.420 For this reason, "we take strenuous measures to mitigate so
far as we can the incidental physical and other kinds of pain that attend
[deathl. " 42'
At the same time, legislatures and courts have engaged in statutory
and judicial behavior that belies their purported humanity. Throughout
history, for example, it appears that a number of legislatures have been
motivated to change a method of execution not for strictly humanitarian
concerns, but because the perpetuation of the death penalty itself became
jeopardized due to that state's particular method. In 1888, the New York
legislature sought a more humane method of execution than hanging
because the public's perception of hanging's barbarity spurred movements
toward a total abolition of capital punishment.4n Thereafter, many states
adopted electrocution, which offered a far less visible and, therefore, less
scrutinized procedure.4n Some electrocution states slowly began to switch
to lethal gas when problems with electrocution became more public. 4
Lastly, some states' decisions to change to lethal injection after Gregg
appeared to be based on economic motivations, in addition to efforts to
make the death penalty more palatable to the public after its long
hiatus. According to the creator of New Jersey's lethal injection bill, for
example, lethal injection makes it easier for a jury to vote for the death
penalty.
States have also appeared to change methods to stay one step ahead
of a constitutional challenge to a particular method of execution. This
approach buffers the death penalty itself from scrutiny, or from any
possible death penalty hiatus that may occur if a method is rendered
unconstitutional. For example, the Maryland legislature was stirred to
authorize lethal injection in response to a death row inmate's request in
1994 to have his lethal gas execution videotaped in support of another
condemned inmate's challenge of Maryland's lethal gas statute.4  In
turn, when California Governor Pete Wilson signed a bill into law that
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See The Death Penalty in America, supra note 274, at 21 (depicting the historical
movement toward total abolition); Denno, supra note 5, at 562-77 (discussing NewYork's anti-
capital punishment movement); Madow, supra note 318, at 490-506 (describing the abolition
of public executions in antebellum New York).
423. See infra app. 1, this. 3-7; app. 3 (charting methods of executions by state from 1895-
1996).
424. &e id.
425. See infra app. 3; see supra notes 315-22 and accompanying text.
426. Michael Norman, Why Jersey Is Leaning to Executions by Injection, N.Y. Times, May 18,
1983, at B6 ("'If you're on the jury, the thought of some guy in that chair sizzling is going to
bother them .... This way, with lethal injections, it might ease their conscience when they
come up with a verdict.'") (quoting Dr. Thomas H. Paterniti, author of the New Jersey lethal
injection bill).
427. See Sabra Chartrand, Given a Push, Maryland Alters Its Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar.
25, 1994, at B18.
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allowed California's death row inmates a choice between lethal gas and
lethal injection, he emphasized that "he hoped the new law would stop
last-minute appeals" of the constitutionality of lethal gas, such as those filed
by Robert Alton Harris. 8 The South Carolina legislature's recent
decision to allow prisoners a choice between electrocution and lethal
injection came quickly on the heels of the prosecutor's announcement to
seek the death penalty in the Susan Smith case,42 perhaps in an effort to
preclude the defense's possible attack on electrocution.
Lastly, the concern for ensuring the continuation of the death penalty
process through execution methods is perhaps most dearly illustrated by
the constitutional substitute provisions of ten states listed in Table 8 (Type
5). These states have one or more constitutional substitutes in case lethal
injection is deemed unconstitutional or invalid. In Oklahoma, for example,
if lethal injection is rendered unconstitutional, the death sentence "shall
be carried out by electrocution." Yet, if both lethal injection and
electrocution are rendered unconstitutional, the death sentence "shall be
carried out by firing squad."'o Presumably, the three execution methods
are ordered in terms of their relative humaneness. The state's interest,
however, is not with seeking the method that inflicts unnecessary pain, but
rather the constancy of the death penalty process itself with a substitute
initially considered to be second or third in a rank ordering of
humaneness. This policy is comparable to a state's determination that
because its twenty-year sentence for crime Xis found to be unconstitution-
ally cruel and unusual, the state will instead substitute a twenty-five year
sentence for crime J its next choice, because the twenty-five year sentence
has not yet been deemed unconstitutional. The death is different principle
is twisted because the state's goal is not to enforce a higher level of
scrutiny or justice, but rather to safeguard the enactment of the death
penalty, without interruption or regard to human cosL
2. Why States Retain An Execution Method
Another approach to deciphering the distortion of the death is
different principle is to examine why states defend their decision to retain
an execution method. One answer concerns states' purported reliance on
precedent, most particularly Kemmler, despite Kemmks limited applicability
to post incorporation issues.0 Such reliance not only fosters legislative
inertia, 4  it protects the viability of the death penalty. As the Ninth
428. California Inmate Get Choice in Executions, N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 30, 1992, at A28.
429. See Rick Bragg, In South Carolina, A Mothes Defens, and Life, Could Hinge on 2 Choicew,
N.Y. Times, July 16, 1995, at A12.
430. See infra app. 1, tbl. 8, n.496. With its two separate substitutes, Oklahoma allows a
kind of constitutional substitute "domino effect.m " Notably, Oklahoma does not list lethal gas as
one of these substitutes, even though Oklahoma used lethal gas for 25 years, from 1951-1976.
See infra app. 3 (Oklahoma).
431. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text (discussing Kemmisi).
432. See Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1407 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that the
(1997]
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Circuit in Firr made dear, however, there was no support for the
defendants' claim that allowing a challenge to lethal gas "would result in
reductions in [plaintiffs'] sentences" because lethal injection was a valid
alternative.m Yet, the defendants readily equated the abolition of the
execution method with that of the death penalty.
Another answer may be that legislatures and courts are attempting to
reflect what they consider to be the public's views toward punishment.
Because scholars have discussed the different theories of punishment in
great detail,M this section presents the theories only briefly and only in
the context of the public's and the states' perceptions of different
execution methods.
According to retribution theory, offenders deserve to be punished in
proportion to the crimes they commit because they made the choice to
engage in social harm. Westley Alan Dodd provided what he
considered to be an execution method example of this theory when he
chose hanging over lethal injection under Washington State's choice
statute, explaining that because he had hanged one of his victims, he too
should hang.W
Utilitarian theory, in contrast, does not view punishment as an end in
itself, but considers whether punishment would provide any future social
benefit, most particularly in terms of crime prevention. The theory
presumes that human actors behave rationally, they will avoid engaging in
crime if they believe the potential pain of punishment is greater than the
potential pleasure reaped from the crime.4 Types of utilitarian theory
include general deterrence, which presumes the punishment of a
particular offender will prevent others from engaging in similar conduct
because they will be aware of, and fear, the consequences.' Antwine v.
legislative "pattern seen with electrocution states reflects the powerful force of legislative
inertia"), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996)
(remanding for reconsideration in light of changed statute).
433. a-erro, 77 F.3d at 305.
434. See generally Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (2d Ed. 1995); George P.
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978); H.LA. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility
(1968); Ronald J. Rychlak, Socidy's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theoy of Punishmen4 65 Tul. L Rev. 299 (1990); loyd L Weinreb, Desert
Punishment and Ciminal Resonsibility, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 47 (1986).
435. See Weinreb, supra note 4S4, at 47 (stating that desert is the sole basis in determining
proper punishment). Some scholars have suggested that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause precludes the application of retribution as a purpose of criminal punishment. See
Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 80, at 1797 n.106. For a discussion of what one author
considers to be the "moral superiority of retribution," see Graeme Newman, Just and Painful:
A Case for the Corporal Punishment of Criminals 128-39 (2d. ed. 1995).
436. See Hanged Slaer Fdt Little Pain at Death, A Doctor Concludrs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1993, at
A7. Of course, Dodd's explanation gives the impression that modern retributive proportionali-
ty theory is based on literal lex talionis ("an eye for an eye"), when it is not.
437. See Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 62-69 (1968); Dressier,
supra note 434, § 2.03 at 9.
438. See Dressler, supra note 434, § 2.03[B]][2] at 10. Other types of utilitarian theory
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Delo 4" highlighted the issues raised when a prosecutor encourages a jury
to consider the alleged humaneness of a particular execution method in
determining whether to recommend the death penalty,"4 however, there
is no evidence that potential criminals are deterred by a state's execution
method. 1
By retaining certain execution methods, legislatures and courts appear
to reflect what they consider to be the public's emphasis on retribution
toward criminals. For example, legislatures and courts commingle the
public's stated endorsement for the death penalty, which opinion polls
show is currently seventy-five to eighty percent,"2 with a comparable
desire for the cruelest method possible to inflict death. However, this
presumption contradicts other polls indicating that the majority of the
public prefers what they perceive to be the most humane method."2
Legislatures and courts therefore use execution methods to symbolize
society's so-called "moral outrage""2 or "revenge-utilitarianism " 4
Include specific deterrence and rehabilitation, which are not applicable to a discussion of
execution methods.
439. 54 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir. 1995).
440. See id at 131-64 (rendering unconstitutional a prosecutor's unsupported dosing
argument that the defendant's death by lethal gas would be "quick, painless, and humane"
because the statement had no evidentiary support in the record and "diminished thejury's
sense of responsibility" for the difficult decision of imposing the death penalty).
441. There is no reliable evidence that the death penalty serves as a general deterrent. See
Paternoster, supra note 284, at 218-43, for a review of the research and literature in this area.
Indeed, some research suggests that "highly publicized executions actually brutalize society by
legitimating lethal violence, leading to unintended increases in the level of criminal
homlcide."John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence orBrtalizationAn ImpactAsssment of Oklahoma's
Rdum to Capital Punishment 32 Criminology 107, 108 (1994) (discussing a research study that
supports prior demonstrations of a brutalizing effect); see also Lesser, supra note 288, at 47-92
(noting the public's fascination, "sympathies," and "identifications" with executions in the
context of "the killer inside us"); Janny Scott, Executions Kep 7Tght Grip on Public's Imagination,.
Death Penalty: The Ritualized Killing is Riveting for Some. For Others, It Brings a Sense of Order and
Justice LA. Times, Apr. 18, 1992, at Al (explaining that, "on a deeper level, experts say
people see in an execution the possibility of order in a world they fear has lost its bearings").
442. See White, supra note 6, at 24; WdliamsJ. Bowers et al, A New Look at Public Opinion
on Capital Punishment. What Citizens and Legilatures Prer, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 77, 78-81 (1994)
(noting that if given the choice in an opinion poll, the public preferred lengthy imprison-
ment and restitution to murder victims' families over the death penalty, although polls
frequently exclude these options).
443. See supra note 309 and accompanying text; Strong Support in California for Executions:
Most in Poll Would Replace the Gas Chamber with Lethal Injection, Atlanta J. & Const., Apr. 29,
1992, at 8 (describing a 1992 Los Angele Times poll finding that although 77% of the poll's
voters supported the death penalty for convicted murderers, 63% viewed lethal injection as
the preferred method of execution, "including those who favor capital punishment").
444. See Packer, supra note 437, at 264 (describing various moral standards as reasons for
punishment).
445. Radin, supra note 28, at 1054; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and
Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L Rev. 1143, 1165 (1980). Radin
applies the concept of "revenge-utilitarianism" to reflect the argument that "[i]t is human
nature to desire revenge against criminals. If the government does not punish criminals to the
extent necessary to satisfy this desire, then people will take it upon themselves to get revenge,
(1997]
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toward criminals.
Of course, there are anecdotal statements supporting unrestrained
vengeance toward criminals in the form of the cruelest execution method
available."0 For example, Bob Butterworth, the Attorney General of
Florida, indicated that Pedro Medina's botched electrocution would serve
as both a means of retribution and as a deterrent." 7 "People who wish to
commit murder, they'd better not do it in the state of Florida because we
may have a problem with our electric chair.""0 On the other hand, other
individuals claim that lethal injection is not cruel enough. As the mother
of one crime victim stated in an interview preceding the execution of her
daughter's killer, lethal injection "is too quick. He would need to suffer a
little bit more according to what he gave [my daughter], which was a lot of
suffering."" 9 Senator Bob Robinson, co-sponsor of the bill replacing
Nevada's gas chambers with lethal injections, emphasized that "the
humane aspect [of lethal injection] didn't enter into his thinking. He said
it would not bother him if the prisoners were executed in the same
method as their victims.""' Justice Scalia may have mirrored such views
when describing a gruesome case he considered particularly eligible for
the death penalty-the rape and murder of an eleven-year-old girl.45
"How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection compared to that!"" 2
The study of hatred and resentment toward criminals in the context
of retribution is an extensive topic that can provide some insight into such
attitudes.45 At the same time, however, such anecdotes appear to
and social disorder will result." Radin, supra note 28, at 1054.
446. According to an individual calling CNN News to comment about the execution of
child sex-murderer Westley Alan Dodd, for example, lethal injection "is too easy for these
killers-I think the hanging and the electrocution or a firing squad is proper." Brian Christie,
Is Execution by Hanging Cruel and Unusual Punishment? (CNN News, Jan. 5, 1993) (transcript of
live report).
447. See infra app. 2.A. (Electrocution: Pedro Medina).
448. Condemned Man's Mask Bursts Into Flam DuringExecution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1997, at
B9 [hereinafter Cndemned Mans Mask].
449. Man Executedfor 1986 Murder, Austin American-Statesman, June 21, 1995, at B5.
450. See Cy Ryan, U. Press Int'l, Feb. 22, 1983; see also Stephen H. Gettinger, Sentenced to
Die: The People, The Crimes, and the Controversy 86 (1979) (noting that when lethal
injection was introduced in Oklahoma, "[m]any legislators opposed the new method because
itwas too 'soft on criminals'").
451. Calllnsv. Collins, 510 US. 1141, 1143 (1994) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
452. Id.
453. See, ag., Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (1988)
(discussing the role of forgiveness, resentment, hatred, and mercy in the law); Stephen P.
Garvey, -As the Gentle Rain Frmn Heaven. • Mercy in Capital Sentencing Cornell L Rev. 989 (1996)
(arguing for a new "mercy-inclusive" approach to capital sentencing); Jean Hampton,
Correcting Hars Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L Rev. 1659 (1992)
(contending that retribution is a necessary part of "any morally right" justice system);
Margaret P. Holmgren, Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Perrons, 30 Am. Phil. Q. 341 (1993)
(presenting a position on forgiveness based upon Kant's claim that all individuals are of equal
intrinsic worth); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Ciminal
Punishmen4 74 Cornell L Rev. 655 (1989) (discussing the influence of emotions on sentenc-
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represent a small percentage of individuals' views toward execution
methods.4m If this is the case, legislatures and courts are appealing to. the
vengeful minority, as well as twisting the death is different prindple4 5 As
Justice Brennan emphasized, "[t]he Court has never accepted the
proposition that notions of deterrence or retribution might legitimately be
served through the infliction of pain beyond that which is minimally
necessary to terminate an individual's life." 4
3. Choice Statutes
Table 8's choice statutes illustrate legislatures' simultaneous efforts to
change and retain methods of execution. Such cross purposes result in
nonsensical provisions that have no apparent penological or social policy
justification. First, states can choose to have either the prior method or the
new purportedly more humane method as the default if an inmate refuses
to make a choice between methods. Yet, given that most inmates decline,
for whatever reason, to make such a choice, 7 they consequently die by
the least humane method in those states that have the least humane
method identified as the default. This least humane default prompted the
litigation in both Campbell and Fierro, where inmates challenged the
constitutionality of the default method. Neither the legislature nor the
Ninth Circuit ever addressed the penological justification of having the
least humane method serve as the default, particularly in light of evidence
that inmates who face immediate execution may not have the psychological
bearing for making choices at all, much less the means by which they are
to die."
Ing). For a thoughtful examination of the literature on this topic, see Joshua Dressier, Hating
Criminals: How Can Something That Feds So Good be Wrong?, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1448 (1990) (re-
viewlngJeffhie G. Murphy &Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (1988)).
454. See supra notes 309, 443 and accompanying text (discussing opinion polls).
455. According to Radin, revenge-utilitarianism "plays havoc with attempts to limit
punishment (because] judges will be tempted to conclude that the amount of punishment
needed to serve this utilitarian revenge purpose is exactly the amount the legislature has
specified." Radin, supra note 28, at 1054.
456. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("The dominant theme of the Eighth Amendment debates was that the ends of the criminal
laws cannot justify the use of measures of extreme cruelty to achieve them.").
457. In FiLenv v. Gom= 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (NMD. Cal. 1994), for example, the court
noted that of the 24 California death row inmates who were provided a choice between lethal
gas and lethal Injection between January 1, 1993 and October 14, 1993, two-thirds (16
Inmates) declined to make a choice, seven selected lethal injection, and one chose lethal gas,
aff4 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cr.), vacated on other ground; 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for
reconsideration in light of changed statute).
458. Although the Royal Commission initially considered that giving a prisoner a choice
between methods would provide a way of "introducing an untried system," the Commission
ultimately decided against it because of the "tormenting vacillation" involved in such a
decision. Royal Comm'n Rep., supra note 219, at 220; see also White, supra note 6, at 176-78
(discussing attorneys' difficulties with handling the depression and death wishes of death row
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A comparably peculiar circumstance arises when an inmate chooses
the method that the legislature, courts, prison personnel, and public
consider to be the least humane or most archaic, but which is allowed by
statute. A recent example is John Albert Taylor's highly publicized choice
to be executed by firing squad under Utah's choice statute, which has
lethal injection as the default.4 Apparently motivated by a desire to
embarrass the State,4 Taylor's decision spotlighted the early Mormon
belief in "blood atonement" which underlied the state's practice of
providing a choice of "blood shedding" methods. ' Taylor's decision also
accentuated current problems in administering the firing squad. 2
Regardless, the diminished publicity following Taylor's death appears to
have comparably dimmed the political concern with the firing squad, in
part because eliminating the firing squad could weaken the mantel upon
which the death penalty itself is based.45 Likewise, in those states where
wardens make the choice," it can be questioned whether granting them
authority in this matter is any more humane or competent given that the
wardens are provided the ultimate discretion-choosing the manner of
inmates).
459. &e infra app. 1, tbl. 8, n.493; app. 3 (Utah); James Brooke, Utah Debates Yhing Squads
in Clash of Past and Preent N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1996, at A16; Condemned Criminal in Utah Seeks
Death by Thing Squad, N.Y. Tines, Dec. 11, 1995, at A14 [hereinafter Condemned Criminal];
Tiring Squad Executes Kiler, N.Y. Tines, Jan. 27, 1996, at A22.
460. SeeBrooke, supra note 459, atA16; Condemned Crimial supra note 459, atA14.
461. See Gillespie, supra note 195, at 12 (describing the evolution of the Mormon belief in
"blood atonement," which proposes that "only through choosing a method of execution which
results in blood being 'spilled' (or shed) can the condemned hope to receive forgiveness in
the next life").
462. The problems with administering the firing squad are varied, ranging from: (1) the
"unwanted flood" of volunteers desiring to be part of the firing squad; (2) the building of a"customized firing squad execution chair" that accommodates a pan underneath in order to
catch the inmate's blood because of the concern with AIDS, Brooke, supra note 459, at A16;
and (3) the "need to deal with lighting conditions, shooting distances and, most importantly,
give the firing squad members a chance to get over any emotional barrier to pulling the
trigger," Condemned QCmina; supra note 459, at A14.
463. At the height of the publicity surrounding Taylor's decision, a number of state
representatives claimed they would introduce a bill to eliminate the firing squad in Utah. So
Brooke, supra note 459, at A16. Although such a bill was introduced, see H.B. 257, 52d Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Utah 1996), it was never even brought to a vote. Telephone Interviews with Clay
Hatch, Administrative Assistant to the Utah Speaker of the House (Mar. 22, 1996; June 14,
1997). Yet, this situation raises the prospect of a number of other potentially unusual cir-
cumstances for those inmates who, in a choice state, may be challenging one of the methods
of execution. For example, by "winning," an inmate may intentionally or unintentionally place
himself or others in a position where they are executed by the least humane method. A
strong argument can be made that the firing squad is the most humane method of the five
methods available if it is competently performed (that is, without vengeful shooters). See
Denno, supra note 5, at 687-89. Moreover, some inmates may prefer having even a difficult
choice rather than no choice at all. See, ag., Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting an inmate's claim that execution by lethal injection in California violates
his constitutional right to choose his method of execution).
464. See infra app. 1, tbl. 8 (Type 6).
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someone else's death.
Next, history shows that some states that selected a new method of
execution did not allow death row inmates convicted or sentenced before a
certain date to make the choice between the old and new method or the
states failed to specify whether their enactment of a new method was retro-
active.o Therefore, by default, pre-enactment prisoners were executed by
the prior method, even though a state's purported rationale for changing
methods was that the new method was more humane. Although the Court
has held that an inmate can be executed by the new, supposedly more hu-
mane method rather than the old method,4 there appears to be no
penological justification for the reverse situation-executing the pre-en-
actment inmate by the least humane technique. Increasingly, the more
modem choice statutes allow the same choice to both pre-enactment and
postenactment inmates, although this is not the current situation in
Mississippi.
Indeed, South Carolina, the most recent choice state, has a unique
provision with no apparent purpose apart, perhaps, from some odd
compromise based upon the wide range of statutes provided in other
states. Both pre-enactment and post enactment prisoners can choose their
method of execution, although the no choice default for the former is
electrocution whereas the no choice default for the latter is lethal
injection. Predictably, electrocution is the constitutional substitute if lethal
injection is rendered unconstitutional.4
One reason for such oddities may pertain to states' concerns that if
they introduce a new method of execution, the old method will be
presumed unconstitutional. Indeed, some statutes specify that the prior
method is not rendered unconstitutional due to the introduction of a new
method4 9 Furthermore, these are the kinds of issues that courts want to
avoid; instead, they prefer to have the legislature simply change the
execution method without creating legal precedent. Such side-stepping is
functional. It skirts the problems involved in rendering an execution
method unconstitutional if that method is still being used in other states.
And, perhaps most importantly, it precludes any suggestion that the death
penalty may not be viable.
465. See infra app. 3.
466. Malloyv. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).
467. See infra app. 1, thl. 8 (Type 4).
468. See id.
469. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 54-617(c) (Michie 1983) ("[Nlothing in this section is to
be construed as a declaration by the Arkansas General Assembly that death by electrocution
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitutions of the United
States or the State of Arkansas.").
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4. Symbolic Disproportionality
Determining whether legislatures are impelled by illicit motivations in
their selection or retention of particular execution methods is difficult. 470
Nonetheless, some evidence suggests legislatures use execution methods as
a means of symbolic, if not actual, disproportionality in punishment. This
Article has noted that such evidence was more apparent historically when
states retained or regressed to using public hangings for the crime of rape,
while employing the new, purportedly more humane method of
electrocution for other crimes.471 Because a grossly disproportionate
number of blacks were executed for the crime of rape,472 it can be
presumed that the symbolic disproportionality of execution methods
pertained not to the differences in crime, but rather the differences in
race. "Symbolically at least, lynching has been perceived as an act against
the whole black community, not merely the execution of a single
'criminal.'" 47
The obvious response, of course, is that states no longer have public
executions and the death penalty for rape is now unconstitutional. Yet,
substantial research shows that, while controlling for a myriad of factors
relevant to the seriousness of a crime, blacks are disproportionately
executed for homicides involving white victims.47 4 While execution with
lethal injection is a private, sterile event as compared to a public lynching,
far more open and visible are the racial differences in the implementation
of the death penalty and the fact that executions occur at all. In this
context, the issue of race and cruel and unusual execution methods only
takes a different form.475
Whether legislatures or the courts should assume the greater
responsibility in determining the constitutionality of an execution method,
470. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problen of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motivation, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 99; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional La, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1212 (1970); Martin R. Gardner, Illicit
Legislative Motivation As A Sufficient Condition for Unconstitutionality Under the Establishment
Clause-A Casefor Consideration: 7he Utah.Rring Squad 2 Wash. U. LQ. 435, 435 (1979).
471. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text (discussing possible racial motivations
for exceptions to changes from hanging to electrocution for the crime of rape).
472. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (evaluating the treatment of blacks
convicted of rape).
473. Steven A. Blum, Public Excutions: Understanding the TCud and Unusual Punishments"
Claus4 19 Hastings Const. LQ. 413, 421 (1992).
474. SeeDavid Q Baldus et al., EqualJustice and the Death Penalty. A Legal and Empirical
Analysis 140-97, 306-93 (1990); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in
Newerse: Tie Role of ProsecutosialDiscrtion, 41 Rutgers L Rev. 27, 100-57 (1988).
475. This argument has also been raised recently in response to the reintroduction of
chain gains. See Recent Legislation: Criminal Law-Prison Labor--loyida Reintroduces Chain Gang
109 Harv. L. Rev. 876, 878 (1996) ("[P]roponents seem to argue that the symbolic value of
chain gangs alone justifies their use. Such an argument either ignores the racially divisive
nature of this symbol or, more insidiously, attempts to take advantage of it by subtly
scapegoating one segment of society.") (footnote omitted).
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thereby diminishing the opportunity for symbolic disproportionality, is too
large an issue for this Article to discuss. Notably, there is less legislative and
judicial action in states that do not regularly impose the death penalty.47
Among those states that do impose the death penalty more frequently,
courts are beginning to take a relatively larger role. As the Fwrro district
court emphasized, however, "[while 'it is for [the judiciary] ultimately to
judge' whether a given punishment offends the eighth amendment, the
amendment is not a vehicle for judges to impose their own views about
what society's standards ought to be."47
CONCLUSION
In Furman v. Georgia,478 the Supreme Court set forth the death is
different principle that established death as a unique punishment in terms
of its "pain," its "total irrevocability," and "its absolute renunciation of all
that is embodied in our concept of humanity."479 This principle fueled
the Court's creation of heightened Eighth Amendment requirements to
preclude the death penalty's cruel and unusual application.4e But the
death is different principle has meant less, not more, scrutiny with respect
to at least one significant issue-the form of the punishment itself. The
Court has yet to review evidence concerning the constitutionality of any
execution method.41 Apart from recent Ninth Circuit decisions
addressing the constitutionality of lethal gas and hanging,2 - the lower
476. For example, although most states that switched to lethal injection had previously
used lethal gas or electrocution, some states did not follow this trend. Idaho used hanging
before it adopted lethal injection in 1978 (and allowed the choice of the firing squad in
1982). This sequence is not surprising given that Idaho executed only nine individuals from
1901 to 1957. Sce Bowers, supra note 274, at 436. Idaho has executed only one other individual
since then, on January 6,1994. First Idaho Execution In 36 Years: A Killer Who Used a Baseball Bat,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1994, at A20. See infra app. 3 (Idaho). Delaware also authorized hanging
prior to adopting lethal injection, but retained hanging as an option. See infa app. 3
(Delaware). Like Idaho, Delaware had few (12) executions from 1930-1980. The Death
Penalty in America, supra note 274, at 60. Presumably, these states would have changed to
electrocution or lethal gas prior to switching to lethal injection had they been more actively
involved in executions.
477. Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citation omitted), affd,
77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for
reconsideration in light of changed statute). See generaly David Q Baldus, Mien SyW oe Clash.
Refletions on the Future of the Comparative Propoitionally Review of Death Sentencas 26 Seton Hall
L. Rev. 1582 (1996); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death..
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases' 75 B.U. L Rev. 759
(1995); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death." The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 1 (1995).
478. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
479. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
480. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of Furman and
the death is different principle).
481. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (noting the Court's refusal to review the
constitutionality of execution methods.).
482. SeeFIerro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir.) (holding lethal gas unconstitutional),
[1997]
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courts also have afforded scant attention to this issue. The Court's neglect
betrays the Eighth Amendment's original purpose of proscribing the
"torturous" and "barbarous" punishments that most commonly resulted
from execution methods. 3
In contrast, the Court has developed a relatively expansive Eighth
Amendment approach to cases involving prison conditions and inmate
health care, addressing in relative detail such issues as prison officials' use
of excessive force, the risk of prisoners' future injury, and inmate-against-
inmate violence.4 Increasingly, such cases have impeded states' efforts to
have inmates' suits dismissed at an early stage of the criminal justice
process, thereby inviting greater judicial involvement in evaluating the
conduct of prison personnel.*
This Article offers various reasons for courts' disparate Eighth
Amendment approaches to capital and noncapital punishments. First, this
Article suggests that if the Court encouraged judicial scrutiny of execution
methods to the same extent that it has evaluated prison conditions, it
might reach the conclusion that no execution method that currently exists
could be implemented humanely. Having finally resolved the issues raised
in Furman and Gregg concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty
itself, the Court would balk to yet again reconsider its oversight of this
most final punishment
Next, courts lack a coherent theory for the constitutional role of pain.
Although the gratuitous infliction of pain is definitely impermissible, far
more perplexing is the nature and amount of pain that courts will allow in
the sui generis and seemingly standardless context of an execution.
Moreover, courts are not clear on when pain is truly gratuitous and when
pain is justified under some acceptable penological theory. This dilemma
explains, for example, courts' discomfort with assessing the scientific and
medical evidence on execution methods. On one level, courts appear
unable to comprehend such evidence either constitutionally or
scientifically; on another level, they may be reluctant to acknowledge that
no acceptable standard would warrant the implementation of any existing
method of execution.
Lastly, courts typically shun emotionally and morally charged subjects,
vacated on other grounds 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of
changed statute); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir.) (holding hanging
constitutional), cet deniA, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994); Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1807, 1314-15
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding hanging unconstitutional under certain circumstances), vacated
on other ground.4 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996) (appeal dismissed as moot in light of changed
statute).
483. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Amendment).
484. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US. 825, 840-42 (1994) (discussing prison officials'
responsibilities and the standard courts should apply for inmate-against-inmate violence);
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-35 (1993) (discussing a prisoner's right to be kept
"reasonably safe"); Hudson v. McMilian, 503 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1992) (discussing the standard ap-
propriate to apply when prison officials are accused of using excessive force).
485. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 399 1996-1997
82 IOWA LAW REVIEW
and few subjects elicit stronger feelings than the death penalty.w The
death penalty itself presents an additional conundrum. Courts allow the
death penalty, but the punishment introduces unique issues concerning
how it must be applied. With respect to execution methods, the courts can
respond in three alternative ways. First, they can skirt the issue entirely (as
the Supreme Court has done) even though three Justices have recently
invited litigation on the constitutionality of electrocution." Next, courts
can develop an Eighth Amendment execution standard that allows for a
high level of pain and frequently botched executions; yet such a standard
in practice may incur substantial criticism. Lastly, courts can defer to state
legislatures as a number have done, emphasizing legislatures' greater
expertise and responsibility in the matter. As this Article has
demonstrated, however, legislatures repeatedly have not accomplished what
courts have expected them to do; this failure suggests that highly
deferential judicial rulings are at best unsatisfactory and at worst,
hypocritical.
By developing and applying an execution methods test, this Article
shows that there are available Eighth Amendment standards for evaluating
execution methods and that courts are not justified in dismissing them.
Rather, courts should engage in detailed factfinding investigations of such
methods in the same way they have approached prison conditions. This
Article has suggested that the most frequently used execution methods
appear constitutionally deficient. It suggests, therefore, that until
legislatures enact statutes providing for a constitutionally humane method
of execution, the death penalty should not be imposed.
486. See Bowers et al., supra note 442, at 119-22 (providing survey data indicating the
public's ambivalence toward the death penalty).
487. See Poyner v. Murray, 508 US. 931, 931-33 (1993) (Justices Souter, Blackmun, and
Stevens commenting on the denial of Syvasky Poyner's writ of certiorari).
488. See infra app. 3 (surveying the legislative changes in execution methods in each state).
[1997]
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APPENDIX 1. TABLES
TABLE 1. CURRENT METHODS OF EXECUTION BY STATE*
SINGLE EDSATS(7
LETHAL INJECTION ONLY (21)
Arizona Arkansas Colorado Connecticut
Delaware Illinois Indiana Kansas Louisiana
Maryland Mississippi Nevada New Jersey
New Mexico New York Oklahoma Oregon





INJECTION OR HANGING: Montana New Hampshire Washington
INJECTION OR FIRING SQUAD: Idaho Utah
INJECTION OR ELECTROCUTION: Ohio South Carolina Virginia
INJECTION OR GAS: California Missouri North Carolina
NO DET PEAT SATS(2
ABOLISHED BY STATUTE
Alaska Hawaii Iowa Maine Michigan
Minnesota North Dakota Rhode Island
Vermont West Virginia Wisconsin
* Appendix 3 provides statutory documentation for each state.
ABOLISHED BY COURT
Massachusetts
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TABLE 2. THE EXECUTION METHODS TEST
Humane Baseline (H)
1. Unacceptable when the Bill of Rights was adopted (Stanford Campbdo
2. "More than the mere extinguishment of life" (Kemmer)
3. "Evolving standards of decency" (Trap, Campbell, Fierro)
Excessive (E)
1. "Unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" (G reg, Francis)
a. Pain experienced while conscious (Campbel, Fierro)
i. Scientific research and testimony (Fierro)
ii. Data extrapolated from animal experiments (Fierro)
iii. Anecdotal accounts of human exposure (Fierro)
iv. Eyewitness accounts of actual executions (Fierro)
- Contemporaneous records by medical personnel (Fierro)
- Eyewitness accounts by the media (Fierro, California First)
- Eyewitness accounts by the public (Fieo, California First)
- Aggregation of all eyewitness accounts (Fierro)
v. Executions under a state's current protocol (Campbel Fierro)
vi. Executions under a state's prior protocol (Fierro, Rupe)
vii. Aggregation of all (current and prior) executions (Fierro)
b. Length of time consciousness exists (Campbd Fierro)
i. > 1 minute (Campbell Fierro)
ii. > 1 or 1.5 minutes, but < 2 minutes (Campbell, Fiero)
iii. Drifting in and out of consciousness (Fierro)
c. Physical characteristics of the inmate (Rupe)
d. Relative merits of other methods (Fierro)
2. "Nothing less than" human dignity (Trap)
a. Mutilation and dismemberment (Campbel Rupe)
b. "A minimization of physical violence" (Glass dissent)
3. Risk of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" (Farmer, Fierro)
a. Risk for the particular execution at issue
i. Risk "is more than slight" (Campbel)
ii. "Substantial risk" of suffering "extreme pain for several
minutes" (Fierro)
b. "Series of abortive attempts" (Francis)
c. The "procedure as a whole and over time" (Fierro)
d. Manner in which the execution protocol is created (Fierro)
i. "Unscientific and slapdash" (Fierro)
ii. No consultation with medical personnel (Rupe)
e. Accuracy of prison personnel's decisions (Rupe)
f. Competence of manufacturer and/or executioner (Fierro, Rupe)
g. Prison personnel's deliberate indifference (Farmer)
i. Knows and disregards "substantial risk" of harm (Farmer)
- "inference from circumstantial evidence" (Farmer)
[1997]
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- "the risk was obvious" (Farmer)
- "longstanding, pervasive," "noted" (Farmer)
ii. Executions and prison conditions "are analogous" (Fierro)
"Standards of Decency" (D)
1. "Objective factors to the maximum possible extent (Stanford)
2. Legislation passed by elected representatives (McCleskey, Fierro)
a. Statutes are presumptively constitutional
b. Few states authorize the method
c. Relatively fewer states authorize the method
d. Legislative trend is away from the method
e. Legislative histories regarding the method
f. Newspaper accounts of legislative changes
3. Public attitudes (Gregg) and opinion polls (Fien-o)
4. Legal challenges to a particular method (Fierro)
5. Acceptability as a form of euthanasia for animals (Glass dissent)
6. Physician involvement (AMA)
7. Heart death (as opposed to brain death)
8. Organ donation by inmates
Alternative Method (A)
1. Competence of manufacturer and/or executioner
2. Physician involvement (AMA)
3. Availability of information about effectiveness
4. Whether the method is "unusual"
5. Cost
PenologicalJustifwation (P)
1. "Basic human rights" (Lloyd Weinreb)
2. Utilitarianism (Gregg) and "revenge utilitarianism" (Margaret Radin)
3. Retribution (Gregg) and "moral outrage" (Herbert Packer)
4. Humaneness
5. Cost (California, Nevada, Oklahoma)
6. Symbolic disproportionality
7. Public versus private methods
8. Racial disparities (e.g., rape)
9. Choice statutes
a. Default is the prior method for postenactment inmates
b. Default is the prior method for pre-enactment inmates
c. Choice made by the warden (or choice is unclear)
d. Choice made by the inmate
10. Retroactive new method statutes (Malloy)
11. Nonretroactive new method statutes
12. Unconstitutionality provisions/constitutional substitutes
13. Illicit legislative motives
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 403 1996-1997
82 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1997]
TABLE 3. METHODS OF EXECUTION BY STATE: 1895 - 1943
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TABLE 4. METHODS OF EXECUTION BY STATE: 1944 - 1996
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TABLE 5. CHANGING PATTERNS OF EXECUTION METHODS: 1888 - 1996
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TABLE 6. CHANGES IN EXECUTION METHODS BY STATE: 1888-1976
I ELECTROCUTION[ HANGINGTO LETHALGAS FIRINGSQUAD
ASTATES NGING TO HANGING TO LCTRCUT TO LETHAL LETHAL TO LETHAL TO LETHAL






















1933 AZ CO AZ CO
CT
1935 NC CT WY NC
WY
CA CA
1937 MO MOOR OR
1939 SD SD




1955 MD NM NI) NM
1965 VT* WV*
1973 RI RI
No Change in Change in
Execution Method Execution Method
* States that eventually abolished the death penalty.
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* States that eventually abolished the death penalty.
** Choice States. (For example, if a state (e.g., Massachusetts) changes from one execution method
(electrocution) to a choice between that method and a new method (a choice between electrocution and lethal
injection in 1982), the new method (lethal injection) only is shown in the Table. When a state (e.g., Nevada)
changes from a choice method (hanging or firing squad) to a single method (lethal gas in 1921), the primary
choice method (hanging) only is shown in the Table.)
HANGING ELECTROCUTION HANGING LETHAL FIRINGHANGING TO TO LETHAL ELECTROCUTION E LETHAUTO ET GAS TO SQUAD TOEAR STATES ELECTROCUTION T AL TO LETHAL GAS JLETHAL INTO LETHA LETHAL LETHAL
IRAELRTO [ INJECTION INJECTION














1984 OR SD OR
SD WY
WY
1986 DE NH DENH**
1988 CO MO Co mo*"
1990 LA PA Lk PA
1992 AZ CA AZ CA*
1993 OH OH**
KS
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TABLE 8. TYPES OF LETHAL INJECTION STATUTES
1. Lethal Injection Only
These statutes (for twenty-one states) provide no alternative method
of execution for prisoners sentenced or convicted after the date the statute
was enacted or became effective." There are two general types of lethal
injection-only statutes:
(A) Type A statutes (for eight states) refer to an injection of a
"substance or substances in a quantity sufficient to cause death."490
(B) Type B statutes (for eleven states) refer to a "lethal quantity of an
ultrashort-acting barbiturate or other similar drug in combination
with a chemical paralytic agent until death. 491
Statutes for two states depart slightly from Type A and Type B.4 2
2. Lethal Injection or Other Method-Prisoner's Choice
These statutes (for eight states) allow prisoners to choose between
lethal injection and another method of execution.493
489. See supra app. 1, thl. 1, "Lethal Injection Only" states.
490. The eight states are Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, New
York, Texas; see Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 22 (1933) (amended 1992), Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 19-
704(A) (1978) (amended 1993) (current 1996); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-100 (1963) (amended
1995) (current 1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (1953) (amended 1986) (current
1996); Ind. Code § 35-38-6-1 (a) (1983) (amended 1995) (current 1996); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-
4001(a) (West Supp. 1993) (amended 1994) (current 1996) ("in a swift and humane
manner"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:569(B) (West 1991) (current 1997); N.Y. Correct. Law §
658 (McKinney 1995) (current 1997); Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 43.14 (West 1977)
(amended 1995) (current 1997).
491. There are variations in the wording of the following lethal injection statutes, depend-
ing on the state. The 11 states are Arkansas, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, NewJersey, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wyoming; see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-
617(a) (Michie 1983) (current 1995); 725 1M. Comp. Stat. 5/119-5(a)(1) (1963) (amended
1992) (West 1996) (current 1996); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 71(a) (1957) (amended 1994)
(current 1996) ("until death is pronounced by a licensed physician"); see also ii § 627; Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-19-51 (1) (1972) (amended 1994) (current 1996); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:49-2
(1983) (Supp. 1995) (current 1996) ("prior to injection by a lethal substance, the person shall
be sedated by a licensed physician, registered nurse, or other qualified personnel, by either an
oral tablet or capsule or an intramuscular injection of a narcotic or barbiturate such as mor-
phine, cocaine or demerol"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-14-11 (Michie 1978) (current 1996); Okla.
Stat. tit. 22, § 1014(A) (1977) (current 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473(1) (1993) (current
1996); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 2121.1 (West 1980) (amended 1995) (current 1996); S.D.
Codified Laws § 23A-27A-32 (Michie 1984) (amended 1988) (current 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
7-13-904(a) (Michie 1984) (current 1997).
492. The two states are Colorado and Nevada, see Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-11-401 (West
1988) (amended 1993) (current 1996) ("sodium thiopental or other equally or more effective
substance sufficient to cause death"); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.355(1) (1983) (amended 1995)
(current 1995) ("a lethal drug").
493. The eight states and the other methods they have selected are as follows: Lethal Injec-
tion or Hanging. Montana, Washington; see Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(3) (1983) (amended
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3. Lethal Injection and Pre-enactment Prisoner's Choice
These statutes (for four states) apply to states that now have a lethal
injection-only statute enacted, but provide pre-enactment prisoners a
choice between lethal injection and the method that existed when the
prisoner was convicted or sentenced to death.44
4. Lethal Injection and No Pre-enactment Choice
This statute (for one state)mandates that a pre-enactment prisoner
use the method of execution that existed when the prisoner was sentenced
to death, even though the state has now enacted a lethal injection-only
statute.49
1989) (current 1995) ("hanging by the neck" or Type B); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.-
180(l) (West 1981) (amended 1996) (current 1996) ("hanging by the neck" or Type A).
Lethal Injection orFi ing Squa& Utah; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5 (1953) (amended 1984)
(current 1996) ("either firing squad or a lethal intravenous injection"). Lethal Injection or
Elecdrocution: Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia; see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2949.22(A-B) (Banks-
Baldwin 1993) (amended 1994) (current 1997) ((A) "causing a current of electricity, of
sufficient intensity to cause death, to pass through the body of the person ... [or (B)(1)] by
lethal Injection"); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530 (A) (Law Co-op. 1976) (amended 1995) (current
1996) ("(A) [The convicted] shall suffer the penalty by electrocution or, at the election of the
person, lethal Injection .... If the person waives the right of election, the penalty must be
lethal Injection."); Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-233 (Michie 1994) (current 1997) ("by electrocution
or by" Type A); 1994 Va. Acts ch. 921 § 1 ("The method of execution shall be chosen by the
prisoner."). Lethal Injection or Lethal Gas: California, North Carolina; see Cal. Penal Code §
3604(a-b) (West 1941) (amended 1996) (current 1996) (lethal gas or Type A); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15-187 (1983) (current 1996) (lethal gas or Type B).
494. This section lists only those states where at least one pre-enactment prisoner remains
who is eligible to choose between lethal injection and another method. Lethal Injection or
Hanging. Delaware; see Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (1953) (amended 1986) (current
1996) (by Type A); 65 Del. Laws 281 § 3 (1986) ('This Act shall become effective only for acts
committed after its enactment [June 13, 1986] except that any person sentenced to death for
acts committed prior to the enactment of this act shall be permitted to elect [Type A] ... as
the method [rather than "hanging by the neck"]; see also infra app. 3 (Delaware) (noting that
only one inmate remains who can choose hanging). Lethal Injection or Elerocution: Arkansas
and South Carolina; see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617(a) (1), (b) (Michie 1983) (current 1995) (by
Type B "until the defendant's death is pronounced according to accepted standards of
medical practice." According to 1983 Ark. Acts 774 § 2, lethal injection applied only to offens-
es committed after July 4, 1983. However, 1983 Ark. Acts 774 § 3 provided that "any defen-
dant sentenced to death by electrocution prior to July 4, 1983, could elect to be executed by
lethal injection"); see also supra note 203 and accompanying text and infra app. 3 (Arkansas);
S,C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530(A-C) (Law Co-op. 1976) (amended 1995) (current 1996) ("(B)
Person convicted prior to effective date must be administered.., electrocution unless the
person elects death by lethal injection."); see also infra app. 3 (South Carolina). LethalInjection
or Lethal Gas: Arizona; Ariz. Const., art. XXII, § 22 (1933) (amended 1992) (current 1996)
(Type A "except that defendants sentenced to death for offenses committed prior to the effec-
tive date of the amendment shall have the choice of lethal gas"); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(B)
(1978) (amended 1993) (current 1996) ("if defendant fails to choose [it will be] by lethal
Injection"); see also infra app. 3 (Arizona). Although Maryland maintains a choice statute
(lethal gas or lethal injection) for pre-enactment prisoners, no inmates remain who are
eligible to make this choice. Therefore, Maryland's choice provision no longer has practical
significance. See infra app. 3 (Maryland).
495. Mississippi; see Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51(1) (1972) (amended 1994) (current 1996)
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5. Lethal Injection and Constitutional Substitutes
These statutes (for ten states) provide a constitutional substitute in
case lethal injection is held to be unconstitutional or invalid.498
6. Lethal Injection By Discretion
These statutes (for three states) allow someone other than the
prisoner to choose the execution method, or the statute is unclear about
who makes this choice.49
("sentenced prior to July 1, 1984, . .. shall be by lethal gas" and on or after July 1, 1984, by
Type B).
496. Lethal Injection or Hanging Delaware, New Hampshire; see Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §
4209(f) (1953) (amended 1986) (current 1996) (if Type A is held unconstitutional, then by
"hanging by the neck"); 1986 N.H. Laws § 82:3 (if Type B is held unconstitutional, then by
hanging). Lethal Injection orElectpcutionr Arkansas, Illinois, Ohio, South Carolina; seeArk. Code
Ann. § 5-4-617(a) (1), (b) (Michie 1983) (current 1995) (if Type B is held unconstitutional,
then by electrocution); 725 nM. Comp. Stat. 5/119-5(a)(2) (1963) (amended 1992) (West
1996) (current 1996) (if Type B is held unconstitutional, then by electrocution); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2949.22(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1993) (amended 1994) (current 1997) (If lethal
injection is held unconstitutional, the death sentence shall be by electrocution); S.C. Code
Ann. § 24-3-530(C) (Law Co-op. 1976) (amended 1995) (current 1996) ("(C) if lethal injec-
tion is held unconstitutional, then death by electrocution."). Lethal Injection or Electrocution or
Fiing Squa Oklahoma; see Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1014(A-C) (1977) (current 1996) (If Type B is
held unconstitutional, then by electrocution; if electrocution is held unconstitutional, then by
firing squad). Lethal Injection or Lethal Gas: California, Mississippi, Wyoming- see Cal. Penal
Code § 3604(d) (West 1941) (amended 1992) (current 1996) ("(d) if either manner of exe-
cution described in subdivision (a) [lethal gas or Type A] is held invalid, the punishment of
death shall be imposed by the alternative means specified in subdivision (a) [lethal gas or
Type A]"); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51 (2) (1972) (amended 1993) (current 1996) (if Type B
is held unconstitutional, then by lethal gas); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-904(b) (Michie 1984)
(current 1997) (if Type B is held unconstitutional, then by lethal gas).
497. Lethal Injection or Hanging New Hampshire; see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630.5(XII-XV)
(1986) (current 1996) ("XIII. [Type B] XlV. The commissioner of corrections or his designee
shall determine the substance or the substances to be used"; if it is "impractical," death will be
by "hanging"). Lethal Injection orFiing Squadk Idaho; see Idaho Code § 19-2716 (1982) (current
1997) ("The director of the department of corrections shall determine the substance or
substances to be used ... provided, however, that, in any case where the director finds it to
be impractical ... for the reason that it is not reasonably possible to obtain expert technical
assistance, should such be necessary to assure that infliction of death by [Type B] can be
carried out in a manner which causes death without unnecessary suffering, the sentence of
death may be carried out by firing squad."). Lethal Injection or Lethal Gas: Missouri; see Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 546.720 (1988) (current 1996) ("The manner of inflicting death shall be by ... lethal
gas ... or lethal injection"); see also infra app. 3 (Missouri) (explaining that, in practice, the
Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections decides which method to use for an
execution; lethal injection is the Director's method of choice now and for the foreseeable
future).
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APPENDIX 2. POST-GREGG BOTCHED EXECUTIONS
A. Electrocution
1. John Spenkelink (Florida, May 25, 1979)
Spenkelink, the first person to be electrocuted after Gre 498
received three separate jolts of electricity, five minutes lapsed before his
death. "' After the first jolt, smoke filled the room and the flesh on his
right leg scorched, revealing a three-inch wound.- Because the doctor
stated that Spenkelink was not yet dead, the executioner applied two
additional surges.5' According to State Representative Andy Johnson,
one of the witnesses, "'[w]e saw a man sizzled and sizzled again.'"0 A
leather harness that fit around Spenkelink's head and over his chin and
arms, prevented him from opening his mouth and emitting possible
sounds of distress.5°
2. FrankJ. Coppola (Virginia, August 10, 1982)
No media representative was present to report Coppola's execu-
tion and corrections officials never released the details of what
happened.6' 5 According to the account provided by J. Samuel Glasscock,
an attorney and former representative to the General Assembly of
Virginia,"' Coppola received two separate jolts of electrical current, each
lasting about fifty-five seconds.o The second jolt produced smoke that
filled the entire death chamber, along with the smell and sizzle of burning
498. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court- The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 Mich.
L. Rev. 1741, 1805-19 (1987) (discussing thejudicial proceedings in the Spenkelink case); An
Electric Chair Is Turned On, Newsweek, June 4, 1979, at 26 (outlining the history of the
Spenkelink case and the final days before his execution); NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., supra note 297, at 2; Death Penalty Information Center, supra note
293, at 1. Gary Gilmore, the first person to be executed after the ban, died by firing squad on
January 17, 1977. Paternoster, supra note 284, at 18; NAACP, supra note 297, at 2; Death
Penalty Information Center, supra note 293, at 1.
499. Bill Curry, Convicted Murderer Executed by Forida; Three Surges of Electricy, Convicted Killer
Is Executed Wash. Post, May 26, 1979, at Al.
500. Id.
501. Id. According to a 1997 Florida Corrections Commission report, "problems
encountered with the process of electrocution dealt with [1] Burning of varying degrees of
parts of the body [21 First jolt of electricity not sufficient to kill" Florida Corrections
Commission, Drafi Report-Execution Methods Used by Other States 12 (Apr. 30, 1997) (on Mie with
the author).
502. An Electric Chair Is Turned On, supra note 498, at 26.
503. See Curry, supra note 499, at Al (stating that "a thick black strap covered [Spenk-
elink's] mouth").
504. See Bassette Memorandum, supra note 220, at 19-20.
505. See id. at 28.
506. See Affidavit of J. Samuel Glasscock, Esq. 1 1-2, Exhibit 3 of Bassette Memorandum,
supra note 220.
507. See id. 4.
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flesh when Coppola's head and leg became inflamed.5es A medical
examiner pronounced Coppola dead minutes after a prison official turned
off the current when Coppola's leg burst in flames.5
3. John Louis Evans III (Alabama, Apil 22, 1983)
Evans' execution in Alabama's Holman prison was one of the most
grotesque.5 0 Evans' attorney, Russell Canan, who witnessed the event,
stated that the firstjolt of 1900 volts of electricity shot through Evans' body
and lasted thirty seconds" Thereafter, "sparks and flames erupted from
the electrode tied to his leg," his body strained against the straps, his fists
clenched, and an electrode caught on fire, bringing with it smoke and "an
overpowering stench of burnt flesh and clothing."512 When the current
stopped, two doctors went into the chamber and determined that Evans
still had a heartbeat; a reporter then yelled that Evans had survived as "a
gush of saliva oozed from [Evans'] face."5's Executioners sent a second
jolt of 1900 volts of current, and Evans gripped the arms of his chair as
more smoke emitted from his head and leg. After doctors examined Evans
for the second time, they reported that he was still alive 14 According to
Canan, "Commissioner [Fred] Smith did not know what he was doing."'"'
When Canan requested clemency for Evans because the electro- cution
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, Smith telephoned then-
Governor George Wallace about Canan's request. Wallace responded that
he would "not interfere."51 6 After a third, thirty-second jolt of electricity,
Evans was pronounced dead. His execution lasted fourteen minutes.5 7
4. Robert Wayne Williams (Louisiana, December 14, 1983)
When executioners applied electricity to Williams, smoke and sparks
emitted from the side of Williams' head, flames appeared from his knee,
and the room smelled like "burning flesh." 5'8 Williams' minister, Rev. J.
508. Id. 1 5-8.
509. Id. 1 8.
510. For a description of Evans' execution, see Shirley Dicks, Death Row. Interviews with
Inmates, Their Families and Opponents of Capital Punishment 47, 48 (1990); Mark C. Wimne,
What It's Like to See a Man Die in the Chair, AtlantaJ. & Const., May 1, 1983, at 17D.
511. Russell F. Canan, Burning at the Wira 7e Execution ofJohn Evans, in Facing The Death
Penalty. Essays on a Cruel and Unusual Punishment 60, 78 (Michael L Radelet ed., 1989).
512. Id at 78-79; see also If WeMust Execute by Injectio7, AtlantaJ. & Const., Apr. 27, 1983,
at 10A (describing Evans' execution and comparing it to ritualized revenge and torture);
Garry Mitchell, Killer Executed in Efecti Chair in Alabart; Boston Globe, Apr. 23, 1983, at 3
(providing a detailed account of the Evans execution and thejudicial action preceding it).




517. Id at 80; Mitchell, supra note 512, at 3; If We Must Execute by Injection, supra note 512,
at 10A.
518. See Record at 142-44 (voL 2), Sawyer v. Whitey, 772 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. La. 1991)
(No. 90-4035).
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D. Brown, reported that when he viewed Williams' body in the morgue
after Williams' diaper had been removed, it was a "bad sight to see." 519
Among other things, Williams' penis "was busted."5 0 Roland Braud, an
electrician who inspects the chair and removes the electrodes from the
prisoners' bodies, conceded that Williams' execution had mistakes. "On
[Williams' execution], I will agree that it wasn't professional. ... That was
excessive burning .... It was our first one [since Gregg]." 2 Williams'
execution was part of the focus of an evidentiary hearing based upon a
condemned inmate's unsuccessful claim that the State of Louisiana "has
concealed since Wayne Williams' execution in 1983, that its electric chair
has design defects which cause mutilation and torture." 22 However, the
1990 publication of postexecution photographs of Williams' "badly burned
head" and body in The Angolite, Louisiana's award winning prison
magazine, "helped stop the use of electrocution as Louisiana's method of
execution." 2
5. Alpha Otis Stephens (Georgia, December 12, 1984)
After experiencing one two-minute jolt of 2080-volt electricity,
Stephens slumped;2 4 soon thereafter, witnesses said that he struggled to
breathe5 s During the six minutes doctors waited for Stephens' body to
cool so that they could examine it, Stephens took about twenty-three
breaths."' Stephens died after receiving the second two-minute, 2080-volt
current 5 z2 Altogether, eight minutes lapsed before the second jolt caused
his death . 2 8 A prison spokesperson said that "'apparently there is no
malfunction,"' in the electric chair, but added that "prison officials
intended to find out why it took two charges to kill Mr. Stephens."52
519. Id. at 147.
520. Id. at 146.
521. Bill Walsh, LA.'s Electr Chair Needlessy Bru4, Critics Say Pain and Mutilation Cite4
New Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 29, 1990, at Al.
522. Sawyer v. Whitley, 772 F. Supp. 297, 305 (E.D. La. 1991).
523. Wendell Smith, Cruel and Unusual? Prison Editors Heib Pull the Plug on an Electric Chair,
30 Colum. Journalism Rev., Sept./Oct. 1991, at 13; see also Wikberg, supra note 241, at 33-36
(describing in detail Williams' execution in TheAngolite); Wilbert Rideau & Ron Wikberg, Life
Sentences: Rage and Survival Behind Bars 303 (1992) (noting the influence of TheAngolie's
Issue on the elimination of electrocution in Louisiana); Interview with Theodore Bernstein,
Ph.D., P.E., Consulting Electrical Engineer, in Tallahassee, Fla. (June 30, 1997) (discussing
Bernstein's Inspection of Williams' bums and account of Williams' injuries in TheAngolit- as
well as viewing Bernstein's 1983 photographs of Williams' body).





528. Dawn M. Weyrich, Gruesome Blunders; Botched Execution Spurs New Death Row Challenge,
Wash. Times,June 7, 1990, atA1.
529. Murderer Eketrocuted, supra note 524, at A18.
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6. William E. Vandiver (Indiana, October 16, 1985)
Vandiver's execution required five jolts of electricity from the seventy-
two year-old electric chair. A witness stated that Vandiver continued to
breathe after the first two jolts of 2300-volt current, and the doctor did not
pronounce him dead for over seventeen minutes after the electricity was
first applied55 According to Vandiver's attorney, who witnessed the
execution, "'[w]hat I saw initially wvas smoke coming from someone's
head .... There was a tremendous smell of burning in the room.' 5'"
Vandiver's fists remained clenched throughout the execution 5 Some
witnesses commented that "the technical problems inhumanely prolonged
the execution."m The physician who determined Vandiver's death stated
that "'[t]his is very rare,'" ' - adding that Vandiver should have died after
the first jolt.5 The Department of Corrections spokesperson conceded
that the execution "'did not go according to plan,'" although the electric
chair had been tested three times by a private contractor and functioned
flawlessly. Moreover, "'[t]he chair has been used 61 times... and has
never filled, except sometimes it needs more than one application. ' ""
Indeed, in 1961, the same chair required six jolts to kill Richard Kiefer,
another Indiana inmate 39
7. Alvin Moore (Louisiana, June 9, 1987)
According to Moore's embalmer, Moore evidenced "severe" circular
bums on the top of his head and bums on his left leg.m
8. Wayne Robert Felde (Louisiana, March 15, 1988)
Felde received four jolts of electricity!"1 In an issue devoted solely to
530. Weyrich, supra note 528, at Al.
531. Man Who Murdered His Father-in-Law Executed in Indiana, N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 17, 1985, at
A22 [hereinafter Man Who Murdered].
532. Eletric Chair Takes 17Minutes to Kill Vandiver, Fla. Times-Union, Oct. 17,1985, atA10
[hereinafter Electric Chair Takes 17 Minutes].
533. Killer'sExecution Takes 17Minutes in Indiana Chair, Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 1985, at A16.
534. Brian Fuller, Vandiver Execution Scrutinized, U. Press Int'l, Nov. 2, 1985, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
535. Man Who Murdered, supra note 531, atA22.
536. Andrew Fegelman, Indiana Execution Wasn't 'As Planned,"ChL Trib., Oct. 17,1985, at
C9.
537. Id.
538. Eletric Chair Takes 17 Minutes, supra note 532, at AO.
539. Id.
540. Joe Gyan, Jr., Federal Court Hears Testimony on Electric Chair, Baton Rouge Morning
Advoc., Jan. 26, 1991, at 4B; Harold Hillman, An American Way of Death; Robert Sauyer's 11car
Fight to Beat the Elecric Chair Exposes a Grim Ordeal in the Name of USJusticv The Independent,
Mar. 31, 1991, at 10.
541. Gary Hines, U. Press Int'l, Mar. 15, 1988.
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 415 1996-1997
82 IOWA LAWREVIEW
electrocution, The Angolite printed a description of Felde's body.-" The
witness providing the description was Felde's sister, a veteran nurse with
fifteen years of experience as an Emergency Room Supervisor and who had
witnessed numerous electrical bums." She stated that she was
"shocked at the extent of the burning on Wayne's body." The
bums were severe: third and fourth degree burns with sloughing,"meaning the skin had literally come loose from his body and was
sliding," she said. Felde's ear was badly burned. "Chunks of skin,
about four centimeters in diameter had been burned off the left
side of his head, toward the front, revealing the skull bone," she
added. The burn to her brother's calf, at the point of contact of
the leg electrode, was "gaping and oozing." She stated the leg was
so badly mutilated that "it had been necessary to enclose that
portion of his calf in a zipped plastic sleeve, with some sawdust-
like material, to absorb and prevent draining of the burn.""A
The Angolit's issue on electrocution helped persuade state officials to
switch to lethal injection.5 "
9. Horace F. Dunkins (Alabama, July 14, 1989)
Witnesses stated that Dunkins, who was mentally retarded, required
nineteen minutes to die in Alabama's electric chair "when it failed to
deliver a single killing jolt." U" Ultimately, two jolts, nine minutes apart,
caused Dunkins' death." 7 Dunkins' attorney described the execution as
"brutal."5 " When it had become clear that Dunkins had not received a
sufficient amount of electricity from the first jolt, a prison guard captain
opened the witness room door announcing, "'I believe we've got the jacks
on wrong.'"" 9 Electricians had to reconnect the faulty cables, which
created insufficient current between jolts, in order for the electrocution to
proceed.'5 .Prison officials admitted, and experts confirmed, that the
electricaljacks were improperly connected and that no electricity appeared
to have reached Dunkins' chair initially" even though officials stated
542. Denno, supra note 5, at 643; see also supra notes 241, 523 (discussing the contents and
impact of The Angolites issue).
543. See Wikberg, supra note 241 at 36.
544. Wikberg, supra note 241, at 37 (quoting an affidavit prepared for Kirkpatrick v.
Whitley, No. 91-0502, 1991 US. Dist. LEXIS 7387, at *49 (FD. La. May 29, 1991), vacated and
remandd, 992 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1993)).
545. Denno, supra note 5, at 643 n.595; see also supra note 523 and accompanying text
(describing the impact of The Angolite's accounts of electrocution).
546. John Archibald, On Second Ty, Dunkins Executed for Murder, Birmingham News, July 14,
1989, at 8A, Michael deCourcy Hinds, Making xecution Humane (Or Can It Be?), N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1990, at 1.
547. Peter Applebome, 2 ElctricJolts inAlabama Execution, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1989, at 6.
548. Id.
549. Archibald, supra note 546, at 8A.
550. Applebome, supra note 547, at 6; Loughlin, supra note 264, at 8.
551. See Thomas v. Jones, 742 F. Supp. 598, 604 (S.D. Ala. 1990); Wikberg, supra note 241,
at 41-42.
[19971
HeinOnline  -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 416 1996-1997
ARE EXECUTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL?
that the equipment was tested every day for the five days preceding the
execution. Alabama Prison Commissioner Morris Thigpen commented
at the time, "I regret very, very much what happened. It was human error.
I just hope he was not conscious and did not suffer."""' Although a
private electrician had tested the chair for its reliability, Thigpen noted
that "'[y]ou can get some reading from the tests, but there is no vray to
know if they are accurate., " '54 Indeed, the press remembered that
Alabama's electric chair, nicknamed "Yellow Mama," had also
malfunctioned in 1983 when John Louis Evans III required three jolts of
electricity before doctors pronounced him deadY5 Regardless, the
United States District Court of the Southern District of Alabama found "no
credible evidence that Dunkins suffered any pain... and that the
likelihood of an error similar to that which occurred during the Dunkins
execution is remote and not likely to occur in the foreseeable future." "56
The court also said that it had "heard ample testimony" that electrocution
in Alabama "is painless.""5 7 Dunkins' execution constituted the focus of
an evidentiary hearing based upon a condemned inmate's unsuccessful
claim that the "State of Alabama has neither the equipment nor the
personnel to competently carry out a humane execution" and that
Dunkins' execution "violated the Eighth Amendment because Dunkins was
physically and psychologically tortured." se
10. Jesse Joseph Tafero (Florida, May 4, 1990)
Tafero's execution has been described as "gruesome. 5 9 For four
minutes, the hooded executioner applied three 2000-volt jolts of electricity
to Tafero's body.6 Until the last jolt Tafero "continued to clench his
fists, nod, convulse and appear to breathe deeply... as if he were
alive. " -"' Moreover, the jolts sparked a fire on his head with six- to twelve-
inch flames that filled the execution chamber with smoke while Tafero's
552. See Loughlin, supra note 264, at 8A.
553. Wikberg, supra note 241, at 42.
554. Michelle Garland, Execution System Reworkd Montgomery Advertiser, July 15, 1989, at
2A.
555. See Archibald, supra note 546, at 8A supra notes 510-17 and accompanying text
(describing Evans' death).
556. Thomas v. Jones, 742 F. Supp. 598, 606 (S.D. Ala. 1990). According to the court, the
first attempt to electrocute Dunkins was a "cycle" not a jolt because there was no electricity
administered. The second cycle of electricity constituted the firstjolt. Id. at 605.
557. I& at 607.
558. Id. at 602.
559. Trombley, supra note 208, at 44 (characterizing Tafero's execution as "probably the
most gruesome in U.S. history"); Cynthia Barnett, Tafero Meet& Gisy Fate in Chair, Gainesville
Sun (Fla.), May 5, 1990, at IA, 9A (quoting an Associated Press reporter who witnessed
Tafero's execution, stating that the incident "was, in a word, gruesome .... I've never seen
anything like this"). For an extensive discussion of the Tafero execution, see generally
Bertolotti Petition, supra note 241.
560. Barnett, supra note 559, at IA.
561. Id.
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"throat produced gurgling sounds."6 2 There were varying explanations
for why the fire occurred and why the first jolt hiled to kill as intended.
Some experts said that the synthetic sponge in Tafero's headset did not
properly conduct electricity and burst into flames with each jolt.me
Leuchter testified that the head and leg electrodes were in "questionable"
condition because Florida's superintendent of prisons had rejected new
equipment considered to be too costly.5" Leuchter declined the
superintendent's subsequent request that he create a leg electrode from an
old army boot and a copper strip.m Indeed, minutes after the execution,
Department of Corrections spokesperson Bob MacMaster said, "[t]here was
a fault in the headpiece."66 Still others suggested that an impaired
electrode reduced the current from 2000 to 100 volts,6e7 "low enough...
to keep a person alive and in great pain." m The medical examiner who
conducted Tafero's autopsy said he could not determine whether Tafero
survived the first two jolts or died instantly,-69 as a prison doctor had
contended. 70 Overall, then, there is substantial evidence that Florida's
electric chair was defective at the time of Tafero's execution and that those
administering his execution were inexperienced. 71  Regardless, the
562. Trombley, supra note 208, at 47; Barnett, supra note 559, at 1A; Weyrich, supra note
528, at Al; Ron Word, Rouida's Electric Chair Focus of LegalDebatj St. Paul Pioneer Press Disp.,
June 24, 1990, at 5A.
563. See Denno, supra note 5, at 555; see also Trombley, supra note 208, at 48-50.
564. See Buenoano v. Dugger, No. 90-473-CIV-ORL-19, 1990 WL 119637, at *32 (M.D. Fla.
June 22, 1990) (citing the affidavit and testimony of Leuchter, "a consulting engineer who
designs and constructs electric chairs"), vacated sub nonm., Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d
1433 (l1th Cir. 1992); Trombley, supra note 208, at 51-52 (describing an interview with
Leuchter on Tafero's execution); State Used Amy Boot to Y=e Electric Chair, AffUavit Says Sun
Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June 16, 1990, at 17A (referring to Leuchter's affidavit); see
also Denno, supra note 5, at 650-51 nn.658-62 and accompanying text (summarizing
Leuchter's testimony about his consultation with Florida's prison electrician and superinten-
dent, who inquired about the possibility of replacing equipment they thought was in"questionable" condition on the state's electric chair).
565. SeeBuenoano, 1990WL119637,at*32.
566. Ellen McGarrahan, 3Jolts Used to Exte Killer, Miami Herald, May 5,1990, atAl, A17.
567. See Trombley, supra note 208, at 60 (discussing the views of Robert Kirschner, M.D.,
the deputy chief medical examiner of Cook County, Illinois, and a specialist in torture and
human rights abuses, who reviewed the available evidence in Tafero's case); Weyrich, supra
note 528, at Al (describing the views of experts).
568. Weyrich, supra note 528, at Al; see also Trombley, supra note 208, at 60 (quoting
Kirschner's view that "'the failure to administer the requisite voltage combined with the other
physiological reactions noted by observers of the execution raises the substantial possibility
that Mr. Tafero experienced conscious pain and suffering during the execution'").
569. See Larry Keller, Autopsy Fails to End Execution Disput4 Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale,
Fla.), May 8, 1990, at 17A (referring to the explanation provided by the medical examiner's
spokesperson).
570. See State Disputes Prime Time' Report on Electrocution, Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale,
Fla.), May 13, 1990, at lIA.
571. Denno, supra note 5, at 650-54. By July 27, 1990, the day that Anthony Bertolotti was
executed In Florida, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
believed that the electric chair was operating sufficiently well. While there were no gruesome
[1997]
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United States District Court of the Middle District of Florida concluded
that there was "sufficient evidence to negate any constitutional claim of
cruel and unusual punishment and to negate the contention that the
unusual events accompanying Mr. Tafero's execution will probably occur
again."572 Tafero's execution constituted the focus of an evidentiary
hearing based upon a condemned inmate's unsuccessful claim that the
procedure for electrocution in Florida constituted cruel and unusual
punishment7 3
11. Richard T. Boggs (Virginia, July 19, 1990)
Boggs required two fifty-five second applications of 2500-volts of
electricity.574 According to one source, Boggs did not die after the first
application."-
12. Wilbert Lee Evans (Virginia, October 17, 1990)
According to accounts by witnesses and reporters, during the
application of the first of two fifty-five second, 2400-volt jolts of electricity,
blood "poured" from Evans' eyes and nose,5 78 drenching his shirt. m
Rev. Russell Ford stated that "air spilled from Evans's lips .... He was
covered with blood."58  According to Tm Cox, a United Press
International reporter, Evans "appeared to give an audible moan or groan
when the electricity was first applied, suggesting he may have suffered
initially.... It was kind of unsettling because we weren't prepared for
it" 5 9 Initially, prison officials stated that Evans merely suffered a
nosebleed possibly caused by his head jerking against the death mask
during the first jolteO Then, officials suggested that the death mask may
have been too small for Evans' nose and physical features."' Later they
circumstances such as those present in the Tafero case, there was one unusual aspect of
Bertolotti's execution. Rather than waiting for a doctor to pronounce death, the time of
Bertolotti's death was recorded as 7:07 p.m., the time immediately following the last of three
two-minute jolts. See Florida Executes Killer, Electric Chair Works Properly, Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauder-
dale, Fla.), July 28, 1990, at 19A.
572. Buenoano v. Dugger, No. 90-473-.-ORL-19, 1990 WL 119637, at *34 (M.D. Fla.
June 22, 1990), vacated sub. om. Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1992).
573. See i at *31.
574. See Viginia Executes Man for gurder, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990, at 9.
575. See id.
576. DeNeen L. Brown, Execution Probe Sought, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1990, at B1; see also
Mike Allen, Groups Seek Probe of Electrocution's Unusual Events; Richmond Times-Disp., Oct. 19,
1990, at B1 ("Witnesses at the State Penitentiary were stunned to see blood stream from the
right side of the leather mask that covered Evans' face to his upper lip.").
577. Brown, supra note 576, at B1.
578. Id.
579. Tim Cox, Evans Executed for Cop Slaying U. Press Int'l, Oct. 18, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
580. see id.
581. See Jim Clardy, Electrocuted Evans' Nosebleed Has Activist Questioning Voltage, Wash.
Times, Oct. 19, 1990, at B4.
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declared that Evans' high blood pressure, due to his heavy consumption of
pork prior to the execution, had caused the bleeding?8 These officials
provided no explanation for Evans' moaning, other than Leuchter's
comment that the sound could have been attributed to "'a contraction of
the diaphram [sic] forcing out air.' " ' s When asked if Evans had
experienced pain, a prison spokesperson replied, "[w]ell, that's possible.
When you touch a circuit you're going to feel a little something."0
According to Virginia's Corrections Director, however, an investigation of
Evans' execution was unnecessary because the chair did not malfunc-
tion.= "We know it didn't because there was no need to administer any
additional surge of electridty." 5'n "'The machines involved operated
properly .... Different people react differenty."'" Although -Leuchter
stated that he could not comment on the possibility that Evans' high blood
pressure caused the bleeding, he emphasized that "[ilf they put something
on his face that was too small for his physical features, that would be
inhumane, medieval."5 He explained that Virginia's Department of
Corrections had communicated with him about five or six years prior to
Evans' execution requesting a price estimate for replacing the helmet and
electrodes used for the electric chair.5 The State's attorneys dismissed
Leuchter's negative comments about Evans' execution, claiming that
Leuchter made them only because he was disgruntled that he did not
receive the contract.5" They contended that Leuchter's failure to obtain
the contract also explained why Leuchter had testified as an expert against
the State (claiming that the state's electric chair could malfunction) in the
appeal of Richard Boggs, whom the State had executed three months
earlier."'
13. Derick Lynn Peterson (Virginia, August 22, 1991)
Peterson's death occurred after thirteen minutes and two separate
jolts of electricityrss After the first series of jolts, Peterson's heart
582. SeeAllen, supra note 576, at BI; Brown, supra note 576, at B8.
583. Letter from Marie Deans, Executive Director, Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons,
to Edward W. Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections 2 (Oct. 19, 1990)
(concerning the possible malfunction of the electric chair used in the Evans execution) (on
file with the author).
584. Cox, supra note 579.
585. SeeJim Mason, No Need for Probe, Va Official Contend Richmond News Leader, Oct.
20, 1990, at 11.
586. Id.
587. Allen, sura note 576, at Bi.
588. G.L Marshall, Expert Questions Circurstances of Evans' Execution, U. Press Int'l, Oct 18,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
589. See iUd
590. See id.
591. See iU; see also supra notes 574-75 and accompanying text (describing Boggs' death).
592. Karen Haywood, Two Jolts Needed to Complete Execution, Free Lance-Star
(Fredericksburg, Va.), Aug. 23, 1991, at 17.
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continued to beat.5 9s The Director of Virginia's Department of
Corrections explained: "We're dealing with brand new equipment. I think
you have to make adjustments as you use the equipment." 60A He added
that in future executions a second jolt would immediately follow the
first.s 5 Jail officials had "planned all along to do a second cycle if they
felt it was necessary."" Jay A. Wiechert, owner of the Arkansas company
that designed the wiring for Virginia's electric chair, stated that "'[m]any
years ago, [two doses] was not uncommon at all .... With modem
equipment, that would be uncommon.'" 50 After Virginia's announce-
ment of its new "two-jolt policy," however, prison officials installed new
electrical equipment on the chair and changed the dose of current."" Ac-
cording to Virginia's Deputy Director of the Department of Corrections,
Edward C. Morris, "[tihe old chair used a much higher voltage. This [new]
system is less likely to cause some of the burning of the body that
happened in the old high-voltage system." "9e However, the risk of botches
in Virginia was even higher under the new system.m
14. Roger Keith Coleman (Virginia, May 20, 1992)
Executioners applied two 1700-voltjolts of electricity with seven amps
of energy in order to electrocute Coleman.e According to Mike
Hazlewood, a member of the Virginia legislature and a witness to the
execution, "[als the switch was thrown, [Coleman's] body took an
immediate jolt backwards. One thing I did notice was some smoke that
started to come from his leg. This was ... when the current was running
through his system."6 Hazlewood stated that he considered what he had
witnessed a form of cruel and unusual punishment. 3 "[It] was not
instantaneous. It was a good seven minutes before a physician even
examined Mr. Coleman to determine whether or not he was still alive."
593. Mike Allen, Death Diary Pleas, Anger RU Days Before Execution, Richmond Thines-Disp.,
Aug. 25, 1991, atB1.
594. Nelson Schwartz & Mike Allen, Death Penalty Opponents Angiy About Latest Execution,
Richmond Times-Disp., Aug. 24, 1991, at B1.
595. Id. Bassette considered this new procedure "an admission that a prisoner is not killed
either painlessly or instantaneously." See Bassette Memorandum, supra note 220, at 30.
596. Schwartz & Allen, supra note 594, at B1.
597. Id-
598. See Virginia Alters Its Procedurfor fEutions in Electric Chair, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1991,
at B3.
599. Id.
600. See Bassette Memorandum, supra note 220, at 40-41 (explaining that the percentage of
botched executions rose after Virginia's electric chair was rewired); see also supra note 262 and
accompanying text (comparing the ratio of botches to electrocutions before and after Virginia
rewired its electric chair).
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15. Gregory Resnover (Indiana, December 8, 1994)
Only one reporter, Lynn Ford, was among the small number of
witnesses who attended Resnover's execution!" Ford explained that"even now, it's hard to talk about, let alone write about. You don't know
what it's like to watch a living being fly unless you've actually seen it " M
[W]hen the blinds opened in the window between the
viewing area and the execution room, I felt like I knew the man
strapped in the electric chair with a black hood covering his
shaven head. Then Resnover's body jerked upward-the first jolt,
2,300 volts. Hazy smoke. An orange halo of fire and sparks
encirded his head. His body slumped, then junped-the second
jolt, 500 volts. His body slumped one last time. 
Robert Hammerle, Resnover's attorney, noted that when the
electricity was applied, Resnover rose suddenly "from his chair in a giant
spasm.... His head jerked back and smoke and spark-like flames came
out of the top of his head."6°s When Resnover's "body stilled," his
eighteen year-old son cried, and "several minutes ticked by," causing
another witness to ask, "[w]hy is this taking so long? Does this mean he
hasn't passed yet?" Senator Richard Thompson said he was spurred to
write Indiana's lethal injection bill "after seeing graphic media accounts"
describing Resnover's execution. 1'
16. Jery White (Florida, December 4, 1995)
There were reports that White screamed and lunged when he was
executed.1 According to prison officials, however, "those who die in the
electric chair immediately become unconscious and do not feel any
pain." 12
17. Lariy Lonchar (Georgia, November 14, 1996)
According to a media witness, Lonchar moaned and "seemed to gasp
for air" as the executioner applied two jolts of 2000 volts each to Lonchar's
body before he was pronounced dead.6'3 The current remained on for
605. Lynn Ford, One Year Later, State's Execution of Greg Resnover Still Haunts Me
Indianapolis Star, Dec. 9, 1995, at Dl.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Rogers Worthington, Electric Chair How 'Cruel and Unusual?', CL. Trib.,Jan. 29, 1995,
at 1C.
609. Lynn Ford, Resigned to a Inal Excruciating Momen Dec. 9, 1994, at Al.
610. Richard D. Walton, Senate Oks Use of Lethal Injecion. Indianapolis Star, Feb. 17, 1995,
at Al.
611. Tloida Executes Molester-Killer of a Young Boy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1995, at Bl
[hereinafter Rorida Executes MolesterKille]; Last-Meal Tradition May Fall to Tough-on-Cime
Politics, The Detroit News, Jan. 17,1996, atAS.
612. Florda ExecutesMolesterKiller, supra note 611, atBll.
613. Rhonda Cook, Lonchar Dies in Electric Cairfor '86 Killings, Atlanta Const., Nov. 14,
1996, atAl.
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two minutes during the first cycle and was put on once again for the
second cycle. 14 Lonchar's attorney, Clive Stafford Smith, reported that
Lonchar's moaning and gasping occurred during the application of both
cycles of electricity while Lonchar's fists increasingly clenched tighter.
18. Pedro Medina (torida, March 25, 1997)
"Immediately" after the executioner applied the electricity, Medina
"lurched backward into the chair and balled his hands into fists"6 6 while
his mask "burst into flames." 67 According to witnesses, "[bilue and
orange flames up to a foot long shot from the right side of Mr. Medina's
head and flickered for 6 to 10 seconds, filling the execution chamber with
smoke."618  Four minutes later, Medina was pronounced dead.1 9
Witnesses described the scene as "ghastly."6 ° Others claimed they were"nauseated by the sight and the smell" 62' "It was horrible. A solid flame
covered his whole head, from one side to the other. I had the impression
of somebody being burned alive," stated witness Michael Minerva, an
attorney at Florida's Capital Collateral Representative. 22 Corrections
Department spokesperson Kerry Flack explained that "a maintenance
supervisor wearing electrical gloves patted out the flames while another
official opened a window to disperse the smoke." ?' The "smell of burnt
flesh filled the witness room."624 Another prison spokesperson claimed
there was no explanation for the cause of the flame and the execution was
not interrupted because of it.6es Eugene Morris, a spokesperson for the
State Department of Corrections, noted that the flames were a "total sur-
prise, disbelief.... In a split second you could tell something had gone
wrong."626 "It was something entirely out of the ordinary. I have
witnessed 11 executions and have never seen anything like what I saw this
morning." 621 Florida Governor Lawton Chiles said, however, that an
614. Id.
615. Affidavit of Clive A. Stafford Smith, Esq. [ 12, Attachment 2 of Original Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court, Felker v. Turpin, No. 96-6715 (S. Ct. Nov. 14, 1996).
Sometime before one of Lonchar's previous execution dates, a prison guard handed Lonchar
a quoted description of the body's reaction to electrocution. Id. 7.
616. Mike Clary, Flames Erupt in Electri Chairs Death Jo14 Excution" FIre Shoots From Rorida
Man's Head, Reaning Capital Punishment Debate, LA. Times, Mar. 26, 1997, at Al.
617. Condemned Man's Mask Bursts Into FameDuing Exoution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1997, at
B9 [hereinafter Condemned Man's Mask].
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Hugh Davies, 'Ghastly' Rame at Fida Execution, Daily Telegraph, Mar. 26, 1997, at 13.
621. Condemned Man's MaA s"ura note 617, at B9.
622. Clary, supra note 616, at Al.
623. Donald P. Baker, Rames Shoot From Convict At Execution; re Prompts Florida Electric
Chair Review, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1997, atAl.
624. Condemned Man's Mask, supra note 617, at B9.
625. Id.
626. Clary, supra note 616, atAl.
627. Davies, supra note 620, at 13.
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attending doctor informed him that "the burns were no different than
you'd see in any execution and, in his opinion, [Medina] felt no pain."8
Governor Lawton added that, "[w]e've had an occasion of smoke before.
But the question is really, Is this something that is torturous or
painful?"6 Senate President Toni Jennings of Orlando noted that, "[tihe
equipment... should work properly, and we might want to discuss other
avenues of execution."-" However, Bob Butterworth, the Attorney
General of Florida, claimed that Medina's execution would serve as a
deterrent. "People who wish to commit murder, they'd better not do it in
the state of Florida because we may have a problem with our electric
chair.""5' According to LL Gov. Buddy MacKay, "[1lethal injection would
be a more reliable and cost-effective method of execution.... [But t]he
last thing we want to do is generate sympathy for these killers."6 2
Regardless, Governor Chiles ordered an investigation by the Department of
Corrections and requested that an independent medical examiner take
part in an autopsy on Medina.6' Whereas corrections officials had
blamed Jesse Tafero's 1990 botched execution on a plastic sponge that had
been substituted for the natural type of sponge used in prior Florida
executions, officials used a natural sponge for Medina's execution.6
B. Lethal Gas
19. Jesse Walter Bishop (Nevada, October 22, 1979)
According to Tad Dunbar, a television news anchor who witnessed
Bishop's execution,
When the cyanide reached him, he gasped, and convulsed
strenuously. He stiffened. His head lurched back. His eyes
widened, and he strained as much as- the straps that held him to
the chair would allow. He unquestionably appeared to be in
pain.... I noticed he had urinated. The convulsions continued
for approximately ten more minutes, and you could see his chest
expand, and then contract, trying to take in fresh air. These
movements became weaker as the minutes ticked away. You could
not tell when Bishop finally lost consciousness.... Death was
pronounced after the shade on our observation window had been
drawn, though there was still some slight movement in the
628. Condemned Man's Mask, supra note 617, at B9.
629. Id.
630. Michael Griffin, Get-Rid-of-Q air Talk Starts Again, Orlando Sentinel, Mar. 26, 1997, at
A6.
631. Condemned Man's Mask, supra note 617, atB9.
632. Baker, supra note 623, at Al.
633. Mireya Navarro, Despite 1re, Eechic Chair Is Defended in Florida, N.Y. Tines, Mar. 27,
1997, at A18.
634. Baker, supra note 623, at Al; see also Denno, supra note 5, at 554-56, 650-54
(describing the different theories and experiments with sponges following Tafero's botched
electrocution). Medina's botched execution provided the impetus for a new round of ongoing
litigation concerning the constitutionality of Florida's electric chair. See infra app. 3 (Florida).
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body.6 e;
Before Nevada's next execution, the legislature replaced lethal gas
with lethal injection. - 6
20. Jimmy Lee Gray (Mississippi, September 2, 1983)
Eight minutes after the gas was released, officials required everyone to
dear the witnesses' room when witnesses were repulsed by Gray's desperate
gasps for air. Gray's attorney criticized state officials for clearing the room
while Gray remained alive.6 " Gray "died banging his head against a steel
pole in the gas chamber while the reporters counted his moans (eleven
according to the Associated Press)."6 According to another account,
Once the gas reached Mr. Gray's face he began to thrash
around in his chair .... The chilling sound of his head
desperately smashing against the pole reverberated through the
air over and over again. About the seventh time he pounded his
head against the pipe, his desperation was so great that the six-
sided glass chamber seemed to shake with the impact. He slump-
ed and lay still for a few moments, then tensed up and resumed
his struggling, again smashing his head against the pole. Mr. Gray
struggled for air while his body contorted and twisted.3"
Another witness added, "[h]e looked like he was being strangled to
death. It was obvious that Mr. Gray was in excruciating pain."6 State
Corrections Commissioner Morris Thigpen acknowledged that Gray's
execution indicated that the process needed to be "refined" in order to
subject witnesses to "as little gore as possible." 64 Prior to Gray's
execution attorneys had submitted an affidavit supporting their argument
that the gas chamber was cruel and unusual because cyanide is no longer
used to kill laboratory animals due to its painful effectsY6 Following
Gray's execution, the Mississippi legislature amended its statute to provide
for execution by means of lethal injection for those prisoners who were
sentenced to death after the date of the amendment60
635. Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1058 (5th Cir. 1983).
636. Id. at 1060; infra app. 3 (Nevada).
637. SeeFernandez, supra note 110, atA14.
638. David Bruck, Dedions of Death, New Republic, Dec. 12, 1983, at 24-25.
639. Memorandum in Support of Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction at 6,
Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (No. 92-1482) [hereinafter Fferro
Memorandum] (quoting the Declaration of Dennis N. Balske, Esq., Exhibit 15), affd, 77 F.3d
301 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration
in light of changed statute).
640. Id. (citing the Declaration of Dan A. Lohwasser, Exhibit 34).
641. Mississippi Looks For Ways to Refine- Execution Process, Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 3, 1983, at
37; see also jrmmy Lee Gray Dies in Gas Chamber, Daily Herald (Provo), Sept. 2, 1983, at BI
(discussing Gray's execution).
642. See Grayv. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1060 (5th Cir. 1983).
643. See infra app. 3 (Mississippi).
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21. Edward Earl Johnson (Mississippi, May 20, 1987)
Johnson's death required seventeen minutes.6" "He was conscious
for several of those minutes, gasping and crying out in agony."6
According to Don Cabana, then Warden of Parchman State Prison in
Mississippi and a former Air Force paramedic in Da Nang, Vietnam, "I've
seen the body do the most amazing things during death and after death,
but I was really shaken by Edward Earl's asphyxiation."" Cabana further
described the scene:
He inhaled deeply as the gas rose and seemed to lose
consciousness quickly. "Seven minutes into it, though," says
Cabana, "he shifted, and this huge, guttural sound came out of
him, an unearthly noise. My head snapped to the right to look at
the physician, and he read my mind: "'He's dead, don't
worry.'"'
22. Connie Ray Evans (Mississippi, July 8, 1987)
Evans' execution required thirteen minutes.6" According to one
witness,
[after the gas began to rise from Evans' chair, he] let out the first
of several loud agonizing gasps. I saw the muscles tightening and
bulging on his neck His forced breathing and tensed body
exhibited excruciating pain. He lost control of his bodily
functions. Saliva drooled from his mouth, running down his chin,
and hanging in a long rope from his chin."
23. Leo Edwards (Mississippi, June 21, 1989)
Edwards' death required fourteen minutes.6 A witness to the
execution stated that:
When [the gas] reached his face, he gasped, then started banging
his head and throwing himself back and forth in the chair. His
body strained so desperately against the straps that I was afraid
they would cut him. He then let out a shriek of terror, the first of
many. It was the sound of pure torment. My heart raced as I tried
to control my own reaction to the torture I was witnessing ....
The shrieking and thrashing lasted for several minutes; he
644. See Complaint at 9, Booker v. Murphy, 953 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (No.
3:95CV49BN).
645. rd.
646. Ivan Solotaroff, ne Last Face You'll Ever See Esquire, Aug., 1995, at 91, 97.
647. Id. Se general Donald A. Cabana, Death at Midnight: The Confession of an
Executioner (1996) (detailing former prison warden Cabana's account of the prison system
and the administration of the death penalty).
648. See Fnv Memorandum, supra note 639, at 7 (cting the Declaration of Robert R.
Marshall, Exhibit 35).
649. Id
650. Id. (citing the Declaration of Kenneth Rose, Exhibit 43).
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remained alive for some time after that.651
24. Donald Eugene Harding (Arizona, April 6, 1992)
Harding's death required ten and one-half minutes after two cyanide
pellets were placed in a bowl of sulfuric acid beneath his chair.ss
"Witnesses described a gruesome scene: Mr. Harding gasping, shuddering
and desperately making obscene gestures with both strapped-down
hands." 6" As Harding's defense attorney and witness stated:
When the fumes enveloped Don's head he took a quick breath. A
few seconds later he again looked in my direction. His face was
red and contorted as if he were attempting to fight through
tremendous pain. His mouth was pursed shut and his jaw was
clenched tight. Don then took several more quick gulps of the
fumes. At this point Don's body started convulsing violently....
His face and body turned a deep red and the veins in his temple
and neck began to bulge until I thought they might explode.
After about a minute Don's face leaned partially forward, but he
was still conscious. Every few seconds he continued to gulp in. He
was shuddering uncontrollably and his body was racked with
spasms. His head continued to snap back. His hands were
clenched. After several more minutes, the most violent of the
convulsions subsided. At this time the muscles along Don's left
arm and back began twitching in a wavelike motion under his
skin. Spittle drooled from his mouth. Don did not stop moving
for approximately eight minutes, and after that he continued to
twitch and jerk for another minute. Approximately two minutes
later, we were told by a prison official that the execution was
complete.'
Other eyewitness accounts confirmed this depiction. 5 The nature
of Harding's death led. Arizona's Attorney General to recommend lethal
injection.m
651. Id.
652. See Gruesome Death in Gas 2armber Pushes Aizona Toward Injection; N.Y. Times, April
25, 1992, atA9.
653. Id.
654. Flerro Memorandum, supra note 639, at 7 (quoting Exhibits in Support of Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order in No. 92-70237 (N.D. Cal.), Vol. 1, Exhibit 17 at 3-4 (Affidavit
of James J. Belanger, Esq.)).
655. See id. at 7-8.
656. See Arizona Man Executed by Lethal Injection, Reuters, Mar. 3, 1993; see also Chris
Limberis, State Scrambling to Get Gas Chamber Teste, Arizona Daily Star, Dec. 15, 1991, at lB
(noting that Arizona's gas chamber had not been used for more than 28 years prior to
Harding's death and that, in light of revelations of Leuchter's lack of qualifications, the state
was quickly attempting to find an expert to test it).
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25. Robert Alton Harris (California, April 21, 1992)
Harris' death required sixteen minutes." More than two minutes
after Harris inhaled the gas, he raised his head and glanced toward either
side and the ceiling.en "Harris gasped, moaned, drooled and convulsed
for 7 minutes... before the cyanide stilled him."s According to one
account, "[m]any European papers... condemned the amount of time it
took the gas to kill Mr. Harris." For example, Spain's leading daily
newspaper, El Pais, emphasized in its front-page report the "'10 minutes of
agony' Mr. Harris suffered before dying." 661
26. David Mason (California, August 24, 1993)
The attending physician and media witnesses said that Mason
remained conscious between one to three minutes. 62 They categorized
many of Mason's apparently conscious actions to be "responses to pain"-
e.g., his hands "clenched into tight painful fists," and "his eyes closed, his
throat looked as if every muscle in it were strained."61"
C. Lethal Injection
2Z Charles Brooks, Jr. (Texas, December 7, 1982)
The execution of Charles Brooks was the first by lethal injection.'
The prison doctor, Ralph E. Gray, M.D.,6 asserted that the state-
657. KillerExecuted by Lethal Injection, Gainesville Sun (Fla.), Apr. 24, 1992, at 5A.
658. See Richard Polito, Harris Saga Finally End4 Matin Indep.J., Apr. 22, 1992, atA1; Sam
Stanton, Eyeaitness: Harris' Violent Life Ends Quietly, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 22, 1992, atAl.
659. Tupper Hull, Lethal-injection Bill Would End Gassings, S.F. Examiner, Apr. 22, 1992, at
A14; see also Dan Morain, Witness to the Executio. A Macabre, Surreal Even LA. Tunes, Apr. 22,
1992, at Al (describing Harris' execution).
660. Another U.S. Execution, supra note 370, at B7; see also Mary McDonald, Gannett News
Service, Apr. 28, 1992 (noting the disgust of several Western European countries over Harrs'
death).
661. Another U.S. Execution, supra note 370, at B7; see also European Media Assail 'An Obscene
Spectacle, S.F. Examiner, Apr. 22, 1992, at A16 (describing Europeans' unfavorable response
to Harris' execution). Harris' execution was the subject of considerable commentary and
litigation. See supra notes 75, 288 and accompanying text.
662. Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 285 (remanding for reconsideration in light of
changed statute); see also Kevin Fagan, Mason Died As He Said He Woud, S.F. Chron., Aug. 25,
1993, atAl; David K. Li, Watching Mason'sDeath, Oakland Trib., Aug. 25, 1993, atAl.
663. Ferro, 865 F. Supp. at 1402; Fagan, supra note 662, at Al; Anne Krueger, Killer
Executed, San Diego Union-Trib., Aug. 24, 1993, at Al.
664. See supra note 324 and accompanying text; see also Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice,
Death Row Inmate Execution File on Charles Brooks (Dec. 7, 1982) (on file with the author)
(noting that "Brooks was the first person to be executed by lethal injection").
665. See Frederick Drimmer, Until You Are Dead: The Book of Executions in America 78
(1990). Gray's presence and involvement stirred wide controversy. The American Medical
Association and other medical organizations publicly denounced physician involvement in exe-
cutions, yet Gray had examined Brooks' veins, supplied the drugs to be used, and the tech-
nicians to administer the drugs. See id.; American College of Physicians, supra note 364, at 10.
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appointed executioner had a difficult time locating a suitable vein for the
procedure because of Brooks' long history of intravenous drug use.6
Gray explained that he "could have hit those veins easier than the people
who did it," although, because of his profession, he could not get
involved. 7 Brooks was injected with an overdose of sodium thiopental,
which required seven minutes to effectuate his death.m Dick Reavis, a
writer for Texas Monthly Magazine and a witness, stated that during the
execution process, Brooks "moved his head as if to say 'no'. Then he
yawned and his eyes dosed, and then he wheezed. His head fell over
toward us, then he wheezed again." 66' Brooks' arm also "bounced up and
down." 67 Terry Bertling, managing editor of The Huntsville Item and also
a witness, said that "Brooks's bare stomach was visibly moving up and
down, showing his last few deep breaths.... [He] opened and dosed his
right hand several times after the injection began and died with his hand
in a relaxed fist."6' Witnesses felt that, "from what they had seen,
[Brooks] had not died easily." 672
28. James D. Autry (Texas, March 14, 1984)
Autry was the second person in the United States to be executed by
lethal injection .6 7  Throughout much of the time, Autry complained of
pain.674 Immediately before Autry's death, a "tremor ran through" his
body.6'5 The entire event required ten minutes, which medical experts
perceived as unusually long.6 76 When questioned about why the execution
took so long, some medical experts suggested that the drugs may have
been diluted because the tube leading to Autry's arm was dogged.677
Others suggested that the I.V. may have slipped out of his vein and into his
tissue as a result of an inexperienced technician's improper insertion of
the needle.678
666. Stryker, supra note 321, at 6.
667. Id.
668. See Gerald Dworkin, The Doctor's Dilemma. Paper presented at the University of
Wyoming, Department of Philosophy, Conference on Capital Punishment and the Morality of
Lethal Injection, at 49, 50 (Apr. 23, 1983) (transcript available in the University of Wyoming
Library) (on file with the author).
669. Robert Reinhold, Execution By Injection Stirs Fear and Sharpens Debate, N.Y. Times, Dec.
8, 1982, at A28.
670. Drimmer, supra note 665, at 74.
671. Reinhold, supra note 669, at A28.
672. Drhnmer, supra note 665, at 74.
673. Id. at 79.
674. Philip Hager, Justices Uphold Executions by Lethal Drugs, LA. Times, Mar. 21, 1985, at 4.
675. Drimmer, supra note 665, at 82.
676. Id; see also Anne Krueger, California's Death Penal C: A Humane Way to Die? State's 1st
Execution by Injection Scheduled Frday, San Diego Union-Trib., Feb. 19, 1996, at Al (describing
Autry's painful 10-minute execution).
677. See Eileen Keerdoja et. al., A Civilized Way to Die, Newsweek, Apr. 9, 1984, at 106
(noting possible reasons for the extended length of Autry's execution).
678. Id.
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29. Thomas Andy Barefoot (Texas, October 30, 1984)
Richard Moran, Professor of Sociology at Mount Holyoke College, was
one of the witnesses to Barefoot's execution.67 He reported that, while
Barefoot was saying the names of his friends on death row,
Barefoot let out a terrible gasp. His neck straightened. His eyes
bulged and his back arched. He lay stiff on the gurney, glazed
eyes fixed on the ceiling, like a soldier standing at attention ....
[The prison medical examiner] tried to dose Barefoot's eyes, but
the lids would not budge. He tried a second time. Still they would
not move. Finally the doctor said: "Eyes dilated, respiration
stopped, heartbeat slowed. Barefoot is dead." I thought to myself,
no he isn't. His heart is still beating.6eo
30. Stephen Peter Morin (Texas, March 13, 1985)
Technicians required more than forty minutes to insert the lethal
injection needle because Morin's long-term drug use hindered their ability
to locate a blood vessel that had no scars or other damage.i Two
minutes after entering Morin's death chamber, technicians attempted the
first injection carrying a saline solution.m "At least five more attempts
were made to locate appropriate veins in [Morin's] arms and even legs
before the technicians came from the department to review its procedures
for administering the drugs when the condemned man has a history of
drug abuse."es Morin died eleven minutes after technicians finally found
a suitable vein. 4 A prison spokesperson stated that the difficulty caused
by inserting the needles "would probably prompt the Texas Department of
Corrections to review its procedures for administering the drugs when the
condemned person has a history of drug abuse."6-e
679. See Richard Moran, Invitation to an Ex.eution-Death by Needle Isn't Eay, L.A. Times,
Mar. 24, 1985, at 5.
680. Id; see also Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Death Row Inmate Execution File on
Thomas Barefoot (Oct. 30, 1984) (on file with the author) (noting that Barefoot "coughed"
and then ceased talking in midsentence, while giving his last statement); Dana Wilkie, Support
Seen for Injection; State Lawmakers Begin Reconsidering Lethal Ga; San Diego Union-Trib., Apr. 22,
1992, atA3 (noting that as Barefoot talked with a reporter, he "gasped in nidsentence".
681. See Weyrich, supra note 528, at Al; Murderer of Thre Women Is Executed in Texas, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 14, 1985, at A23 [hereinafter Murderer of Three Women].
682. Murderer of Three Women, supra note 681, atA23.
683. Michael L. Graczyk, Convicted Killer in Texas Waits 45 Minutes Before Injection is Given,
Gainesville Sun (Fla.), Mar. 14, 1985, at 12A.
684. Stolls, supra note 334, at 260.
685. Murderer of Three Women, supra note 681, at A23. The Texas Department of
Corrections has not yet changed its procedures to accommodate condemned inmates with a
history of drug use. See supra notes 395-98 and accompanying text.
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31. Randy L. Woolls (Texas, August 20, 1986)
Because of his history of drug addiction, Woolls had to assist
execution technicians to find an adequate vein for insertion.8 Woolls
reportedly told authorities that "prominent veins in his arms had collapsed
long ago from drug use."6 Woolls died seventeen minutes after
technicians inserted the needle.6
32. Elliot RodJohnson (Texas, June 24, 1987)
Johnson's execution was plagued by repetitive needle punctures.m
Technicians finally required thirty-five minutes to locate and insert a
catheter into one ofJohnson's veins.r9°
33. Raymond Landry (Texas, December 13, 1988)
While Landry was strapped to a gumey, executioners "repeatedly
probed" his veins with syringes for forty minutes, attempting to inject
potassium chloride 9 Then, two minutes after the execution began, the
syringe came out of Landry's vein, "spewing deadly chemicals toward
startled witnesses."6r What officials termed a "blowout" resulted in the
squirting of lethal injection liquid about two feet across the room. 9 A
plastic curtain was pulled so that witnesses could not see the execution
team reinsert the catheter into Landry's vein.6 "After 14 minutes, and
after witnesses heard the sound of doors opening and dosing, murmurs
and at least one groan, the curtain was opened and Landry appeared
motionless and unconscious."695 Landry was pronounced dead twenty-
four minutes after the drugs were initially injected.!6 State officials said
the delay was due to a "mechanical problem caused by Landry's muscular
arms and previous drug use."6 According to a spokesperson for the Tex-
as Attorney General, Landry's execution "was a mechanical and physical
problem .... Landry was very muscular and had 'Popeye-type' arms.
When the stuff was flowing, it wouldn't go into the veins and there was
686. Texas Execute Murderer, Las Vegas Sun, Aug. 20, 1986, at 12A.
687. The Nation, LA Times, Aug. 21, 1986, at 2.
688. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Death Row Inmate Execution File on Randy L
Woolls (Aug. 20, 1986) (on file with the author).
689. SeeFdderlPetition, supra note 321, at 68.
690. Douglas Freelander, Johnson Executed for 1982 Murder at Beaumont Store; Houston Post,
June 24, 1987, at 3A see also Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Death Row Inmate Execution
File on Elliot Rod Johnson (June 24, 1987) (on file with the author) (noting that the saline
solution started at 12:09 a.m. and the lethal injection was given at 12:43 am.).
691. Hinds, supra note 546, at 1.
692. Weyrich, supra note 528, at Al.
693. See Michael L Graczyk, Landy Executed for '82 RobberySlaying Dallas Morning News,
Dec. 13, 1988, at 29A.
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more pressure in the hose than his veins could absorb." 698 A
spokesperson for the Texas Department of Corrections stated that this was
the first time such a problem had occurred in Texas. Yet, others noted the
difficulties authorities encountered in 1985 when technicians experienced
trouble locating a vein in another Texas inmate, Stephen Morin. Morin
had also been a heavy drug user.'"
34. Stephen McCoy (Texas, May 24, 1989)
McCoy reacted violently to the introduction of lethal injection drugs
into his blood stream.7° Experts stated that a weak dosage of drugs
caused McCoy "to choke and heave" during the last minutes of his
execution.701 According to Karen Zellars, McCoy's attorney, soon after
the injection, "McCoy began gagging and coughing deeply, his back
arching off the gurney in the death chamber .... He breathed a deep,
long moan, dosed his eyes and stopped breathing. The normal solitude of
the death chamber was shattered then, when Robert Hurst, a reporter...
witnessing the execution, fainted, crashing into one of four other media
witnesses."702 When this happened, Zellars claimed that she "nearly lost
control herself,"7 °s stating that "I stayed with [McCoy] until the first
violent heave. [McCoy's reaction] was more violent than I had expected.
Then I heard the choking. The next thing I realized, everybody was
gasping. I had no idea what it was. I really felt we were going to have a
chain reaction. " 7 4 According to one experienced execution reporter,
"[i]t was the first time a witness had fainted at an execution since they
were resumed in 1982, and one of the most violent reactions from an
inmate."7 5 The Texas Attorney General acknowledged that McCoy"seemed to have a somewhat stronger reaction [to the drugs]," adding that
"[t]he drugs might have been administered in a heavier dose or more
rapidly."706
35. George "Tiny" Mercer (Missouri, January 6, 1989)
A medical doctor was required to perform a cutdown on Mercer's
groin. 07 Cutdown procedures are now rare in light of medical advances
in injection techniques.7 s
698. Murderer Executed After A Leaky Lethal Injction, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,1988, at A29.
699. Id.
700. Marquart, supra note 318, at 147.
701. Weyrich, supra note 528, atA1; Man Put to Death for Teas Murder, N.Y. Times, May 25,
1989, at A23.





707. SeeTrombley, supranote 208, at 115.
708. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
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36. George C. Gilmore (Missouri, August 31, 1990)
According to Kenneth Smith, M.D., a neurosurgery professor who
attended Gilmore's execution, force was used to stick the needle into
Gilmore's arm.10 Smith said that the "experience had solidified his belief
that the death penalty is wrong.""0
3Z Charles Troy Coleman (Oklahoma September 10, 1990)
Coleman was the first person to be executed by lethal injection in
Oklahoma."' According to a corrections officer, technicians had diffi-
culty finding a usable vein. As a result, Coleman's execution was delayed by
ten minutes." 2
38. Charles Walker (illinois, September 12, 1990)
Walker's execution required eleven minutes rather than the three or
four contemplated by the Department of Corrections' procedures. There
was some indication that the first chemical may have worn off before
Walker became unconscious."' s "If this occurred .... Walker would have
slowly strangled and suffered excruciating pain while remaining completely
immobile-appearing 'calm' and 'serene' to all witnesses because he was
completely paralyzed."" 4 According to journalist Stephen Trombley, an
assistant to Walker's execution stated there were two major problems.75
First, a kink developed in the intravenous line that stopped the flow of the
lethal injection chemicals and extended the time required for Walker's
heart function to cease.56 Second, the three doctors attending the
execution inserted the intravenous needle improperly so that the chemicals
flowed toward Walker's fingertips instead of his heart."7 This mistake
further delayed the time for the chemicals to reach Walker's vital organs
and take effect. It appears that these problems were due to the
incompetency of the doctors who were rumored to be residents with
limited experience."5 The executioner stated that when these difficulties
709. Bill McClellan, Ethics Police: CruisingMoralMisdeeanows St. Louis Post Disp., Oct. 12,
1990, at 3A.
710. Tom Uhlenbrock, Execution Enforced Beliefs, Witness Says, St Louis Post-Disp., Sept. 9,
1990, at ID.
711. Bev&ly Merz, Physicians Assist in Illinois Execution by Lethal Injection, Am. Med. News,
Sept. 21, 1990, at 32.
712. Id.
713. Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at
14-15, Silagy v. Thompson, No. 90-C5028 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
714. Id.
715. See Trombley Affidavit, supra note 376, 1 18-20.
716. Id. 19.
717. Id. 20; see also Trombley, supra note 208, at 252.
718. Furor Erupts AJfer Physicians Assist in Illinois Execution, Medical Ethics Advisor, Feb.
1992, at 9.
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arose, corrections officials "panicked" and ordered that the blinds to the
execution room be dosed. 9 Therefore, witnesses could not see the
executioner's inspection of the intravenous line and removal of the kink or
"the period when Mr. Walker's heart function ceased."1
39. Maurice Byrd (Missouri, August 23, 1991)
An executioner using Leuchter's lethal injection machine stated that
he "had a problem with one of the pistons that drives one of the syringes
in the machine. The piston became stuck and did not automatically
depress the plunger on one of the syringes." 721 As a result, the
executioner needed to activate the piston by using the manual override in
the system. Thereafter, he altered Leuchter's machine by substituting stain-
less steel pistons for the ones Leuchter had originally provided!22
40. Rickey Ray Recto9 (Arkansas, Januay 24, 1992)
The thirteen witnesses seated behind a thick, black curtain could not
see the lethal injection procedure. However, the witnesses stated that they
heard "as many as eight moans" 24 that "filtered from the death chamber
as technicians pierced Rector's skin with needles and searched almost an
hour for suitable veins to carry lethal doses of chemicals."126 While those
administering the execution attempted to find a vein, a sheriff commented
to a reporter that "[i]t sounds like they're really having trouble. They're
palpating his arm."726 An administrator of medical and dental programs
for the Arkansas Department of Corrections said, that "the moans did come
as a team of two medical people that had grown to five worked on both
sides of his body to find a vein."7 Altogether, eight people were
involved, including what were called the "tie-down people."2 Rector
himself assisted the team in finding the vein. By the time the execution
team found a vein in Rector's right hand, the team was already in the
process of preparing for a cut-down.!" According to the prison's
719. Trombley Affidavit, supra note 376, 1 19.
720. Id. 121; see also supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing litigation over the
lethal Injection concerns in Illinois).
721. Id. 1 15.
722. Id.
723. After killing a police officer, Rector shot himself in the head. The wound and the
resulting surgery in effect lobotomized him However, Rector's attorneys were unsuccessful at
convincing the court that he was mentally incompetent. SeeJoe Farmer, Rector, 40, Executedfor
Officer's Slayfing Arkansas Democrat Gazette, Jan. 25, 1992 at LA, 9A.
724. Id. at 1A.
725. Sonja Clinesmith, Moans Pierced Silence During Wai4 Arkansas Democrat Gazette, Jan.
26, 1992, at4B.
726. Id. at 8B. The term "palpate" means "[t]o examine by feeling and pressing with the
palms of the hands and the fingers." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1285 (26th ed. 1995).
727. Farmer, supra note 723, at IA.
728. See Clinesmith, supra note 725, at 4B.
729. See id.
730. Id.; see supra notes 375; 708 (explaining that cutdown procedures are now rare in light
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administrator, Rector's hand was the only part of his body where the
medical staff could start an IV.7- Although two intravenous needles are
used to send chemicals into the bloodstream, a witness for the Associated
Press stated that he saw only one needle in Rector's hand.!32 According
to the administrator, "[the blood vessels collapsed and we couldn't find
them."7 " "Small drops of blood were splattered on the white sheet
Rector was lying on and on the metal gurney-apparent signs of the
difficulty before the curtain was opened.n7m
41. Robyn Lee Parks (Oklahoma, March 10, 1992)
One reporter's account of Parks' death stated that:
Moments after executioners administered the drugs ... , Parks
was blinking and nervously licking his lips when he gasped and
violently gagged. His head jerked toward his right shoulder ....
[M]uscles in his jaw, neck and abdomen began to contract
spasmodically for approximately 45 seconds .... [T]he rhythmic
jaw clenching returned for a few seconds.3 5
According to another account:
Less than two minutes after [the execution began], Parks' body
began bucking under straps that held him to a gurney. He
spewed out all the air in his lungs, spraying a cloud of spit ....
The death looked scary and ugly .... Several times, Parks
groaned and turned his head back and forth, his eyes tightly shut.
A vein on the left side of his neck stood out thickly."'
A reporter stated that, "[flor appearances sake, it looked painful and
inhumane."377 Parks died within eleven minutes after the executioners
administered the drugs.7
42. Billy Wayne White (Texas, Apil 23, 1992)
White's death required forty-seven minutes because the executioners
had difficulty finding a vein that was not severely damaged from years of
heroin abuse.711 After White assisted the executioners, they found a vein
in his hand.7 The director of the Texas prison system defended the
of advanced medical technology).
731. See Farmer, supra note 723, at 9A.
732. Id
733. id,
734. Clinesmith, supra note 725, at 8B.
735. Don McCoy, Dying Parks Ga edfor Life, Daily Oklahoman, Mar. 11, 1992, at 1, 2.
736. Wayne Greene, 11-Minute Execution Seemingy Took Forever, Tulsa World, Mar. 11, 1992,
atA13.
737. See Michael Murphy, Lethal Injection Use Questioned, Debate Swirls Around Executions
Designed to Be More Humane, Phoenix Gazette, Feb. 8, 1993, at Al (quoting Wayne Greene, a
reporter for the Tulsa World).
738. See Greene, supra note 736, at A13.
739. See Killer Executed by Lethal Injection. supra note 657, at 5A; Another U.S. Execution, supra
note 370, at B7.
740. See Murphy, supra note 737, at Al.
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executioners, explaining that at least one comparable sort of delay had
occurred in Texas for the same reason v4r White's execution was delayed
even further, however, because the doctor in charge of examining
executed prisoners arrived late742 White required nine minutes to die
after the initial injection.74
43. Justin Lee May (Texas, May 7, 1992)
"May violently reacted to the drugs."P4 According to Robert
Wernsman, a local reporter, "May gasped, coughed, and reared against
heavy leather restraints, coughing once again before his body froze.""45
An Associated Press reporter added that May "went into a coughing spasm,
groaned and gasped, lifted his head from the gurney and would have
arched his back if he had not been held down by wide white leather
belts."743 When May finally stopped breathing, "his eyes were open and
his mouth agape."7 47 May's death required about nine minutes.'
44. John Wayne Gacy (llinois, May 10, 1994)
Gacy's execution process was delayed when a "dog developed in the
delivery tube attached to his arm."749 Technicians noticed that one of the
delivery tube's chemicals was "gelling or dotting."70 The execution team
pulled a curtain around Gacy as they struggled to dear the tube in order
to allow the drugs to flow into him2' The execution was expected to last
ten minutes, but the complications caused the execution to last eighteen
minutes before Gacy died.752 "According to witnesses, as a dose of
anaesthetic knocked him unconscious, [Gacy] uttered a long grunting
sound, his belly rose and fell, and then there were no signs of life."763
741. See Killer Executed by Lethal Injection, supra note 657, at 5A.
742. See Kathy Fair, White Was Helpful at Execution, Houston Chron., Apr. 24, 1992, at 31.
743. See id,
744. Murphy, supra note 737, at Al.
745. Id. In an interview, Werusman said, "I certainly did not see a humane extinguishing
... because there was anguish there." Id.; see also Convict Struggled During His Execution, S.F.
Examiner, May 7, 1992, atA12 (noting a statement made by Texas Department of Corrections
spokesperson Charles Brown, that May "attempted to rise up against the straps that held him
to the gumey").
746. Man Put to Death for 1978 Murder. Texas May Execute 5 Other Killers This Month, Dallas
Morning News, May 8, 1992, at 32A.
747. Id.
748. See Kathy Fair & John Toth, Justin May is Executed for '78 Murder Rampage Houston
Chron., May 7, 1992, at 34.
749. David Seideman, A Twist Before Dying. A Snafu at the Execution of a Serial Killer Inflames
the Debate about Humaneness and Capital Punishment Time, May 23, 1994, at 52.
750. See Stephen Braun, Gacy Executed in Illinois for Murders of 33, L.A. Tunes, May 10, 1994,
at 12.
751. See Seideman, supra note 749, at 52.
752. See Susan Kuczka & Rob Karwath, All Appeals Fai4. Gacy is ERxecut Chi. Trib., May 10,
1994, at 1.
753. Illinois Promises More Executions, Despite Foul-up with Gacy, Detroit Free Press, May, 11,
[19971
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45. Emmitt Foster (Missouri, May 3, 1995)
Twenty-nine minutes passed before Foster was pronounced dead after
receiving his first injection.7M George Lombardi, a Department of
Corrections spokesperson, stated that, "Mr. Foster's veins had apparently
collapsed because of long-term drug use." 5 Additionally, the death was
prolonged because a leather strap on Foster's arm was tied too tightly.1
According to one account,
[p]rison workers dosed the blinds to the windows of the
execution chamber at 12:10 aam. and did not reopen them until
12:36 a.m., three minutes after [Foster] was pronounced dead.
The official witnesses, including reporters, could not see into the
chamber during that time. One witness refused to sign the
routine statement that she had witnessed the execution.77
Thirty-six death row inmates filed suit in federal court claiming that
Foster's execution represents the cruelty of lethal injection. The suit
resulted in a temporary restraining order that was lifted for the execution
of Larry Griffin onJune 21, 1995.7M
46. Ronald K Allridge (Texas, June 8, 1995)
Typically, a lethal injection needle is inserted into both of an inmate's
arms. However, Allridge's execution was conducted with only one needle,
which was inserted into his right arm, because officials had difficulty
discovering a vein in his left arm.s 9 Allridge was pronounced dead nine
minutes after the chemicals started flowing.76
47. Richard Townes, Jr. (Virginia, January 23, 1996)
Townes was executed "after a 22-minute delay to allow medical
personnel to find a vein large enough for the needle." 1 Eventually,
personnel injected Townes in his right foot 7 2 Typically, an intravenous
line is inserted into each arm.7
1994, at 5A.
754. See Missouri Executes Murderer of Teammate, N.Y. Tmes, May 4, 1995, at A16.
755. Id.
756. See Carolyn Tuft, AppealsDenied. Griffin Executed St Louis Post-Disp.,June 22, 1995, at
7A.
757. Tim O'Neil, Too-Tight Strap Hampered Execution. Coroner Chiemical Row Was Impeded, St.
Louis Post-Disp., May 5, 1995, at lB.
758. See Tuft, supra note 756, at 7A; see also supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text
(discussing the Missouri inmates' suit).
759. Man is Executed for Fort Worth Woman's Slaying, Dallas Morning News, June 9, 1995, at
121).
760. Id.
761. Store Cler*'s KillerExecuted in Virginia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1996, atA19.
762. Jonathan Freedland & Ian Katz, Execution Horrors Set Off Doubts Guardian, Jan. 26,
1996, at 11.
763. Virginia Executes Man for Murder of Store Clerk Reuters, Jan. 23, 1996.
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48. TommieJ. Smith (Indiana, July 18, 1996)
Prison officials acknowledged that they knew two months prior to
Smith's execution that he had "unusually small veins that might cause
problems with the lethal injection."7 After searching for sixteen minutes
for a vein in Smith's arm, the execution team called in a medical doctor
who tried to insert a tube into Smith's neck, but failed. Finally, the doctor
inserted a tube into Smith's foot. The team required thirty-six minutes to
find a vein. Although the doctor was in conflict with professional guide-
lines when he assisted with the execution, the team explained that they
asked him to participate.7
49. Luis M. Mata (Aizona, August 22, 1996)
Under established procedures, at approximately 11:30 p.m. on August
21, officials strapped Mata to a gurney and inserted the lethal injection
needle into his arm. Mata remained in this position in the execution
chamber for one hour and ten minutes while his attorneys argued his case
to the Arizona Supreme Court.76 When Mata's execution began, his
head jerked back and from side to side while his face contorted and his
mouth made unnatural movements. Minutes later, his chest and stomach
began a series of quick, sharp up and down movements.67
764. Sherri Edwards & Suzanne McBride, Dodor's Aid in Injection Volated Ethics Rule;
Physician Hdped Inset the Lethal Tube in a Breach of AMA's PoliUy Forbidding Active Role in an
Execution, Indianapolis Star, July 19, 1996, at Al.
765. Id
766. Sce Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus Challenging the
Execution of Sentence, Greenawalt v. Stewart, No. 97-99001, at 11-12 (9th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Greenawalt Pdition]; Affidavit of Edward A. Brunner, M.D., Ph.D. [hereinafter
Brunner Affidavit], Exh. A. of App. to Greenawalt Pdition, supra (discussing Mata's lethal
injection procedure); Affidavit of Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Esq. [hereinafter lrchmeier
Affidavit], Exh. 7. of App. to Greenawalt Petition, supra (K rchmeier, who is on the faculty of
Tulane University Law School, was one of Mata's attorneys); Steve Benson, Bearing Witness to a
Wrongful Execution, Arizona Republic, Sept. 1, 1996, at HI (describing a personal account of
Mata's execution).
767. Kirchmeler Affidavit, supra note 766, 1[ 18-22.
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1957-present no death penalty"'
ARIZONA (AZ)
1901-1915: hanging"5
1916-1917: no death penalty (except for treason and train robbery)" 4
1918-1932: hanging
768. This Appendix benefitted from the research provided in Watt Espy, Changes of
Methods of Execution: First by Method After Hanging (Jan. 12, 1994) (unpublished paper on
file with the author).
769. 1836 Ala. Acts p. 107 § 36 (hanging).
770. 1923 Ala. Acts 587 § 1; Ala. Code § 5309 (1923) (electrocution); Ala. Code § 15-18-
82(a) (1975) (current 1996). The 1923 Act affected only those sentenced to death after
February 28, 1927. State Prepares to Quit Gallows After October 1, Birmingham News, Feb. 6, 1926,
at 1. Although electrocution was generally considered more humane, in 1927, three 2000 volt
jolts were required for Alabama's electric chair to kill Horace DeVaughn. See Sean Reilly, Al%
Eliminated Hangings in '20s, Star (Anniston, Ala.), Jan. 5, 1993, at 1A. In 1983, the same chair
required three jolts to killJohn Louis Evans III. Id.; see supra app. 2A (Electrocution: John
Louis Evans II). In Brown v. State 264 So.2d 549 (Ala. 1971), the Supreme Court of Alabama
held that, although Klby Prison was the only statutorily designated location for executions,
Kllby's dismantling did not force a de facto repeal of the death penalty. See id. at 549-51.
Currently, legislation is being assembled in Alabama to allow lethal injection as an alternative
method of execution because injection is "considered more humane than electrocution."
Editorial, Lethal Injection Considered More Humane Execution, Montgomery Advertiser (Ala.), Jan.
26, 1997, at 21; see also Legislation Being Prepared Would Offer Death by Lethal Injection As An
Option to Electrocution, Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Jan. 26, 1997, at Al (noting State Senator
Steve Windom's statement that "lethal injection could eliminate problems that come with
using the electric chair, such as a possible malfunction").
771. 1913 Alaska Terr. Sess. Laws 20 § 2308 (hanging).
772. 1957 Alaska Terr. Sess. Laws 132 § 1 (death penalty abolished). Alaska entered the
Union on January 3, 1959. See The World Almanac, supra note 271, at 542.
773. Ariz. Terr. Rev. Stat. 2 § 1035 (1901) (hanging).
774. 1917 Ariz. Sess. Laws p. 4 § 1 (Amendments and Initiative Measures) (Initiative Act
1916, amending 1913 Ariz. Penal Code § 173) (abolishing the death penalty for first degree
murder); see also Exparte Faltin, 254 P. 477, 477-80 (Ariz. 1927) (explaining that Initiative Act
1916 abolished the death penalty for first degree murder only, but not for treason and train
robbery). Arizona entered the Union on February 14, 1912. See The World Almanac, supra
note 271, at 542. In 1916, an initiative petition to abolish the death penalty succeeded; the
referendum passed by a margin of 152 votes. See 1917 Ariz. Sess. Laws p. 5 § 1 (Amendments
and Initiative Measures) (Initiative Act 1916, amending 1913 Ariz. Penal Code § 173).
775. 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws p. 20 § 10 (Amendments and Initiative Measures) (Initiative Act
1918, amending 1913 Ariz. Penal Code § 173) (death penalty reinstated; hanging). In 1918,
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1933-1991: lethal gas"8
1992-present lethal injection (lethal injection or lethal gas at the condem-
ned's election if the condemned was sentenced to death for
an offense committed prior to the Act's effective date; lethal




the death penalty was reinstated for first degree murder, this referendum passed by a margin
of 2-1, or about 10,000 votes. See id. at 21 (Note). An influential factor in the 1918 rein-
statement was the lynching of a murderer/rapist; the Tucson Citizen attributed the
condemned's crimes to the abolitionist beliefs of the current governor and his followers in
the abolition movement. See Galliher et al., supra note 282, at 563 nn.173-74 and accompa-
nying text.
776. Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 22 (1933) (lethal gas). In 1930, Eva Dugan was decapitated
when she was hanged because of her 250 pound weight and the length of the drop. SeeJames
E. Cook, Atizona Gas Chamber is a Roomful of Bad Memories, Ariz. Republic, June 23, 1991, atE2.
As a result, "[r]evulsion was so widespread and great that Governor George W. P. Hunt asked
the legislature to find 'a means to enact the death penalty less barbarous and revolting than
the one used at present.'" Id. Accordingly, Arizona's switch to lethal gas in 1933 was "on the
ground that [lethal gas] was more humane." After a Gas Chamber Onde4a Arizona Considers
Injection, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1992, at AIO [hereinafter After a Gas Chamber Ordea; see also
Crane McClennen, Capital Punishment in Arizona, 29 Ariz. Att'y 17, 18 (Oct. 1992) (noting that
the switch to lethal gas in Arizona was due to botched hangings). In Hernandez v. State, 32
P.2d 18 (Ariz. 1934), the Supreme Court of Arizona considered lethal gas to be humane be-
cause "'for many years animals have been put to death painlessly by the administration of
poisonous gas'" and "'gas has been used for years by dental surgeons for the purpose of
extracting teeth painlessly.'" Id. at 25 (quoting State v. GeeJon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1923)).
In 1992, however, Donald Eugene Harding required 10 1/2 minutes to die by lethal gas. See
supra app. 2.B (Lethal Gas: Donald Eugene Harding); After a Gas Chamber Ondea4 supre, at
A10. Harding's botched execution spurred the state's change to lethal injection. See Arizona
Man Executed by Lethal Injection, Reuters, Mar. 3, 1993.
777. Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 22 (1992) (current 1996) (lethal injection (lethal injection or
lethal gas at the condemned's election if the condemned was sentenced to death for an
offense committed prior to the Act's effective date; lethal injection if the pre-enactment
condemned fails to choose a method)); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-704 (A-B) (1978) (amended
1993) (current 1996). A defendant who is sentenced to death for an offense committed
before November 23, 1992, shall choose either lethal gas or lethal injection. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-704(B). Currently, approximately 85 of the 118 inmates on Arizona's death row can
choose between lethal gas and lethal injection. See Arizona Dep't of Corrections, Inmates on
Death Row (June 27, 1997); Telephone Interview with Mike Arra, Public Affairs Administrator,
Arizona Dep't of Corrections (July 28, 1997). There have been serious criticisms of Arizona's
procedure for administering lethal injection. See generaly Greenawalt Petition, supra note 766,
at 10-19 (detailing prior problems with Arizona's lethal injection procedure and the likelihood
of future difficulties); Brunner Affidavit, supra note 766 (concluding, after a thorough review
of Arizona's lethal injection procedure, that there are "severe risks of error" because, for
example, the "Operations Checklist" that personnel presumably follow in inserting a catheter,
provides no guidance).
778. 1894 Ark. Acts 49 § 2304 (hanging). This law prohibited any public execution for a
capital offense. Id. § 2302. Moreover, § 2303 penalized, with a $100 fine, any officer who
disobeyed the law. Id. The law is the same today. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-502(d) (1)
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1913-1982: electrocution!"
1983-present lethal injection (electrocution, or lethal injection at the
condemned's election, if the condemned was sentenced to
death prior to the Act's effective date; electrocution if the





(Michie 1987) (current 1995). Notably, however, 1901 Ark. Acts 58 § I amended the 1894 law
by providing public executions only for the crime of rape.
779. 1913 Ark. Acts 55 § 2 (electrocution). The 1913 law switching to electrocution did
not expressly indicate retroactive operation. In 1964, Arkansas officials sent states a
questionnaire concerning their use of lethal gas, although Arkansas never enacted a lethal gas
statute. &eResearch Dep't, Arkansas Legislative Council, Execution of Condemned Criminals
by Gas Chamber, Research Report No. 120, 1-2 (Apr. 1964) (on file with the author).
780. 1983 Ark. Acts 774 § 1; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4617(a)(1) (Michie 1983) (current 1995)
(lethal injection). The provision, 1983 Ark. Acts 774 § 3, provided that any defendant
sentenced to death by electrocution prior to July 4, 1983, could elect to be executed by lethal
injection. This choice provision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Fairchild
v. Stat4 690 S. W.2d 355 (Ark. 1985), even though the condemned inmate in that case
ultimately allowed prison officials to choose the method by which he would be executed. Id. at
356. Prison officials selected electrocution, which was originally specified in the inmate's sen-
tence. See Arkansas Electrocutes Its First Inmate Since 1964, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1990, at A10. See
also supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that only two Arkansas inmates remain
who can choose electrocution). According to Senator John Bearden and Attorney General
Steve Clark, who both testified in favor of a lethal injection bill, the state's change to lethal
injection was motivated by a desire to "provide the most humane form of execution currently
available." U. Press Int'l (Feb. 15, 1983).
781. Cal. Penal Code 2 § 1228 (1872) (hanging). In 1930, Assemblyman Melvyn L Cronin,
relying on accounts of Nevada executions, stated that "execution by means of lethal gas is
certainly a more humane manner of putting a criminal to death than the horrible and
hideous picture that hanging presents." Gilbert Gordon, Lethal Gas or Hanging. Which?, True
Detective Mysteries, Oct. 1931, at 10. Cronin was supporting a lethal gas bill that eventually
passed both houses of the state legislature, but was vetoed by Governor James Rolph, Jr. Id.
Rolph declared that
I have held conferences with the board of prison directors, wardens and physicians
of both penitentiaries and others, and have received many written reports from
experts on the subject of execution by lethal gas and who are by no means united in
their opinion. After thoughtful consideration of this means of execution I am not in
favor of experimenting with human misery.
Id. at 12. Rolph explained that "[it's the lonesomeness of such a death that influenced me to
veto the lethal gas bill. Imagine the horror of it-a man sealed in a place alone with no air."
Id. at 14.
782. 1937 Cal. Stat. 172 § I (lethal gas). The switch to lethal gas eventually occurred in
1937 when James B. Holohan, a former San Quentin Warden who was elected to the State
Senate, considered lethal gas more humane and less subject to mishap than hanging. Kevin
Roderick, Last Steps, Last Words on the Row California Has Put 501 Men and Women to Death Since
the State Took Charge of Executions. Not All of Them Went Quiet1, LA. Times, Mar. 28, 1990, at Al.
Furthermore, Eaton Metal Products Company of Colorado had informed California officials
that the gas chamber would be more effective, stating that their new chamber "would snuff
out life in about fifteen seconds." Id.; see also Hull, supra note 659, at A14 (noting that a lethal
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1972-1991: mandatory death penalty judicially abolishedes
1992-1996: lethal gas or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
lethal gas if the condemned fails to choose a method7"
1996-present: lethal gas or lethal injection at the condemned's election;








gas death was characterized as invoking "instantaneous unconsciousness"). In Peole v.
Daugherty, 256 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1953), the Supreme Court of California denied an Eighth
Amendment challenge to the lethal gas statute, rejecting the defendant's contention that the
statute was so vague an executioner could use a slower acting lethal gas that would cause long
and cruel suffering. Id. at 922-23; see supra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing
Daugherty).
783. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1992) (declaring the state's death
penalty unconstitutional under the state prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
784. 1992 Cal. Stat. 558 § 2 (lethal gas or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
lethal gas if the condemned fails to choose a method); Cal. Penal Code § 3604(a-c) (West
1941) (amended 1992).
785. Cal. Penal Code § 3604 (a)-(b) (amended 1996) (current 1996) (lethal gas or lethal
injection at the condemned's election; lethal injection if the condemned fails to choose a
method). In FYem, v. Gonw, 77 F. 3d 301 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds 117 S. Ct. 285
(1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of changed statute), the Ninth Circuit held
unconstitutional execution by lethal gas. Id. at 309. However, the Supreme Court remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of the legislature's decision to change the statute and
provide that lethal injection be administered unless the inmate requests lethal gas. &e Gomes
v. lero, 117 S. Ct. 285, 286 (1996); see also supra notes 136-49, 286-98 (discussing Fen). Most
recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California held that the
First Amendment requires prison officials to allow the public and the media to witness a lethal
injection from the time preceding a prisoner's strap down to a gumey until just after the
prisoner's death. California First Amendment Coalition v. Calderon, 956 F. Supp. 883, 890
(N.D. Cal. 1997).
786. Colo. Rev. Stat. 22 § 183 (1868) (hanging); see also Garveyv. People, 6 Colo. 559, 560
(1883) (noting that prior to 1870, Colorado had instituted death by hanging).
787. 1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 35 § I (death penalty abolished). This law was not retroactive.
Id. § 2.
788. 1901 Colo. Sess. Laws 64 § 3 (death penalty reinstated; hanging). Those executed by
hanging had their hearts removed after the hanging so that executioners could be certain of
their deaths. See Gas Execution Success: Kills Victim Quicl, Jackson Daily News (Mss.), June 23,
1934, at I (describing the execution of William C. Kelly, the first person in Colorado to be
executed by lethal gas).
789. 1933 Colo. Sess. Laws 61 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1933 law was not applied retroactively,
even for those who committed their offense prior to the new law but who were convicted and
sentenced later. See i&; see also True Detective Mysteries, Mar. 1934, at 111 (describing the
hanging execution of Walter Jones on December 1, 1934, even though lethal gas had
statutorily replaced hanging).
790. 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 113 § 1 (lethal injection); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-11-401
19971
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1995-present: lethal injection 9'
DELAWARE (DE)
1829-1957: hanging!"
1958-1960: no death penalty9'
1961-1985: hangingJ9
1986-present: lethal injection (hanging, or lethal injection at the condem-
ned's election, if the condemned's offense was committed
prior to the Act's effective date; hanging if the pre-
(West 1988) (amended 1993) (current 1996). Colorado administers lethal injection
"regardless of the date of the commission of the offense or offenses for which the death
penalty is imposed." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-11-401 (West 1988) (amended 1993) (current
1996).
791. Conn. Gen. Stat. 13 § 19 (1875) (hanging).
792. 1935 Conn. Pub. Acts 266 § 2 (electrocution); Conn. Gen. Stat. 335 § 1727c (1935).
The 1935 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation. In Simvboss v. Wleri 183 A.
688 (Conn. 1936), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that ajudgment directing execution
by hanging was not affected by the electrocution statute. There were statutes expressly stating
that repeals of the execution method would not affect any existing liability to prosecution and
punishment, nor any pending proceedings for offenses committed prior to the electrocution
statute. See ii at 689-90.
793. 1995 Conn. Acts 95-16 § 1 (Reg. Sess.) (lethal injection); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-100
(1963) (amended 1995) (current 1997). Connecticut lawmakers stated that lethal injection
was "cheaper and more humane that electrocution." Matthew Daly, TougherDeath Penalty Passes
Govenw, Senate Expeted to Appme House Bill Next Week, Hartford Courant, Apr. 6, 1995, at Al.
In State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1996), the Supreme Court of Connecticut allowed the
defendant's action to be remanded to the trial court so that the defendant could challenge
the constitutionality of the state's administration of lethal injection. Id. at 198-99. At the time
the defendant was convicted and sentenced, Connecticut's death sentences were carried out
by electrocution, thereby precluding the defendant's opportunity to challenge lethal injection
at the trial court level. Id. at 198. Litigation concerning the constitutionality of lethal injection
in Connecticut is ongoing. An evidentiary hearing is planned for October 6, 1997. Telephone
Interviews with Barry Butler, Chief Public Defenders Office, Hartford, Conn. (May 19, 1997,
Aug. 1, 1997).
794. Del. Code p. 143 § 4 (1829) (hanging). It appears that hanging began to replace
other forms of execution in Delaware as early as 1787. See 1786 Del. Laws p. 135 (containing
"An Act to alter the Judgment at Common-Law against persons convicted of Petit-Treason,"
passed on June 5, 1787, to change the penalty from burning to hanging for the crime of petit
treason); State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 1963) (noting that the Act ofJune 5, 1787,
changed the penalty for petit treason from burning to hanging in sufficient time to ease the
execution of Sarah Kirk, who was convicted of petit treason for murdering her husband).
However, it was not until 1829 that Delaware determined that all punishments by death shall
be inflicted by hanging. See Del Code p. 143 § 4 (1829); see also Cannon, 190 A.2d at 517
(noting that the 1829 Delaware Code "provided that all punishments by death shall be
inflicted by hanging").
795. 51 Del. Laws 347 § 1 (1958) (death penalty abolished).
796. 53 Del. Laws 309 § 2 (1961) (death penalty reinstated, hanging).
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797. 65 Del. Laws 281 § 1 (1986) (lethal injection); 65 Del. Laws 281 § 3 (1986) (hanging,
or lethal Injection at the condemned's election, if the condemned's offense was committed
prior to the Act's effective date; hanging if the pre-enactment condemned fails to choose a
method); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (1953) (amended 1986) (current 1996). The Act's
effective date was June 13, 1986. 65 De. Laws 281 § 3 (1986). Governor Michael N. Castle
called hanging "barbarous and inhumane" when he signed the 1986 law switching to lethal
Injection. See Kurt Heine, 7w Deliverance of Death in Delawre Phil. Daily News, Aug. 16, 1991,
at 5. In Ddhieds v. StatW4 534 A2d 630 (Del. 1987), the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
the defendant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of death by hanging because
he could avoid hanging by electing lethal injection; therefore his challenge was non-
justiciable. See id. at 639. The court added that even if it were to assume that the defendant
had standing, the defendant's challenge would faiL There was no evidence of a "legislative
intent to declare hanging unconstitutional" or of facts indicating that hanging was cruel and
unusual. Id at 640. Currently, only one Delaware inmate remains who can choose between
hanging and lethal Injection (James W. Riley). See Telephone Interview with Loren C. Meyers,
Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Wilmington, DeL (July 25, 1997); Telephone Interview
with Anthony Farina, Spokesperson for the Delaware Department of Corrections, Wilmington,
Del. (July 25, 1997). The last person hanged in Delaware was Billy Bailey, who was executed
on January 25, 1996. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 293, at 6.
798. 1868 Fla. Laws ch. 1637 § 27 (hanging).
799. 1923 Fla. Laws ch. 9169 § 2 (electrocution); Fla. Stat. ch. 922.10 (1992) (amended
1994) (current 1996). The 1923 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation. The
constitutionality of electrocution in Florida is currently being challenged. SeeJones Complaint,
supra note 220, Recendy,Judge A.C. Soud,Jr., FourthJudicial Circuit (Duval County, Florida),
held that Florida's electric chair did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. SeeJones v.
Butterworth, No. 81-4593-CF, at 24 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 18, 1997). Soud's decision followed the
largest evidentary hearing yet conducted on electrocution. In general, Soud concluded that:
1. Cruel or unusual punishment is defined by the Courts as the wanton infliction of
unnecessary pain; ... 2. Florida's electric chair, in past executions, did not wantonly
Inflict unnecessary pain, and therefore, did not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment; 3. Florida's electric chair, as it is to be employed in future executions
pursuant to the Department of Corrections' written testing procedures and
execution day procedures, will result in death without inflicting wanton and
unnecessary pain, and therefore, will not constitute cruel or unusual punishment; 4.
Florida's electric chair in its present condition does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment; 5. During the hearing it has been strongiy suggested and inferred by
Jones that Florida's electric chair as the method of judicial execution should be
abandoned in favor ofjudicial execution by lethal injection. Such a move to adopt
lethal injection is not within the constitutional prerogative of the Courts of this State,
but rather lies solely within the prerogative of the Legislature of the State of Florida.
Id, at 24-25. The Florida Supreme Court is currently reviewing Soud's ruling. So far, however,
It is unclear whether the Florida legislature will attempt to adopt lethal injection, either
because the legislature is not interested in the issue or because its members believe a change
may delay executions or encourage additional litigation (among other reasons). SeeJeffrey
Brainard, Faculty Execution Renews Debat4 St. Petersburg Times (Fla.), Mar, 26, 1997, atAll.
(1997]







1956-present: no death penalty05
IDAHO (M)
1864-1977: hanging
1978-1981: lethal injection!8 5
1982-present: lethal injection at the election of the director of the depart-





1983-present: lethal injection8 9
800. Ga. Code p. 794 § 85 (1845) (hanging).
801. 1924 Ga. Laws 475 § 1 (electrocution); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-38(a) (1985) (current
1997).
802 Haw. Terr. Rev. Stat. 229 § 4095 (1925) (hanging).
803. 1956 Haw. Terr. Sess. aws 282 §§ 1-14 (death penalty abolished). Hawaii entered the
Union on August 21, 1959. See The World Almanac, supra note 271, at 542.
804. 1864 Idaho Terr. Sess. Laws p. 269 § 467 (hanging). Idaho entered the Union on July
3, 1890. See The World Almanac, supra note 271, at 542. Until 1994, hanging was the only
execution method ever used in Idaho. SeeJennifer Brandlon, Gresham Minister Visits Murderer
Befor Ec-ution, The Oregonian (Portland), Jan. 7, 1994, at C5 (discussing the lethal injection
execution of Keith Wells on Jan. 6, 1994, Idaho's first execution since 1957).
805. 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws 70 § I (lethal injection).
806. 1982 Idaho Sess. aws 257 § 1 (lethal injection at the election of the director of the
department of corrections; firing squad if injection is "impractical"); Idaho Code § 19-2716
(1982) (current 1997). It appears that Idaho passed legislation approving the firing squad if
lethal injection proved infeasible because "physicians, nurses and medical personnel at the
state penitentiary had said they would not participate in the administration of a lethal
injection." Susanne Daley, 4 StateS Allow Lethal Injedionjfor Executions, N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 7,1982,
at A30.
807. 1839 IlL laws div. 15 § 156 (hanging).
808. 1927 IlL laws div. 14 § 1 (electrocution).
809. 1983 Ill. laws 83-233 § 1 (lethal injection); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/119-5(a)(1) (1963)
(amended 1992) (West 1996) (current 1996). In 1982, GovernorJames Thompson, in vetoing
a bill that proposed a switch from electrocution to lethal injection, stated that "if you're going
to impose the death penalty... you ought to impose it and not try to salve your conscience
about it by making it something akin to a peaceful passing." See Thompson Statement on Lethal
Injection Much Softer Now, Ill. News-Sun, Sept. 9, 1983, at 14A. When Thompson signed the
lethal injection bill in 1983, he said he no longer saw it as "a gesture to opponents of the
death penalty... I bow to [the General Assembly's] judgment." Id. Sponsors of the 1983
legislation characterized lethal injection as "a 'more humane' alternative to electrocution."
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1965-present no death penalty""4
KANSAS (KS)
1872-1906: hanging815
1907-1934: no death penalty818
1935-1993: hanging 17
Chair selds to Needl as Method of Exeution, Ill. News-Sun, Sept. 9, 1983, at 14A. Representative
Joseph Ebbeson said that lethal injection is a "more humane procedure" than the electric
chair, which he described as "archaic at best." Legiskture Approves Execution By Injection, IIL
News-Sun, June 22, 1983, at 4B. Senator John Grotberg, who sponsored the lethal injection
legislation, denounced electrocution as "obsolete" and "barbaric." "What we do with animals
we should be able to do with people. Society's power to take a life is enough. We don't need
the sideshow." Thompson Signs Lethal Injection Bill, U. Press Int'l (May 19, 1981). "I don't think
the frying, roasting and writhing is necessary for the state to take a life," he added. U. Press
Int'l (Mar. 10, 1981). The 1983 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation.
810. 1889 Ind. Acts art. 22 § 367 (hanging).
811. 1913 Ind. Acts 315 § 1 (electrocution).
812. 1995 Ind. Legis. Serv. 294-1995 (West) (lethal injection); Ind. Code § 35-38-6-1(a)
(1983) (amended 1995) (current 1996). Republican Senator Richard Thompson stated he was
moved to introduce a bill changing the state's method of execution from electrocution to
lethal Injection after viewing graphic media accounts of the December, 1994, execution of
Gregory Resnover. See Walton, supra note 610, at Al; app. 2.A (Electrocution: Gregory
Resnover). Others commenting on Senator Thompson's bill emphasized that "[e]lectrocution
boils a person's blood and bums his flesh, and it can last for many excruciating minutes."
Suzanne McBride, Bill Could End Use of Death Chair, Indianapolis News, Jan 21, 1995, atAl. A
comparable bill had passed the State House twice in the 1980s. Id. The change to lethal
injection was also offered in light of a number of earlier botched electrocution executions.
According to Randy Koester, legal director for Indiana's Department of Correction, Indiana's
switch "may have been influenced" by William Vandiver's gruesome 1985 electrocution. SJo-
seph Gerth, Lethal Injection: Humane or Cnt4?, Courier-Journal (Ky.), Mar. 14, 1997, at 1A.
Vandiver's execution required five separate jolts of electricity and 17 minutes before he was
declared dead. See Suzanne McBride, Senate Approes Lethal Injection, Indianapolis News, Feb.
17, 1995, at BI; supra app. 2A (Electrocution: William Vandiver). Republican Senator
Lawrence Borst emphasized that "[t]he bill is a step forward" because lethal injection is a
"more humane way to carry out retribution." ld. See generaly Rondon Memorandum, supra
note 244 (detailing Indiana's history, use, and misapplication of the electric chair as well as
evidence indicating electrocution's cruel and unusual effects on the human body).
813. 1878 Iowa Acts 165 § 9 (hanging).
814. 1965 Iowa Acts 435, 436 (death penalty abolished).
815. 1872 1an. Sess. Laws 166 § 2 (hanging).
816. 1907 Ran. Sess. Laws 188 §§ 1, 2 (death penalty abolished).
817. 1935 Kan. Sess. Laws 154 § 1 (death penalty reinstated); 1935 Kan. Sess. Laws 155 § 1









(hanging). In 1935, the Governor cited the "loss of lives in the state in the wave of crime" as
the reason for the state's reinstatement of the death penalty. See Galliher, supra note 282, at
571 n.240 and accompanying text (quoting a state representative introducing a death penalty
bill). There were no executions for nine years after the reinstatement. Id. at 571 n.239 and
accompanying text. However, while 43 people have been legally executed in Kansas, more
than 200 were lynched. See RamonaJones, Return to Death Row: Syinge Replaes the Rope, Wichita
Eagle-Beacon, Dec. 14, 1986, at 14A. Between 1965 and 1989, the death penalty was not
inflicted in Kansas. &,John Marshall, A His" of The Death Pal t, Parsons Sun (Kan.),Jan. 9,
1989, at 49.
818. 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 252 § 11 (lethal injection); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4001(a) (1993)
(amended 1994) (current 1996). The 1994 law was not retroactive. See 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws
252 § 25. The law also provides that
A person sentenced to death may make an anatomical gift in the manner and for
the purposes provided by the uniform anatomical gift act. To the extent deemed
practicable by the secretary of corrections, in the discretion of the secretary, a person
making such gift shall be executed in such a manner that such gift can be carried
out.
I&
819. Ky. Stat. Ann. 36 § 1137 (1894) (hanging).
820. 1910 Ky. Acts 38 § I (electrocution); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.220 (Banks-Baldwin
1992) (current 1997). The 1910 law did not apply to offenses committed before its passing.
1910 Ky. Acts 38 § 10. Notably, 1920 Ky. Acts 163 § 1, provided for public hangings for the
crime of rape. Nine men, eight of them black, were punished under this law between 1920
and 1938, when the law was repealed. See Bowers, supra note 274, at 442-45. Kentucky
conducted the last public execution (hanging) in this country on August 14, 1936. It is
estimated that 15,000 individuals observed. See Legislative Research Commission, Capital
Punishment, Research Report No. 218, at 9 (Oct. 1985) (on file with the author). Currently,
Kentucky legislators are debating whether to allow lethal injection as an alternative execution
method because injection is considered more humane than electrocution. SeeJoseph Gerth,
Lethal Injectio - Humane or Cmel?, Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 14, 1997, at 1A. "More
than likely," Kentucky will switch to lethal injection either this year or in January 1998. S
supra note 293 and accompanying text. Notably, however, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a challenge to a method of execution "is to be treated
as a habeas petition" and not "a simple 'conditions of confinement' action." In e Sapp, No.
97-5755, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1781, at *9 (6th Cir. June 27, 1997). The Sixth Circuit's
conclusion came in response to Harold McQueen's claim that Kentucky's use of electrocution
was cruel and unusual punishment Id. at *1; see also supra note 293 and accompanying text
(discussing McQueen's execution).
821. 1884 La. Acts p. 166 § 983 (hanging).
822. 1940 La. Acts 14 § 1 (electrocution). In 1932, Representatives Edmund G. Burke and
Peter A. Hand introduced a bill to switch to execution by electrocution, a method they
perceived as more humane than hanging. &e Report on Net Executon Bill, New Orleans Times-
Picayune, June 8, 1932, at 6. The 1940 electrocution law did not expressly indicate retroactive









1994-present: lethal injection (lethal injection, or lethal gas at the con-
demned's election, if the condemned's death sentence was
imposed prior to the Act's effective date; lethal injection if
the pre-enactment condemned fails to choose a method) s
operation. However, in State ex reL Pierre v. Jones, 9 So.2d 42 (La. 1942), the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that the electrocution statute should apply retroactively to those who had been
sentenced to hang, emphasizing that "electrocution is recognized as a more humane and less
painful manner or means of carrying out the death penalty than by hanging." Id. at 43. See
also Helen Prejean, Dead Man Walking- An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the
United States 18 (1993) (noting that Louisiana switched from hanging because it considered
electrocution "more humane and efficient).
823. 1990 La. Acts 717 § I (lethal injection); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:569(A-B) (West
1991) (current 1997). "A. Every sentence of death executed in this State prior to September
15, 1991, shall be by electrocution .... B. Every sentence of death executed on or after
September 15, 1991, shall be by lethal injection." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:569 (A-B) (current
1997). Publication of post electrocution photographs of Robert Wayne Williams and Wayne
Robert Felde in The Angoite contributed to Louisiana's ban on electrocution and the state's
adoption of lethal injection. See supra app. 2A (Electrocution: Robert Wayne Williams, Wayne
Robert Felde) (describing accounts of the botched electrocutions of Robert Wayne Williams
and Wayne Robert Felde in Te Angolite). The legislature had failed to pass prior attempts to
replace electrocution with lethal injection. SeU. Press Int'l (Sept. 12, 1984).
824. Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, 168 § 10 (1841) (hanging). As early as 1821, murderers,
arsonists, rapists, burglars, and robbers could be hanged. In 1829, rapists, burglars, and
robbers could no longer be executed. In 1876, the death penalty in Maine was abolished
altogether, but was reinstated for murder in 1883 before being permanently abolished in
1887. See Letter from the Law and Legislative Reference Library of Maine, to Prof. Deborah
Denno (Aug. 3, 1993) (on file with the author).
825. 1887 Me. Laws 133 (death penalty abolished).
826. 1809 Md. Laws 138 § 16 (hanging).
827. 1955 Md. Laws 625 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1955 law did not apply to offenses
committed prior to June 1, 1955 (one year before the Act's effective date ofJune 1, 1956). 1&
§§ 2-3.
828. 1994 Md. Laws 5 § 1 (lethal injection); 1994 Md. Laws 5 § 2 (lethal injection, or
lethal gas at the condemned's election, if the condemned's death sentence was imposed prior
to the Act's effective date; lethal injection if the pre-enactment condemned fails to choose a
method); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 71 (1957) (amended 1994) (current 1996); Md. Ann.
Code art. 27, § 627 (1957) (amended 1994) (current 1996). &ee supra notes 292-98 (discussing
Maryland's switch from lethal gas to lethal injection). All Maryland pre-enactment prisoners
electing to be executed by lethal gas were required to provide a written request for lethal gas
within 60 days after the Act's effective date of March 25, 1994. Their right to a lethal gas
execution would be waived if they made no such timely request. See 1994 Md. Laws 5 § 2.
Currently, no prisoner now on Maryland's death row elected lethal gas by May 24, 1994, the
[1997]





1975-1981: death penalty judicially abolished"'1
1982-present electrocution or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; electrocution if the condemned fails to choose a
method 2
1984-present: death penaltyjudidally abolished"
MICHIGAN (MI)
1816-1845: hanginge
1846-present: no death penaltys
last day of the election period. Therefore, Maryland's pre-enactment choice provision no
longer has practical significance. Gregory Hunt, who was recently executed, did request a
lethal gas execution on May 24, 1994, even though he subsequently changed to lethal
injection. Se Telephone Interview with Denise Charlotte Barrett, Asst. Federal Public
Defender, Baltimore, Md. (July 25, 1997). In Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Maryland's choice provision did not violate the
Eighth Amendment, thus discounting Hunt's claim that "forcing a person to choose the
method of his execution is cruelly inhumane." Id. at 1337. The court further rejected Hunt's
contention that Maryland's provision required a choice between two cruel and unusual
methods. Id. Upon holding that lethal gas was not a cruel and unusual method (even though
it "may not be the most humane method"), the court did not have to address Hunt's
challenge to lethal injection. Hunt had already selected lethal gas, a constitutional method. Id
at 1337-38.
829. Mass. Rev. Stat. 139 § 13 (1835) (hanging).
830. 1898 Mass. Acts 326 § 6 (electrocution). The 1898 law did not apply to persons
sentenced to death for offenses committed prior to the effective date of the Act. Id. § 8. In In
re Storti, 60 N.E. 210 (Mass. 1901), Chief'Justice Holmes explained that the legislature changed
from hanging to electrocution "for the purpose of reaching the end proposed as swiftly and as
painlessly as possible." Id at 210.
831. In Commonwealth v. O'Nea, 339 N.E.2d 676, 687-88 (Mass. 1975), and Commonwealth v.
Harington, 323 N.E.2d 895, 901 (Mass. 1975), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
struck down the death penalty statute as unconstitutional.
832. 1982 Mass. Acts 554 § 6 (electrocution or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; electrocution if the condemned fails to choose a method). The 1982 law did not
apply to offenses committed prior to the effective date of the Act, January 1, 1983. Id § 8.
833. In Commonwealth v. Coon.Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984), the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts again declared the state's death penalty statute unconstitutional. Id. at
119-34. While the death penalty statute remains on the books, it is effectively abolished.
Furthermore, no one has been executed in Massachusetts since 1949. See High Court Will Be
Asked For Ruling on Death Penalty Law, Boston Globe, May 6, 1984, at 31; Jeremy Crockford,
Death Penalty Vote Sought Patriot Ledger, Aug. 3, 1995, at 1. Whether this situation will change
in the future remains to be seen. S id.; Nat Hentoff, Death Penalty Tears Up a State, Rocky
Mountain News, July 31, 1995, at 28A (Editorial).
834. 1816 Mich. Terr. Laws p. 134 § 64 (hanging).
835. Mich. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, ch. 153, § 1 (1846) (abolishing the death penalty); Mich.
Const. art. IV, § 46 (1963) ("No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death.");
Mich. Comp. Laws art. 4 § 46 (West 1967) (establishing in the state constitution a legislative
ban on the death penalty and indicating that the ban dated back to 1846). The 1846 abolition
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MEVAEOTA (M O
1905-1910: hanging MM
1911-present: no death penaltye
MISSISSIPPI (MS)
1906-1939: hanging
1940-1953: electrocution (electrocution or hanging at the condemned's
election if the condemned's death sentence was imposed
prior to the Act's effective date; hanging if the condemned
fails to choose a method)89
1954-1983: lethal gas (lethal gas or electrocution at the condemned's
election if the condemned's death sentence was imposed
prior to the Act's effective date; electrocution if the
condemned fails to choose a method) °
did not apply to the crime of treason because treason is a federal offense; therefore, Michigan
is considered to have had no death penalty since 1846. The treason exception was removed in
1963. Sm Bowers, supra note 274, at 9 n.b; see generay James R. Lincoln, The Everlasting
Controversy: Mihigan and the Death Penaty, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1765 (1987) (discussing the
history and conflict surrounding the death penalty and its abolition in Michigan). In 1846,
Michigan became the first state to abolish the death penalty (after having entered the Union
In 1837). See id. at 1775-77. For 116 years, from 1847 to 1963, the death penalty was banned
by an act of the Michigan legislature. In 1963, however, a ban was put into effect by the
Michigan constitution. The 1963 ban requires that the state's constitution be amended before
the death penalty could return to Michigan. See id. at 1787.
836. Minn. Rev. Laws 104 § 5419 (1905) (banging). Capital punishment in Minnesota
originated in 1849, when an Act of Congress created the Minnesota Territory. SeeJohn D.
Bessler, The 'Midnight Assassination Law" and Minnesotas Anti.Death Penaly Movement, 1849-
1911, 22 Win. Mitchell L Rev. 577, 583 (1996). On December 29, 1854, the new Territory
experienced Its first hanging-a Dakota Indian named U-ha-zy. Id. The boisterous mob that
attended U.ha-zy's hanging reportedly left the scene afterwards "satisfied and in high glee." Id.
at 585. The last hanging in Minnesota occurred in 1906. See Galliher et aL, supra note 282, at
553. Because the rope was too long, the prisoner reached the ground. Id. Consequently,
officials had to hold the prisoner's feet off the ground for fourteen and one-half minutes
while he choked to death. Id. at 553 n.110 and accompanying text. This "gruesome, slow
death... began a six-year movement in the Minnesota Legislature to abolish the death
penalty, which finally succeeded in 1911." See Grant Moos, Newspaper Details of 1906 Hanging
Made It State's Last, Star Trib., Mar. 26, 1992, at 19A.
837. 1911 Minn. Laws 387 § 1 (death penalty abolished).
838. Miss. Code Ann. tit. 31, ch. 168 § 11 (1906) (hanging); see also Bowers, supra note
274, at 11 (noting that Mississippi had the death penalty since at least 1872).
839. 1940 Miss. Laws 242 §1 (electrocution); 1940 Miss. Laws 242 § 8 (electrocution or
hanging at the condemned's election if the condemned's death sentence was imposed prior
to the Act's effective date; hanging if the condemned fails to choose a method). In Childress v.
State I So.2d 494 (Miss. 1941), the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that, where the
defendant chose electrocution before the electric chair had been installed, resentencing the
defendant to be executed on a later date was not a violation of his due process rights. See id.
at 494-95.
840. 1954 Miss. Laws 220 § 1 (lethal gas); id. § 4 (lethal gas or electrocution at the
condemned's election if the condemned's death sentence was imposed prior to the Act's
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1984-present: lethal injection (lethal gas if the condemned's death








1983-present: hanging or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
hanging if the condemned fails to choose a method
effective date; electrocution if the condemned fails to choose a method). The 1954 law stated
that "in all cases where sentence of death was imposed prior to the passage of this Act, the
one so sentenced shall have the choice of receiving the death penalty under this act or as
provided by law prior to the date of the passage of this act." Id. § 4. The Act took effect on
December 31, 1954. Id. § 7.
841. 1984 Miss. Laws 448 § 2 (lethal injection; lethal gas if the condemned's death
sentence was imposed prior to the Act's effective date); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51(l) (1972)
(amended 1994) (current 1996). The 1984 law did not apply to those inmates sentenced prior
to the laws effective date of July 1, 1984. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51(2) (1972) (amended
1994) (current 1996). Only three death row inmates are currently required to be executed by
lethal gas. See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text. A 1994 law provided that "the
Commissioner [of Corrections] may donate the unclaimed body of an executed person to the
University of Mississippi Medical Center for scientific purposes." 1994 Miss. Laws 479 § 2.
842. Mo. Rev. Stat. 214 § 27 (1866) (hanging).
843. 1937 Mo. Laws p. 222 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1937 law did not expressly indicate
retroactive operation. However, in State v. Brochngtot, 162 S.W. 2d 860 (Mo. 1942), the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the lethal gas statute should apply retroactively to those
sentenced to hanging. See id. at 860-61. When asked about his views concerning the state's
forthcoming lethal gas bill, Roscoe "Red" Jackson, the last person to be hanged in Missouri,
stated that, "[firom the viewpoint of the condemned man that would be an improvement, but
from the viewpoint of society, I think the example of a public hanging is better."Jackson's Last
to Die by Rope, Leader & Press (Springfield, Mo.), May 21, 1937, at 1.
844. 1988 Mo. Laws p. 985 § A (lethal gas or lethal injection; statute leaves unclear at
whose election); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 546.720 (1988) (current 1996). The 1988 law did not
expressly indicate retroactive operation. In addition, the 1988 law states only that "[t]he man-
ner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by the administration of lethal gas or by
means of the administration of lethal injection." Id. It thus leaves unclear who decides what
method of execution to use. In practice, the Director of the Missouri Department of
Corrections decides which method to use for an execution. Lethal injection is the Director's
method of choice now and for the foreseeable future because the gas chamber is not
appropriately equipped. See Telephone Interview with Tun Kniest, Public Information Officer,
Missouri Dep't of Corrections (July 28, 1997).
845. Mont. Code tit. VIII, ch. 2, § 2255 (1895) (hanging).
846. 1983 Mont. Laws 411 § 4 (hanging or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
hanging if the condemned fails to choose a method); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(3) (1983)
(amended 1989) (current 1995).







1912-1920: hanging or firing squad at the condemned's election; the
court's choice if the condemned fails to choose a
method'
1921-1982: lethal gasss1
1983-present: lethal injection 2
847. Neb. Comp. Stat. 51 § 7276 (1895) (hanging). In 1905, Frank Barker built an
electrical hanging device that enabled him to spring the trap door at his own execution. See
Will Execute Himself 4 an Ingenious Eectical Device of His Ow Design, Popular Mechanics, June
1905, at 712. Apparently, the warden approved of this scheme and allowed Barker to proceed.
ICL
848. 1913 Neb. Laws 82 § I (electrocution); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2532 (1943) (electrocu-
tion) (current 1996). The 1913 law did not apply to offenses committed prior to its effective
date. 1913 Neb. Laws 32 § 1. On June 25, 1959, five separate 2200 voltjolts were administered
before Charles Starkweather was pronounced dead by the attending physician. See Del
Harding, KilerExXUte4 Morning Star, June 25, 1959, at 1. Recently, Senator Ernie Chambers
called electrocution a "high tech burning at the stake." Eaecution by Eectwcution: Is It Humane
or CrulDeath, Sunday World-Herald, July 12, 1992, at 4B.
849. Nev. Gen. Stat. Ann. 21 § 4348 (1885) (hanging).
850. Nev. Rev. Stat. p. 2039 § 7281 (1912) (hanging or firing squad at the condemned's
election; the court's choice if the condemned fails to choose a method). The 1912 law did
not expressly indicate retroactive operation. In 1912, Andrija Mirkovitch chose the firing
squad as his method of execution. See Phillip L Earl, Nevada's Execution Machine The
Nebadan, Dec. 3, 1972, at 3. However, several guards were reluctant, or flatly refused, to carry
out the sentence because they thought it was too similar to cold-blooded murder. Id. When
word of this reluctance was revealed, volunteers from all over the world wrote to Nevada's
warden. The warden tried to convince Mirkovitch to consent to hanging, but Mirkovitch
refused. Mirkovitch was finally killed by a 1000 pound execution machine that fired three
mounted rifles upon the cutting of three strings, only two of which fired the weapons with
real bullets. Thus, the three "executioners" never even had to see their victim. Id. Although
the machine performed successfully, it was never used again. Id.
851. 1921 Nev. Stat. 246 § 1 (lethal gas). In 1921, in an attempt to prove the state
humane, the Nevada legislature passed a law providing that lethal gas was to be administered
"without warning and while [the inmate was] asleep in his cell." Bowers, supra note 274, at 12.
This procedure was never followed, however, because it was impossible to release the gas in a
regular cell. Id. Yet, in State v. GeeJon, 211 P. 676 (Nev. 1923), the Nevada Supreme Court em-
phasized that the legislature "sought to provide a method of inflicting the death penalty in
the most humane manner known to modem science." Id. at 682. The legislature evaluated,
but rejected, hanging, shooting, and electrocution in favor of lethal gas. Id. The 1921 lethal
gas law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation.
852. 1983 Nev. Stat. 601 § 1 (lethal injection); Nev. Rev. Stat. 176 § 176.355(1) (1983)
(amended 1995) (current 1995). The 1983 law did not expressly indicate retroactive
operation. Nevada finally turned to lethal injection because injection was considered "more
humane, cheaper and safer for the witnesses." Ryan, supra note 450, at 40.
[1997]




1986-present lethal injection at the election of the commissioner of




1983-present: lethal injectione 7
853. N.H. Pub. Stat. 255 § 6 (1891) (hanging). See Bowers, supra note 274, at 453
(providing information on executions in New Hampshire as early as 1869).
854. 1986 N.H. Laws § 82:1 (lethal injection at the election of the commissioner of
corrections; hanging if injection is "impractical"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(XIII-XV)
(1986) (current 1996). The 1986 law stated that "[t]his act shall apply to all executions
carried out on or after January 1, 1987, irrespective of the date sentence was imposed." 1986
N.H. Laws § 82:2.
855. 1898 N.J. Laws p. 237 § 127 (hanging).
856. 1906 N.J. aws 79 § 1 (electrocution). The 1906 law went into effect on March 1,
1907, and applied only to crimes committed after that date. Id. § 14. For example, there was a
hanging in NewJersey as late as 1909. See Bowers, supra note 274, at 457 n.L In State v. Tomas
69 A. 214 (N.J. 1908), the Court of Errors and Appeals in NewJersey noted that the switch to
electrocution was to "mitigate the pain and suffering of the convict." Id. at 217-18. The court
relied, in part, on the fact that the Court of Appeals of New York had sustained a similar
statute in PeopLe v. Durston, 24 NXE. 6 (N.Y. 1890), and People v. Kemmier, 24 N.E. 9 (N.Y. 1890).
A 1907 editorial in the Newark Evening New; arguing for the switch to electrocution, stated
that:
The change from the rope to electricity was made in the interests of decency and
humanity. Choking a man to death is believed to prolong his agony unnecessarily,
but the action of the electric current is instantaneous, and therefore, in the general
belief, painless. If the death penalty must be inflicted the quickest way is best. New
York State has had many executions by the new swift method, and no such bungling
as sometimes happens at hangings has occurred since the electric chair was adopted.
Editorial, Newark Evening News, Mar. 4, 1907, at 6; see also Erwin L Feiertag, Capital Pun-
ishment in New Jersey. 1664-1950, A Study of Change 54 (1951) (unpublished thesis, MA.
Political Science, Columbia University) (on file with Columbia University Library) (discussing
the change from hanging to electrocution).
857. 1983 N.J. Laws 245 (lethal injection); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C.49-2 (West 1983) (Supp.
1995) (current 1996). The switch to lethal injection in 1983 was propelled by a memorandum
written for NewJersey Governor Tom Kean by Steven L. Carnes, Esq. See Norman, supra note
426, at B6. The memorandum included graphic accounts of the long drop method of
hanging, firing squads where bullets miss the condemned's heart, disfigurement caused by
electrocution, and "the sight of a person struggling for breath in the gas chamber." Id.
Electrocution in particular would lead to "distasteful pain and suffering." Id. Governor Kean
said he considered lethal injection "the most humane form of capital punishment." Joseph F.
Sullivan, Senate in NewJersey Backs ExeFuion Using Injections, N.Y. Tunes, June 17, 1983, at B1.
However, some commentators emphasized the difficulties associated with lethal injection.
Colman McCarthy, Killing With Kindness, Wash. Post, June 11, 1983, at 1. The 1983 law did not
expressly indicate retroactive operation.
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1965-1973: no death penalty (except for the murders of peace officers
engaged in their duties or for the murders committed by
prisoners serving a term of life imprisonment)"
1974-1994: electrocutions
1977-1983: part of the mandatory death penalty judicially abolished'
1984-1994: remainder of the mandatory death penalty judicially
abolisheds"
858. 1880 N.M. Laws p. 254 § 6 (hanging). New Mexico entered the Union on January 6,
1912. See The World Almanac, supra note 271, at 542.
859. 1929 N.M. Laws 69 § 11 (electrocution). The 1929 law did not expressly indicate
retroactive operation. However, in Woo Dak San v. Star4 7 P.2d 940 (N.M. 1931), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that the new law substituted electrocution for hanging as the
method of execution, even for those individuals under a sentence of hanging on the effective
date of the statute. See id. at 941.
860. 1955 N.M. Laws 127 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1955 law did not apply to capital offenses
committed prior to the Act's effective date. Id. § 3.
861. 1979 N.M. Laws 150 § 8 (lethal injection); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-14-11 (Michie 1978)
(current 1996). The 1979 law did not apply to capital offenses committed prior to the Act's
effective date ofJuly 1, 1979. See 1979 N.M. Laws 150 § 10.
862. 1886 N.Y. Laws 19 (Act passed on Mar. 30, 1778) (hanging). For an account of the
history of capital punishment in New York and the events that led to the abolition of hanging,
see Denno, supra note 5 at 562-77.
863. 1888 N.Y. Laws 489 § 5 (electrocution). In 1886, Governor David B. Hill appointed a
commission to find a method of execution that was "more humane than hanging." Denno,
supra note 5, at 566-67. The 1888 law switching to electrocution did not apply to any offenses
committed prior to the Act's effective date. See id. at 573 (noting that under New York's
Electrical Execution Act, anyone convicted of a capital crime after january 1, 1989, would be
electrocuted rather than hanged).
864. 1965 N.Y. Laws 321 § I (death penalty partially abolished). The 1965 statute
abolished the death penalty except for the murders of peace officers engaged in their duties
or for the murders committed by prisoners serving a term of life imprisonment. Id.
865. 1974 N.Y. Laws 367 § 2 (death penalty reinstated; electrocution). The 1974 statute
reinstated the death penalty and made the penalty mandatory for murderers of police officers
or prison workers and for murders committed by inmates serving a term of life imprisonment.
Id.
866. In People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1977), the New York Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional the statutes that imposed mandatory death sentences for certain enumerated
crimes. See id. at 463-64.
867. In People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1984), the New York Court of Appeals
Invalidated the last remaining mandatory death penalty provision, which imposed the death
sentence for murder by an inmate serving a term of life imprisonment. See id. at 896-98.




1883-1908: hanging 8 9
1909-1934: electrocution" °
1935-1982: lethal gas
868. 1995 N.Y. laws 1 § 32 (lethal injection); N.Y. Correct. Law § 658 (Mcinney 1995)
(current 1997); The Death Penalty Debates, New York State (NYS) Assembly (Mar. 6, 1995)
(Record of Proceedings) [hereinafter NYS Dealth Penalty Debates]. According to 1995 N.Y.
Laws I § 38, "[tlhis act shall take effect on [Sept. 1, 1995] and shall apply only to offenses
committed on or after such date." From 1977 to 1995, efforts to pass a new death penalty
measure consistently failed due to the inability (and sometimes unwillingness) of the New
York State Assembly to join the State Senate in overriding numerous gubernatorial vetoes. Se
Dale M. Volker (New York State Senator), Chronology of Death Penalty, Mar. 1993
(memorandum on file with the author). This circumstance changed in 1995 when the death
penalty in New York was once again enacted. See New York Enacts Capital Punishmen Nat'l UJ.,
Mar. 27, 1995, at AS. Early on, Senator Dale M. Volker suggested that the state would use
lethal injection rather than electrocution because lethal injection was perceived "as a less-cruel
method of execution than strapping someone into an electric chair with no certainty that the
result would be quick." Dan Herbeck, Electia Chair Unhely jfDeath Penaly Returns, BU News,
Dec. 27, 1994, at 1; see also New Law on Death Penalty is Reasonable Compromise,; Hedges Ultimate
Punishment with Safeguards, Bufl News, Mar. 8, 1995, at 2 ("Death will be by lethal injection, a
more humane method of execution than the electric chair."). Several times during the course
of the New York State Assembly's 1995 debates concerning New York's re-enactment of the
death penalty, representatives expressed their differing views on the humaneness of lethal
injection. See generay NYS Death Penalty Debates, supra, at 68-609. For example, Assemblyman
Philip M. Boyle stated that he was "happy that Governor Pataki ha[d] decided to use lethal
injection," in light of Boyle's opportunity to witness a lethal injection execution in Texas. Id
at 261. As Boyle explained, "[firom the moment that the injection starts.., the prisoner is
dead within five seconds. He will cough once or twice and then a blast of air, and [he's]
gone. As far as I could tell, [the Texas execution] was very painless and over quickly." Id. On
the other hand, Assemblyman Alexander B. Grannis contended that "Mr. Boyle must have
been in Texas on a good day because there have been bad days in Texas when things didn't
go so well." I- at 325. Grannis also elicited testimony that the technician administering lethal
injections in New York would not be required to have "any particular special license in a
healthcare profession." Id. at 323. Grannis emphasized that none of the execution methods
currently used in the United States has ever worked properly, including lethal injection. Id. at
323-24 (referring to a number of botched lethal injections in Texas). As Assemblyman
Michael A. Balboni contended, however, the "perception" was that lethal injection involved
"less pain" and was "somewhat less cruel" than electrocution. Id at 364. See Pamela Katz, Death
Penalty is Unacetable Human Behavior, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), Feb. 26, 1995, at El
(contending that the state is "choosing lethal injection instead of the electric chair in an
attempt to sidestep the state constitution's ban against cruel and unusual punishment").
869. N.C. Code 26 § 1243 (1883) (providing for private execution); N.C. Code p. 861,
Index (1883) (hanging).
870. 1909 N.C. Sess. Laws 443 § 1 (electrocution). The 1909 law did not apply to crimes
committed before the law's effective date.
871. 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 294 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1935 law did not apply to crimes
committed before its effective date. See State v. Brice, 197 S.E. 690, 691 (N.C. 1938) (noting
that because the crime occurred before the enactment of the 1935 statute, the defendant
would be administered electrocution rather than lethal gas); State v. Hester, 182 S.E. 738, 740-
41 (N.C. 1935) (indicating that the language concerning which offenses pertained to the 1935
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1983-present: lethal gas, or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
lethal gas if the condemned fails to choose a methode 2
NORTH DAKOTA (ND)
1895-1914: hanginge5
1915-1972: no death penalty (except for first degree murder committed
by a prisoner serving a life sentence for first degree
murder)04




1993-present: electrocution, or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; electrocution if the condemned fails to choose a
methodP8
act was Identical to, and modelled from, the 1909 statute). Pressure for a more humane meth-
od of execution prompted the 1935 switch to lethal gas. See Guy Munger, The Grim Histoy of
N.. Exeeutions, News and Observer Perspective, Mar. 4, 1984, at 8D.
872. 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 678 § 1 (lethal gas, or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; lethal gas if the condemned fails to choose a method); N.C. Gen. Stat § 15-187
(1983) (current 1996). It seems that the 1983 law did not apply to crimes committed before
the statute's effective date. While debating the 1983 bill to provide for the choice of lethal
Injection, Representative John W. Varner, a physician, said:
There's no doubt about it Death in a gas chamber is a horrible death. You're
strapped in a little room. For many minutes, not a few, he's struggling, trying to
breathe and all he can breathe is gas. With lethal injection, he feels no pain. It's like
going Into an operating room and going to sleep. He passes away with no struggle.
Munger, supra note 871, at ID.
873. N.D. Rev. Code § 8319 (1895) (hanging).
874. 1915 N.D. Laws 63 § I (death penalty partially abolished). The 1915 abolition bill
Included an emergency clause to prevent the hanging of a man already on death row. Se id. §
4. The bill did not abolish the death penalty for first degree murder committed by a prisoner
serving a life sentence for first degree murder. See id. § 1; see also Galliher et aL, supra note
282, at 555-56 (discussing the death penalty in North Dakota).
875. 1973 N.D. Laws 116 § 41 (death penalty abolished). The 1973 law abolished the
death penalty for all crimes.
876. 1835 Ohio Acts p. 41 § 40 ("An Act Providing for the Punishment of Crimes")
(hanging); see also Webster v. State, 4 N.E. 92, 93-94 (Ohio 1885) (providing a brief history of
hanging legislation in Ohio).
877. 1896 Ohio Laws p. 159 § 1 (electrocution). This law applied only to crimes
committed from and after July 1, 1896. Id. § 5.
878. 1993 Ohio Laws 38 § 1 (electrocution, or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; electrocution if the condemned fails to choose a method); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2949.22(A-B) (Banks-Baldwin 1993) (amended 1994) (current 1997). The 1993 law did not
expressly Indicate retroactive operation. The push to change Ohio's execution method law
began in 1985, when Republican State Representative John Galbraith contended that "'death
by lethal injection is a more humane method, that is quick and painless, and the cost is
minimal.'" U. Press Int'l (Feb. 6, 1985). Although the lethal injection bill was passed by both
Houses in 1989, it was vetoed by then-Governor Richard F. Celeste, a death penalty opponent,









1914-1919: no death penalty
who claimed lethal injection was a "facade to make people feel more comfortable about
capital punishment." Lee Leonard, New Law Permits Execution by Lethal Injection, Colum. Disp.,
July 7, 1993, at 6D. After the state legislature passed the 1993 bill, Representative Ronald M.
Mottl stated that lethal injection was a "much more humane way of executing an individual"
than electrocution. Lee Leonard &James Bradshaw, House Okhs Bill Giving Condemned Choice in
Execution, Colum. Disp., Mar. 25, 1993, at 4D. However, Representative Otto Beatty, Jr., said
that offering the choice to the condemned is to "ease our own consciousness [sic].... This
doesn't make it any easier on anybody except us." Id. Notably, the 1993 law states that "[n]o
change in the law made by this amendment constitutes a declaration by or belief of the
general assembly that execution of a death sentence by electrocution is a cruel and unusual
punishment." 1993 Ohio Laws 38 § 1. However, the law also states, in the section regarding
choice of method of execution, that "the person's death sentence shall be executed by
causing the application to the person of a lethal injection of a drug or combination of drugs
of sufficient dosage to quickly and painlessly cause death instead of by electrocution as
described in division (A) of this section." Id The electrocution statute does not specify that
the execution should be quick or painless.
879. Okla. Terr. Stat 72 § 40 (1890) (hanging).
880. 1913 Okla. Sess. Laws 113 § 1 (electrocution). The 1913 law did not expressly
indicate retroactive operation. For a discussion of the construction and early uses of
Oklahoma's electric chair, see Bob Gregory, T76 Died for Teir Sins, Okla. Monthly, Nov. 1979,
at 73.
881. 1951 Okla. Sess. Laws 17 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1951 law provided that the method of
execution would be electrocution until a lethal gas chamber was built. I& Electrocution was
used in Oklahoma as late as 1966. Bowers, supra note 274, at 486.
882. 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws 41 § 1 (lethal injection); Okla. Stat tit. 22, § 1014(A) (1977)
(current 1996). Oklahoma was the first state to institute lethal injection. State Senator Bill
Dawson introduced the idea and consulted Stanley Deutsch, then Chief of Anesthesiology at
the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center. Don Colbum, Oklahoma Was the Frst,
Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1990, at Z14. Deutsch assured Dawson that lethal injection was "[w]ithout
question ... extremely humane in comparison to... electrocution." Id. Deutsch stated that
"[f]rom what I had heard of electrocution, it was pretty grotesque, with eyeballs popping out
of their sockets and smoke coming out of the head helmet It seemed to me a lethal injection
would be much more humane. I thought it was a pretty good idea, myself." Id.; see also supra
notes 320-21 and accompanying text (discussing the communications between Dawson and
Deutsch, and the impetus behind the introduction of lethal injection). Nancy Nunnally, a
spokesperson for the Oklahoma Corrections Department, confirmed that the state changed to
lethal injection for "humane" reasons. As she explained, "'[pleople don't realize it, but the
electric chair can take 11 minutes to kill people. The first shock knocks you unconscious, but
then it would just cook you. You would literally fry.'" Mary Thornton, Death by Injection, Wash.
Post, Oct. 6, 1981, atAl. The 1977 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation.
883. 1874 Or. Laws p. 115 § I (hanging).
884. 1915 Or. Laws 92 § 1 (abolishing the death penalty); 1915 Or. Laws p. 12
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1920-1936: reinstated but method unknown (hanging presumed)m
1937-1963: lethal gasm
1964-1977: no death penalty8 "
1978-1983: lethal gas8






(constitutional amendment) (stating that Oregon voters abolished capital punishment by 157
votes In 1914, when the abolition took effect).
885. 1920 Or. Laws 19 § 1, 21 § I (death penalty reinstated). Between 1920 and 1937, the
method of inflicting the death penalty was not made clear in the statutes. This ambiguity,
however, was apparently not a bar to inflicting the death penalty. See Bowers, supra note 274,
at 489. According to the governor at the time, the 1920 reinstatement was due to a nation-
wide crime wave that Oregon had experienced and that had spurred its residents to demand"greater and more certain protection." Galliher et al., supra note 282, at 569.
886. 1937 Or. Laws 274 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1937 law did not apply to offenses committed
prior to Its effective date. Id. § 2. In 1937, "[t]he electric chair was ruled out [as a possible
method] because there were too many cases of men being inadvertently tortured by the
current before they died. The unavoidable odor of burning flesh was also a mark against it."
Dick Pintarich & Ray Stout, In Hard 7mes, Capital Punishment Makes a Comebac. Exedion Oregon
Syl Oregon Times Mag., June 1977, at 25.
887. 1964 Or. Laws p. 6 art. I (Capital Punishment Bill) (death penalty abolished).
888. 1979 Or. Laws 2 § 3 (death penalty reinstated) (Act effective on Dec. 7, 1978); 1979
Or. Laws 2 § 7 (lethal gas); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.116 (1978) (death penalty reinstated).
889. In State v. Quinn, 623 P.2d 630 (Or. 1981), the Supreme Court of Oregon declared
the death penalty statute unconstitutional. Se id. at 639-44. The statute did not operate for
three years.
890. 1984 Or. Laws 3 § 7 (lethal injection); Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473(1) (1985) (current
1996). The 1984 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation.
891. 1860 Pa. Laws p. 402 tit. vi § 75 (hanging). In 1911, Pennsylvania established a three-
person commission to "investigate the method of inflicting the death penalty... and to
recommend... [a] new method." 1911 Pa. Laws p. 1158 no. 65. For an account of hangings
and electrocutions in Pennsylvania, see generaly Negley K Teeters, Scaffold and Chair. A
Compilation of Their Use in Pennsylvania, 1682-1962 (1963).
892. 1913 Pa. Laws 338 § 1 (electrocution). The 1913 law did not apply to offenses
committed prior to its approval date. Id. § 11. The legislature switched to electrocution
because it was allegedly more humane than hanging. SeeJohn Watson, The Strange Life of Reily,
True Detective, May 1943, at 25, 26.
893. 1990 Pa. Laws p. 572, no. 1990-145, § 1 (lethal injection); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, §
2121.1 (West 1990) (amended 1995) (current 1996). The 1990 law did not indicate
retroactive operation. State Senator Richard Snyder, one of the sponsors of the lethal
Injection bill, witnessed an electrocution in the late 1930s. Lawmakers Propose Execution by Lethal
Injection, U. Press Int'l (July 25, 1983). He concluded that "the electric chair is a brutal way to
kill someone." IL Representative James Barber said he introduced the bill because he was"appalled" at an earlier botched electrocution in Alabama. Id. Contending that "'death in
itself is enough of a punishment,'" Barber emphasized that "'electrocution only makes it even
more Inhumane.'" Id.
1997]





1979-1983: mandatory death enaltyjudicially abolished9




1995-present electrocution, or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; lethal injection if the postenactment condemned
fails to choose a method; electrocution if the pre-enactment
condemned fails to choose a method9 '9
894. 1822 R.L Pub. Laws p. 353 § 63 (hanging). Rhode Island carried out its last hanging
in 1845. The 1896 law made the death penalty mandatory for persons who murdered while
under a sentence of imprisonment for life. The law did not expressly indicate retroactive
operation. Hanging was the only method ever used. See Bowers, supra note 274, at 13 n.a.
895. 1973 R.L Pub. Laws 280 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1973 law made the death penalty
mandatory for persons who murdered while confined in an adult correctional institution or
the state reformatory for women. The law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation. Id.
§2.
896. In State v. Cline 397 A.2d 1309 (R.L 1979), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
declared the state's mandatory death penalty unconstitutional. See id. at 1309-11.
897. 1984 R.L Pub. Laws 221 § I (death penalty abolished).
898. S.C. Code p. 446, Punishment (1841) (hanging) ("on the conviction of a slave or free
person of color, for a capital offense"). See also F. Carlisle Roberts, Law and theJudidaiy, in
Columbia: Capital City of South Carolina, 1786-1936, at 161, 168 (Helen Kohn Hennig ed.,
1936) (noting that prior to 1868, executions were by hanging, "which might take place under
any convenient tree"; from 1868 to 1912, hangings were conducted in the county jail or
jailyard); J.F. Williams, Old and New Columbia 40-48, 102-33 (1929) (describing hangings in
Columbia, South Carolina, during the 1800s).
899. 1912 S.C. Acts 402 § 1 (electrocution).
900. 1995 S.C. Acts 83 § 25; S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530 (A-B) (Law Co-op. 1993) (amended
1995) (current 1996) (electrocution, or lethal injection at the condemned's election; lethal
injection if the postenactment condemned fails to choose a method; electrocution if the pre-
enactment condemned fails to choose a method). South Carolina's choice act became
effective on June 8, 1995. See 1995 S.C. Acts 108 § 2. Currently, there are 53 pre-enactment
condemned inmates on South Carolina's death row, and 16 postenactment condemned
inmates. Telephone Interview withJoan Wood, Administrative Specialist, South Carolina Dep't
of Corrections (July 28, 1997). According to State Representative Harry M. Hallman, a
sponsor of the lethal injection bill, lethal injection is a more humane method of execution
than electrocution. See Sid Gaulden, Bill Would Let Inmates Chwose Method of Death, Post &
Courier (Charleston, S.C.), Mar. 1, 1995, at A13 ("When people refer to a death sentence
being carried out in the electric chair, they talk about a person jerking back and the smell of
flesh. And they describe it as the most horrible thing in the world. Lethal injection is a little
more humane."). Another sponsor, State Representative Joyce Hear, contended that "[being
strapped in an electric chair, given jolts of electricity with a black cap over your head, I just
think we have evolved past that." Bill Would Replace Electrocution With Lethal Injection, U. Press
Int'l (Feb. 23, 1985).










1915-1916: no death penalty (except for the crime of rape and for
convicts serving life terms convicted of any offense





901. S.D. Terr. Rev. Code p. 902 § 467 (1877) (hanging).
902. 1915 S.D. Laws 158 §§ 1-3 (death penalty abolished).
903. 1939 S.D. Laws 30 § 1 (death penalty reinstated); 1939 S.D. Laws 135 § 11 (electrocu-
tion). The 1939 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation. During World War II, it
was impossible to get materials for an electric chair, so several death sentences were
commuted. See Bowers, supra note 274, at 502.
904. 1984 S.D. Laws 181 (lethal injection); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-32 (Michie 1984)
(current 1997). The 1984 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation.
905. Tenn. Code 2 § 4601 (1858) (hanging).
906. 1913 Tenn. Pub. Acts 36 § 1 (first executive session) (electrocution). Although the
1913 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
held that the law should be retroactive. See Shipp v. State, 172 S.W. 317, 318 (Tenn. 1914)
(holding that the legislature intended that the death penalty be imposed "by means of
electrocution In all cases where the sentence of death was pronounced after the act of 1913
went Into effect, without regard to whether the crime was committed before or after the
passage of the act.")
907. 1915 Tenn. Pub. Acts 181 § 1 (death penalty partially abolished); Tenn. Code 15 §
7204a3 (1918) (citing the 1915 Act). The 1915 law did not abolish the death penalty for the
crime of rape or for convicts serving life terms convicted of any offense previously punishable
by death. In Datuson v. Bomar, 354 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1962), the court held there was no bar
to Inflicting the death penalty even though the law designating electrocution as the method of
execution was passed by a state legislature that had not yet reapportioned itself in accordance
with the constitution. Se id at 766-67. Since the law designating capital punishment for rape
had been In effect since 1871 and had not been abolished in 1915 along with the law
designating capital punishment for murder, the prisoner's conviction was still valid. See i
While the method of execution was arguably invalid, the petitioner was barred from arguing
that on appeal as he had neglected to do so in the trial court. See id. at 766.
908. Tenn. Code Ann. § 6442 (1917) (death penalty reinstated, electrocution); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-23-114 (1932) (current 1996).
909. 1836 Repub. Tex. Laws pp. 194-95 § 52 (An Act Punishing Crimes and Misdemean-
ors) (hanging).
910. 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws 51 § I (electrocution). The 1923 law did not apply to sentences
[1997]




1852-1897: firing squad, hanging, or beheading at the court's or
condemned's election 12
1898-1979: firing squad or hanging at the condemned's election;
court's choice if the condemned fails to choose a
method91s
1980-1982: firing squad 14
imposed prior to its effective date. Id, § 13. Representative T. K Irwin and Senator J.W.
Thomas authored the 1923 bill that switched Texas to the electric chair because they believed
that the chair was more humane than hanging. See id. § 14 (stating that hanging "frequently
creates great disturbance in the county"); Billy Porterfield, Electric Chair Has Seen Its Share of
Pain, Death, Am. Statesman (Austin Tex.), Oct 26, 1990, at BI (noting arguments that the
electric chair was more humane than hanging). The 1923 bill stated that "[tihe system [of
hanging] is antiquated and has been supplanted in many states by the more modem and hu-
mane system of electrocution." 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws 51 § 14.
911. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 138 § 1 (lethal injection); Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 43.14
(West 1977) (amended 1995) (current 1997). The 1977 law did not expressly indicate
retroactive operation. In Earvin v. Stat4 582 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state's use of lethal injection was not cruel and
unusual punishment, nor was it violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Se id. at 799. Indeed, sponsors of the state's lethal injection bill
were spurred by their belief that lethal injection was a far more humane method of execution
than electrocution. According to Ben Grant, one of the bill's sponsors, death by electrocution
is a "gruesome ritual," and the electric chair is "a barbaric torture device." Martin R. Gardner,
Executios and Indignitie-An Eighth Amndmet Assesment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Pun-
ishment 39 Ohio St. L J. 96, 126-27 n.228 (1978) (citation omitted). However, Texas is the
first state to have granted an evidentiary hearing on the constitutionality of lethal injection,
given the substantial amount of evidence suggesting that the state's procedure is cruel and
unusual. See generally Richardson Application, supra note 110 (concerning the evidentiary
hearing on the constitutionality of lethal injection in Texas held on April 28-30, 1997); see also
Kurt Anderson, A "More Palatable" Way of Killing Tune, Dec. 20, 1982, at 28 (noting that
"[t]echnicians, botching an injection, could accidentally inflict excruciating pain"); supra
notes 382-400 (emphasizing the particularly high risk of botched executions in Texas).
912. 1852 Utah Tern. Laws tit XII, pp. 142-43 §125 ("General Definition and Provision as
to Crimes and Offenses") (Mar. 6, 1852) (firing squad, hanging, or beheading at the court's
or condemned's election). Utah entered the Union on January 4, 1896. SN The World
Almanac, supra note 271, at 542. For a history of the development of Utah's execution
method laws, see Gillespie, supra note 195, at 11-107; Gardner, supra note 470, at 449-57. In
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Supreme Court held that, although the Utah
territory's legislature had made no provision for a method of execution in the 1876 Code,
which superseded the 1852 law, the petitioner could properly be sentenced to death by
shooting. Se id. at 132-37. It appears that Utah was the first state to give the condemned a
choice of method of execution. Allowing the choice has roots in the Mormon religious
doctrine of blood atonement. See Gillespie, supra note 195, at 12. Only through choosing a
method of execution that results in blood being shed can the condemned hope to receive
forgiveness in the next life. Id. SN supra notes 459-63 (discussing the current consequences of
the early Mormon belief in blood atonement).
913. Utah Rev. Stat. § 4939 (1898) (firing squad or hanging at the condemned's election;
court's choice if the condemned fails to choose a method). Only two men elected to be
hanged under the 1898 statute. Bowers, supfa note 274, at 13 n.h.
914. 1980 Utah Laws 15 § 2 (firing squad). The 1980 law did not expressly indicate
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1983-present: firing squad or lethal injection at the condemned's election;









1994-present: electrocution or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; lethal injection if the condemned fails to choose a
method 21
retroactive operation.
915. 1983 Utah Laws 112 § 1 (firing squad or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
lethal Injection if the condemned fails to choose a method); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5
(1953) (amended 1984) (current 1996). The 1983 law did not expressly indicate retroactive
operation.
916. Vt. Rev. Slat. 102 § 6 (1840) (hanging)
917. 1912 Vt. Acts & Resolves 97 § 6 (electrocution). The 1912 law did not apply to
offenses committed before its effective date. Id. § 8.
918. 1965 Vt. Acts & Resolves 30 § 1 (death penalty abolished, except for the murder of
police and prison employees or a second unrelated murder). Currently, there is still a partial
death penalty statute in Vermont. However, the statute applies only to the crime of treason,
sce Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3401 (1996), or, relatediy, crimes committed by three or more
people, acting In concert, in a time of war or of threatened war, see id. § 3484. Electrocution is
used when the death penalty is imposed. Id. § 7106.
919. Va. Code 198 § 4062 (1887) (hanging).
920. 1908 Va. Acts ch. 398 § 1 (electrocution). The 1908 law indicated no retroactive
operation. Id. § 8. Notably, Va. Code Ann. 196 § 4946 (1918), provided that, when the death
sentence had been Imposed for the offense of rape (or attempted rape), the body was not to
be delivered to the relatives of the condemned. According to Charles V. Carrington, M.D.,
Assistant Professor of Surgery, University College of Medicine, and Surgeon to the Virginia
Penitentiary, electrocution was "a great step forward" relative to the "sickening horrible" death
of hanging. Charles V. Carrington, The Hi.toy of Eletrocution in the State of Virginia, Va. Med.
Semi-Monthly 353, 353 (1910).
An electrocution ... is a swift, solemn, and withal humane way of inflicting the
death penalty. It is all over in about sixty to seventy seconds .... There is absolutely
no physical preparation necessary, or made, and I never knew a single one of the
thirty-odd rye seen electrocuted do a thing but meet death calmly and without
flinching. It is so quickly over, so swift in its every detail the subject does not have
time to weaken or wilt.
Id.
921. 1994 Va. Acts ch. 921 § I (electrocution or lethal injection at the condemned's
election; lethal injection if the condemned fails to choose a method); Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-
233 (Michle 1994) (current 1997). The 1994 law did not expressly indicate retroactive
operation. The legislature's decision to allow inmates a choice between electrocution and
lethal Injection was motivated by a number of botched electrocutions that had occurred in the
[1997]




1913-1918: no death penaltya
1919-1980: hangingee2
1981-1996: hanging, or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
hanging if the condemned fails to choose a method 9
1996-present lethal injection, or hanging at the condemned's election;





state, such as Derick Peterson's in 1991 and Wilbert Evans' in 1990. Se Eledic Chair On Its
Way Out As Va. Switches to Lethal Injection, Charleston Gazette, Mar. 5, 1994, at 2A. According
to State Delegate Philip Hamilton, a Republican sponsor of the bill, the lethal injection alter-
native allowed Virginia "to carry out the death penalty in a way that doesn't cause the state to
stoop to the level of the criminal." Id. As Senator Edgar S. Robb, who has witnessed an
execution, explained, "[e]lectrocution is a violent, tortous and dehumanizing act .... The
objective is death, not violent torture." Warren Fiske, E=ecutions, Va. Pilot and Ledger-Star,
Feb. 26, 1994, at DI. The majority of the state senators who were "[s]upporters said that lethal
injection would offer a more humane and less painful death than electrocution." Id.
Moreover, public opinion strongly upheld the bill. "Polls consistently have shown support for
lethal injection [in Virginia]." Peter Baker, Va. Assemby Adds Option for Fxecution, Wash. Post,
Feb. 26, 1994, atAl (citing Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research poll conducted in January,
1992, which found that 49% of Virginians favored changing to lethal injection, 21% opposed
the change, and the remainder said they did not know). Hamilton said that when he
witnessed the state's first execution by lethal injection, the experience "confirmed" his belief
that injection "was a less violent method" than electrocution, which he had also witnessed.
Peter Baker, Va. Caries Out Its 1st Exeution by Ldhal Injection, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1995, at DI;
see also Cody Lowe, Killer Dies by Needle, Roanoke Times & World News, Jan. 25, 1995, at Al
(discussing the execution of Dana Ray Edmonds, the first person in Virginia to be executed
by lethal injection).
922. Wash. Gen. Stat. Ann. XIII § 1352 (1891) (hanging).
923. 1913 Wash. Laws 167 § 1 (death penalty abolished).
924. 1919 Wash. Laws 112 § 1 (death penalty reinstated (hanging) subject to imposition by
special verdict of the jury).
925. 1981 Wash. Laws 138 § I (hanging, or lethal injection at the condemned's election;
hanging if the condemned fails to choose a method). The 1981 statute did not expressly
indicate retroactive operation. For an overview of Washington State's capital punishment law
(but not methods of execution) through the 1981 legislation, see generally Leonie G. Helig,
The Death Penalty in Washington'AnHiso lPerspective, 57 Wash. L Rev. 525 (1982).
926. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.180(1) (1981) (amended 1996) (current 1996) (lethal
injection, or hanging at the condemned's election; lethal injection if the condemned falls to
choose a method). See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text (discussing Washington
State's changes in execution methods).
927. 1899 W. Va. Acts pp. 12-13, ch. 2 (hanging).
928. 1949 W. Va. Acts pp. 163-67, ch. 37 (electrocution). The 1949 law did not apply to"capital punishment crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act." Id. at 163. In
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1965-present no death penalty9V
WISCONSIN (WI)
1839-1852: hangings





State v. Burdette, 63 S.E.2d 69 (W. Va. 1950), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
stated that "[I]t Is common knowledge that the purpose and intent of the Legislature of West
Virginia in enacting [electrocution as the method of execution] was to provide a more
humane and less cruel means for execution of death sentences." Id. at 85.
929. 1965 W. Va. Acts 40, art. 11 § 2 (death penalty abolished). The 1965 law expressly
Indicated retroactive operation. Id
930. 1839 Wis. Terr. Laws p. 379 § 9 ("An Act to provide for the punishment of offences
against the lives and persons of individuals") (hanging); 1849 Wis. Laws 150 § 9 (hanging). See
also Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Capital Punishment in Wisconsin and the Nation,
Informational Bulletin 90-1, 4 (Jan. 1990) (noting that the first codified laws of the territory
of Wisconsin provided in 1839 that the punishment for murder would be hanging).
931. 1853 Wis. Laws 103 § 1 (death penalty abolished). The state's abolishment of the
death penalty was spurred by the 1851 hanging of John McCaffary, whose execution was
witnessed by more than 1000 people. See Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, supra note
930, at 4. Although a number of attempts have been made to re-enact the death penalty in
Wisconsin, none has yet been successful. See id at 4-5; Matt Pommer, Lmaker Asks Return of
Death Penalty in State, Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Oct. 7, 1992, at 3A.
932. Wyo. Rev. Stat. 12 § 3334 (1887) (hanging).
933. 1935 Wyo. Sess. Laws 22 § 1 (lethal gas). The 1935 law did not apply to offenses
committed before its effective date. Id. § 2.
934. 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws 54 § 1 (lethal injection); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-904(a) (Michie
1984) (current 1997). The 1984 Act did not expressly indicate retroactive operation. In
Hopkinson v. State 798 P.2d 1186 (Wyo. 1990), the Supreme Court of Wyoming held, in a
single sentence citing authority, that lethal injection does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment. Id. at 1187.
(1997]
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